893.00/4–3045

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State

No. 321

Sir: I have the honor to transmit a copy of a memorandum by Dr. John D. Sumner of the Embassy staff regarding the economic policies and views of the Chinese Communists. The memorandum has been prepared on the basis of available Communist publications, information in the Embassy’s files (much of it supplied by Mr. John S. Service), and conversations with other Americans who have visited Yenan. I likewise submit, following the summary of the memorandum, certain comment thereon.

Summary: While Chinese Communists generally adhere to Marxian ideology and believe in a socialistic state as an ultimate goal, they have expressed the belief that China will not be ready for socialism for many years to come.

Present policies of the Communist regime include regulation of rent and interest, government ownership along with private enterprise, the use of taxation as an instrument of economic policy, the fostering of cooperatives, some regulation of wages and hours of labor, and similar measures. Currency problems are of less importance due to the extensive use of barter.

Ideas of postwar economic policy have not crystallized. The expressed views of Communist leaders, however, include the gradual transfer of land ownership to peasants, the fostering of private enterprise along with state enterprise, a liberal attitude toward foreign investment and trade, regulation of wages and hours, and a nondiscriminatory policy toward the Japanese. The primary objective of industrialization is said to be that of raising the standard of living of the people, rather than of building a “national defense economy”. End of Summary.

To assist the Department in evaluating the enclosed report, I offer the following comments: In some parts of the memorandum, particularly that section which outlines the views which Communist leaders are reported to have expressed regarding postwar economic policy, it was necessary for Mr. Sumner, in the absence of other materials, to rely chiefly on statements of Mr. John S. Service, a Foreign Service Officer who was in Yenan during several months in 1944 and again in 1945, or on materials transmitted by him. As the Department is aware from Mr. Service’s reports from that post, he has shown himself to be very favorably disposed toward the Communists and also on occasion to be most unfriendly to the Nationalist Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It is my impression, which is amply supported by Mr. Service’s reports and despatches, that he cannot therefore be considered as an impartial observer, and I feel obliged to enter this caveat.

[Page 352]

(I refer for example to Mr. Service’s Secret report to General Stilwell dated October 10, 1944,20 the following headings from which appear typical of his point of view.

1.
“We are in no way dependent on the Kuomintang. We do not need it for military reasons.
2.
We need not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition.
3.
We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang Government.
4.
We need not support the Kuomintang for international political reasons.
5.
We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or democratic groups… ”)

In this connection I presume that Mr. Service’s opposition to the National Government of China is well exemplified by the reports already in the Department. My own directive was to prevent the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China, whereas, Mr. Service was apparently attempting to bring about the downfall of that Government. The second phase of my directive was to harmonize the relations between the American Embassy and the civil government of China. Mr. Service’s objective appears to have been to establish that type of relationship not with the National Government but with some other institution or party in China, obviously the Communist armed party in China. Consequently, I could not fulfill my mission and at the same time support the position taken by Mr. Service. My directive did not say in effect “prevent the collapse of the National Government of China and harmonize relations between the American and Chinese military establishments and the American and Chinese civil governments if you find the motives of the Kuomintang to be pure”. That would have given me an opportunity to agree with Mr. Service, My directive, however, was unequivocal “to prevent the collapse of the National Government and to harmonize the relations between that government and the American military and civil establishments in China.[”]21

At the same time I wish to emphasize that, despite my own belief in the general partiality of his most frequent source, I regard Mr. Sumner’s memorandum as an objective statement.

Respectfully yours,

Patrick J. Hurley
[Page 353]
[Enclosure—Extracts]

Memorandum by the Economic Adviser to the Embassy in China (Sumner)22

Economic Policies and Views of Chinese Communists

The purpose of this memorandum is to bring together certain information with respect to the economic policies pursued by Communist China, together with the views of Communist leaders as to future policies. Emphasis will be placed, not upon specific measures regarding production adopted as war expedients, but upon economic policy in the broader sense, including such questions as taxation, land ownership, control of rent and interest, the position of private enterprise and of foreign investment, and similar matters.

The sources employed in preparing this memorandum include translations of speeches and articles by Communist leaders, certain laws and resolutions of the “Border Region”, materials contained in despatches from members of the U. S. Army Observer Section in Yenan, and conversations of the writer with Americans who have visited the “Communist Capital” at Yenan. Information provided orally by Mr. John S. Service,* as well as information in despatches prepared by him, has been particularly useful.

