893.00/11–1045: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

1959. Dr. K. C. Wu informed us confidentially this morning that on October 80 Govt. made following six proposals in writing to Communists (sent to Dept; repeated to Moscow):

1.
Both sides to give orders to their troops to remain wherever they are and not attack other side.
2.
Communists to withdraw their troops from places along railways which they have been raiding and Govt. will undertake not to send troops to those places. These sections to be guarded entirely by railway police.
3.
A communication supervisory committee to be organized by People’s Political Council with members of PCC, as well as other disinterested representatives from various localities concerned to make inspection along railway lines and report their findings about the true situation.
4.
In case Govt finds it necessary to move troops along Peiping–Suiyuan railroad, Tatung–Puchow railroad, Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad, northern section of Pinghan railroad, eastern section of Lung-hai railroad, and northern section Tientsin–Pukow railroad, Govt will consult Communists first in order to reach agreement.
5.
Both sides should endeavor earnestly within one month to reach a fundamental arrangement about reorganization of Communist troops and allotment of places where they will be stationed.
[6.]
Proposed People’s Consultative Council should be convened at once.

(Dr. Wu said that everyone but Communists had already named their delegates to People’s Consultative Council, which consists of 8 Govt, 7 Communists, 13 third party, and 9 non-partisans, total of 37 members.)

Dr. Wu said Communists did not reply until November 8 when they made written communication in substance as follows:

1.
Military Council of National Govt to issue orders to Govt troops to cease attacking immediately.
2.
Govt to withdraw all its troops from “advanced occupied areas”.
3.
Govt to withdraw all troops from railways.
4.
Govt to guarantee no further attacks by Govt troops.

Dr. Wu commented that Communist communication said nothing at all about Govt’s six proposals; nothing about General Yeh Chien-ying coming to Chungking to take part in 3-man military committee to discuss military reorganization; and nothing about appointment of any Communist delegates to People’s Consultative Council. He remarked that Communist first point was one-sided in that it [Page 484] called only for Govt to issue orders to its troops; Govt had proposed that both sides issue such orders. He said Communist second point referred to “advanced occupied areas” which is extremely vague and not defined in any way. He said Communist third point merely referred to “railways”, also not defined and very general. Communist fourth point, he said, was in same tenor as their first point, as it called only for Govt action with no mention of Communist action.

Dr. Wu said Chou En-lai, in recent talk with foreign correspondents, suggested that a “civil war investigation committee”, which Communists preferred, be organized, and gave correspondents impression that this had been proposed to Govt. Dr. Wu said Communists had not mentioned this in their written communication. He said that, in order to counteract what he termed “this false propaganda war”, he would talk to foreign press this afternoon and tell them generally of Govt proposals and Communist communication. He said he would not give out definite texts, as Govt had agreed not to do so without Communist agreement, but, in view of Chou En-lai’s statements, he felt something must be done to correct false impression created by Chou.

Dr. Wu then went on to discuss situation in general. He said Communists obviously did not want to come to agreement with Govt, and he felt that Russians were back of whole matter. He commented on Russian bad faith, saying that Russians had guaranteed Chinese Govt troops land at Yingkow (Embassy’s 1900, October 3137) between November 5 and 10, but that when Govt troops arrived there November 7 they found that Russian troops previously stationed there had departed and Communists in control; Chinese Govt troops, therefore, did not land, as this would have endangered Americans.

Dr. Wu said Russians always contend that Communists in Manchuria are “civilians”, but these civilians seem to have plenty of arms, probably Japanese arms turned over to them by Russians or which Russians had allowed Japanese to turn over to them. Dr. Wu remarked that prior to Jap surrender it was widely known there were practically no Chinese Communists in Manchuria; he did not know how many Chinese Communists have gone to Manchuria since Jap surrender, but said there are large numbers of civilians recruited by Communists and armed as mentioned above. He believed many more Communists are now making their way to Manchuria from China. Dr. Wu seemed to feel that, while Russians may be retiring from Manchuria, they are clearly obstructing arrival of Govt troops and are leaving control to Communists, who would probably become a Russian puppet government.

Dr. Wu commented on great similarity of editorials now appearing in Communist papers in Yenan, Paris, Rome, London and New York, [Page 485] and said he felt sure they all originated in a central organization, probably some form of Third International which was theoretically abolished some time ago. He said these editorials all demanded immediate withdrawal of American troops from China, in order to avoid “democratic” interference in China, but he remarked they never said anything about Russian interference in China.

As Department is aware from Yenan broadcasts, present Communist line is that America is primarily responsible for civil war in China (see Embassy’s 1899, Oct. 31). They now seem to be centering their attack on General Wedemeyer, alleging that Wedemeyer’s press statements are contrary to those of President Truman. In recent call at Embassy, Wang Ping-nan, Communist, again expressed Communist feeling that U. S. is primarily to blame for civil strife.

It may be of interest to report that during call mentioned above, Wang Ping-nan commented that Russians had not turned over Jap arms to Communists, but had merely allowed any “resistance forces” in area to accept Jap surrenders and arms. He said Russians would withdraw from Manchuria on schedule. He expressed opinion that after Russian withdrawal from Manchuria all would be peaceful and a democratic government would be organized; he did not say who would organize that government.

Robertson
  1. Post, p. 1035.