Memorandum by Mr. Everett F. Drumright of the Division of Chinese Affairs
It seems clear that Mao Tse-tung’s report “On the Coalition Government”25 merits our close study.[Page 366]
In this report, Mao continues the current Communist strategy which is to discredit the Kuomintang and, by contrast, to laud the achievements of his own regime. Pursuing the line of a despatch appearing recently in a Moscow newspaper, Mao even goes so far as to refer to the “scores of Mihailovichs in China”. Mao continues to advocate the formation of “a provisional government”. It appears to be Mao’s concept that such a “coalition government” would involve the inclusion of all parties and groups, none of which would have final responsibility.
Although the Communists have constantly urged the implementation of a “democratic program” and profess to have established such a “democratic coalition” system in areas under their control, Mao makes it very plain in his report that the Communists will completely dissociate themselves from the “National Assembly” which the Kuomintang proposes to convoke in November 1945. Mao describes the projected convocation of the National Assembly as a “mockery of democracy” (perhaps with a good deal of basis), asserting that it is the intent of the Kuomintang to enact an “anti-democratic constitution” and so maintain its “dictatorship”. Mao goes so far as to term the National Government “illegal”; he alleges (and perhaps correctly) that the projected constitutional government will be utilized to issue “punitive orders against anyone who disagrees[”] (presumably a reference to the Communists).
In lieu of the Kuomintang plan for the convocation of a National Assembly in November, Mao calls for the early formation of a “coalition government” to be followed after the war by a “National Assembly based on a broad democratic foundation …26 called (by) … a regular democratic government of a similar coalition nature …” He advocates the continuance after the war of a “coalition government … no matter whether the Communist Party is the majority or the minority in the National Assembly”.
To promote the setting up of a “coalition government”, Mao proposes that “a conference of people’s representatives in (all) of liberated China should be called in Yenan as soon as possible to discuss the unification of all liberated areas …”. In the event that Mao is unable to achieve his object of the formation of a “coalition government”, it is probable that the occasion of the proposed meeting at Yenan will be utilized to set up a wholly separate and independent regime in Communist-controlled areas.
Particularly worthy of attention from the point of view of the United States and Great Britain are Mao’s remarks that the “principal ruling cliques in the Kuomintang” (which incidentally includes [Page 367]the Generalissimo) “hope that the Allied Commanders in China (will) enact the role of General Scobie in Greece. They hail and welcome the slaughter committed by General Scobie and the reactionary Greek Government”. By “Allied Commanders in China”, Mao apparently has reference to General Wedemeyer and other American commanders. His reference to General Scobie and his activities in Greece is not likely to meet with a favorable reception in British quarters.
Mao’s report, as carried by FCC, further dims any hopes that may be held for the achievement of Chinese internal unity in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there may be read into his report a hint of defiance with respect to the policies being pursued by the United States in China. Certainly, Mao’s attitude, as reflected in his report, is not conducive to the harmonious settlement of the division between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.