General Economic Ideology

Chinese Communist party leaders have been asked why, in the interest of obtaining a more sympathetic foreign reaction, they do not abandon the name “communist”, particularly since their present policies do not constitute communism. The reply has been, “We believe in communism.”

This attitude has recently been relaxed, however, to the extent of using the romanization of the party name—“Kungchantang”—rather than its translated meaning, for purpose of foreign publicity.

The ideology of the Chinese Communists is Marxian.§ But it is also a pragmatic ideology which advocates the adaptation of economic [Page 354]policies to the stage of industrial and political development in which China finds herself today. Thus, Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Party, has written of necessary transitional periods in the development of China: “It is evident that if the present society of China is colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal in character, the process of China’s revolution must be divided into two steps. The first step is to change the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal form of society into an independent democratic society, while the second step is to push the revolution forward to establish a socialist society. What we are carrying on now is the first step of the Chinese revolution.” And again: “If it is impossible for us to travel the road of capitalism with a bourgeoisie dictatorship, would it be possible then for us to travel the road of socialism with a proletarian dictatorship? No, it is just as impossible.—The present task of China’s revolution is the task of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism.—Moreover, the period of the first step is by no means a short one. It is not a matter that can be achieved overnight. We are not Utopians. We cannot isolate ourselves from the actual conditions right before our eyes.”

Thus, Communist leaders argue that China has not yet reached a stage of development appropriate to the establishment of a socialist state, although such a state is their ultimate goal. Mr. Service was told that many years would elapse before a socialist state could be established. It was said that since China is 200 years behind other countries, she will not be ready for socialism until nearly all other countries have adopted it.**

Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan of the National government, has apparently accepted the interpretation expressed above. In an interview of November 15, 1944, with American Journalists, he is reported to have said in effect: “… the Communists are not foolish people. They know that they cannot attain Communism for a long time to come. They believe in orthodox Marxist theory as the ultimate goal, yes, but they know that China cannot jump from the present backward feudalism into a Communist Utopia overnight.… Trying to forestall Communism now, a generation before the problem arises, is childish and academic”.††

It is believed by the Communists, of course, that the world trend toward socialism will carry all before it. Thus Chairman Mao in his [Page 355] New Democracy refers to the Chinese revolution as part of the “proletarian-socialist revolution”, the “new world revolution”, and to world capitalism as having “clearly shown its symptoms of decadence”.‡‡ Moreover, while socialism is not recommended as an immediate step, it is emphasized that the Chinese state, in the transition before socialism is realized, must control capitalism in the protection of the people’s interest, and that China cannot “construct a capitalistic society of the European or American style”. Wrote Mao in sanguine terms: “Whoever dares act against this direction shall not be able to accomplish his work, and he himself shall find his head broken.”§§

While it is not the purpose of this memorandum to describe the attitude of the Chinese Communists with regard to political concepts such as “democracy” a passing reference to these matters seems necessary in view of the close relation between political and economic ideas and policies.

The Communists reiterate their belief in “democracy”. Chairman Mao, leader of the Party, is said to have quoted Mencius with approval: “First the people, then the State, then the Emperor.”║║ Communist literature is filled with references to efforts to enlist popular support, and to achieve an increasing degree of public participation in government affairs. Much is made of the “one to three” principle, under which representation in government should be one third Communist, one third Kuomintang, and one third from other groups. Some difficulty is experienced in following this policy, since there is reported to be a Kuomintang organization in only one of the Border Regions (Shansi–Hopei–Chahar) and its relation to the Kuomintang Party is obscure.¶¶ Available evidence suggests, however, that a real effort has been made to include non-Communist groups in government.* In part, this is due to a desire to unite all classes in the war against Japan and ensure political stability in areas dominated by the Communist Party. In part also, it doubtless reflects the frequently expressed belief of the Communists that longer range political and economic progress in China requires the institution of popular and democratic processes.

There is reference to certain democratic “freedoms” in various documents. For example, article 6 of the Administrative Program of [Page 356]the Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border Region contains the following: “Safeguard civil rights, political rights, property rights, and rights of freedom of speech, press, assembly, organization, belief, residence and movement of all anti-Japanese people, including landlords, capitalists, peasants, and workers, et cetera, …” This document was adopted in May, 1941, by the People’s Political Council of the Shen–Kan–Ning Border Region and is said to have become in effect an informal constitution. Similar policies are reported to have been adopted by the other Communist-controlled Border Governments in North and Central China.

