FE Files, Lot 52–354
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Chase)
The Yenan radio summarized a military report by General Chu Teh to the recent Chinese Communist Party Congress, which constituted probably the most complete indictment of the Kuomintang’s conduct of the war yet published by the Communists. While bluntly restating all previous charges against the Kuomintang, Chu advanced no new ones; refrained from attacking the Generalissimo specifically; and emphasized the need for military unity in preparation for an imminent counteroffensive. The principal significance of his report seemed to lie in the constant assertion of the Communists’ increasingly popular and important role in the liberation of occupied China, and in the clearly implied warning that Allied forces must give the Communists treatment and cooperation commensurate therewith.
Tracing the course of the war, General Chu restated Communist charges that the Kuomintang reverted to reactionary policies and a passive attitude toward the war following the loss of Hankow in 1938; has been conniving with the Japanese; conducted operations [Page 389] against the Communists instead of cooperating with them in organizing popular guerrilla resistance; and has thereby been losing strategic areas to the Japanese on the “Kuomintang front”, while the Communists, with popular support, have been regaining extensive territories on the “liberated-area front”. According to Chu, the Kuomintang front has now become secondary to the liberated-area front from the standpoint of the coming counteroffensive.
By way of further explanation of the “new situation”, Chu contrasted in pungent terms: “the anti-popular, defeatist and solely defensive military line” of the “Kuomintang reactionaries”, which seeks to protect the interests of “big landlords, compradors and bankers”, relies on Gestapo methods, opposes reforms, abuses troops, depends on foreign military aid for a quick victory, and prepares for civil war; and the “Mao Tze-tung military line of the people’s war”, which seeks “the merging of the armed forces with the people”, “has confidence in the people’s strength”, develops willing effort and efficiency, needs but does not depend on outside help, and “strives for victory through reliance on its own strength”.
General Chu concluded his report with a statement of Communist military objectives, which included: the purging of “anti-popular elements and corrupt practices” from Chinese forces; the adoption of military and political lines “in harmony with the war of resistance and the people’s interests”; the abolishment of “unequal treatment to different troops”; the equitable distribution of “Allied supplies among the armies fighting at the front”; army democratization and recruiting and training reforms; expansion of the liberated areas; expansion and technical (including artillery) training of the “people’s armed forces”; organization of underground armies in Japanese-held cities; and establishment of close unity between the Communist forces, the Kuomintang armies and other Chinese forces in preparation for a “strategic change from anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare to anti-Japanese regular warfare during a counter-offensive”.
A distinct note of warning that the Communists will insist on recognition as a major participant in the final operations against the Japanese appeared to be conveyed in Chu’s culminating statements: “Anyone who ignores the greatest possible efforts of the liberated area battle-front will be sure to commit a very grave mistake. We want to unite with all friendly troops to defeat the Japanese aggressors.”