761.9311/8–1645: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State

1365. Last night the Generalissimo2 told me that he received a cable from Dr. Soong3 in Moscow stating that the Sino-Soviet treaty4 was expected to be signed last Tuesday night. He stated that the news that the treaty had been signed was publicly broadcast but he had no official confirmation of that fact. He stated that Russia made some concessions toward meeting his conditions in regard to Port Arthur. He also said that for a time Russia declined to agree to establish boundary lines for Outer Mongolia. He stated that a satisfactory agreement had been reached in regard to the boundary. He discussed freely his attitude on all the terms of the treaty which I will not repeat to you here as the Department has been kept fully advised. He expressed himself as being generally satisfied with the treaty.

My reports, especially those rendered to President Roosevelt, will show that the Generalissimo has always doubted the Soviet’s position in regard to its relations with the Chinese Communists. Yesterday he thanked me for the basis that I had helped him to lay for rapprochement with the Soviet. He also expressed appreciation for the first time for the two visits I have made to Moscow on that subject. In fact he admitted that the Sino-Soviet treaty indicates (1) an intention on the part of the Soviet to assist in bringing about unification of the armed forces of China; (2) to support China’s efforts to create a strong, united, democratic government and (3) to support the National Government of China.

[Page 446]

After this conversation I suggested to the Generalissimo the advisability of sending an invitation to Mao Tze-tung, Chairman of the Communist Party of China, to confer with the Generalissimo in Chungking. The invitation has been sent. If Mao Tze-tung accepts the invitation, the armed conflict between the Communist Party of China and the National Government may be reduced to a political controversy. The logic of events would seem to indicate this result except for one factor and that is the question which I have raised definitely with the State Department and the War Department—whether Japan will be permitted to surrender any of her arms to the armed Communist Party in China?5 Unquestionably, as the record which I have sent you shows, the Communists desire to acquire Japanese arms to continue their position as a belligerent within China.

Chiang Kai-shek will now have an opportunity to show realistic and generous leadership. He will have an opportunity to show his qualifications for leadership of the Chinese people in peace as well as in war. I am with the Generalissimo frequently. I wish to assure you, however, Mr. Secretary, that while I am suggesting I am not assuming responsibility for his decisions. I insist continuously that the Chinese people must furnish their own leadership, make their own decisions and be responsible for their own policies.

  1. Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.
  2. T. V. Soong, President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier).
  3. Treaty of friendship and alliance, signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945; Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 585. For documentation, see pp. 851, ff.
  4. For documentation on this subject see pp. 492 ff.