While available evidence suggests strong democratic tendencies in the Chinese Communist Party, particularly when contrasted with current policies of the Kuomintang, a word of caution is necessary. It has been essential, as testified by Communist leaders themselves, to strive for popular support and unity in the areas “controlled” by the Party. The Party has been intelligent enough to recognize the democratic implications of this necessity, and to carry through popular government to an encouraging degree. At the same time, the several Border Governments are dominated by a well organized party, which seems to know what it wants, and how to accomplish its wishes. The people in its areas are predominantly rural, and largely illiterate. Opposing political opinion is unorganized and appears to be extremely weak.

In these circumstances, it may be argued that the Party’s professed belief in the various political freedoms which are associated in western countries, with democracy, has never been put to a serious test. One does not know the extent to which effective political opposition would be tolerated. In one reference to freedom of the press, Chairman Mao is said to have made an interesting reservation: He is quoted as having said that non-Party newspapers would be welcome in Yenan and that there would be no censorship (aside from military) so long as the principle of cooperation and unity were not violated.§ (Emphasis added.)

The above may be summarized by saying that the Chinese Communists appear to have made a real effort to institute a degree of popular participation in government which is in marked contrast to policies pursued elsewhere in China; that they profess a belief in [Page 357]“democracy”; but that it remains unclear to what extent democracy in the Anglo-American sense would be practiced under circumstances different from those now obtaining in the so-called Border Regions.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Views Regarding Postwar Economic Policy

In writing, or in conversation with Americans, Communist leaders have expressed a number of views with regard to desirable postwar economic policy. It would appear, however, that the Communists have not had an opportunity carefully to map out their policies in this regard. Partly for this reason, and partly because so much necessarily depends on other, and to them external, developments including American, Russian, and general international policy, what follows must be regarded as highly tentative.

1. Land ownership and rent control: Communist leaders in 1944 are reported to have said that land confiscation would not be practiced after the war, but that ownership by the peasants would be achieved gradually, and by the adoption of two types of measures. The first, including policies of rent and interest rate reduction, amelioration of taxes, cooperative cultivation and credit advanced through mutual aid societies, would increase the purchasing ability of tenant farmers. The second type of measure, including confiscation of lands of puppet officials, sale of public lands, and the increased willingness to sell of owners subject to rent and interest control, would increase the availability of land to tenant classes.

Communist leaders apparently intend to follow a policy of further gradual reductions in rent, partly as a means of inducing landlords to sell to tenants, and also to increase the volume of private investment in industry.

It is possible, however, that the earlier policy of confiscation may be resumed. In 1940, for example, Mao Tse-tung in his New Democracy stated that the new China “will adopt certain measures to confiscate the land of big landowners and distribute it to the peasants who are without land or have too little of it …”.** Mao more recently is reported to have predicted that civil war would probably bring outright confiscation,††

2. Industrialization and Economic Planning: Mao Tse-tung is reported to have said that three forms of industrialization, which, as he pointed out, were mentioned in the manifesto of the First Kuomintang [Page 358]Congress, will develop in postwar China. These forms are state enterprises, large scale private enterprises, and handicraft industries. Cooperatives will be necessary in rural and distant areas.‡‡

Whereas leaders of the Central Government have stressed the development of “heavy industries” largely for reasons of national defense, Communist leaders are reported to take a different view: The first thing to do is to raise the standard of living of the people. After that can come the “national defense” industry that Chiang talks about in his China’s Destiny.§§ Moreover, China is not naturally equipped to develop a “heavy industry” economy. There will be no more war; there is no further reason for war. To assume the possibility of war is to create that possibility. Criticism is also expressed of allegedly imperialistic tendencies in the Kuomintang leadership.║║

There exists a vaguely expressed belief in “economic planning”. Certainly, the Communists would engage in planning in the sense of setting certain objectives and implementing their attainment by deliberate and planned policies. It is not clear, however, to what extent an overall “blueprint” would be formulated closely to govern the development of different kinds of production, including its geographical location.¶¶ In this connection, Mr. Service informed the writer that laissez faire ideas are prevalent to a considerable extent. For example, he found it argued that the geographical location of industry should be allowed to develop naturally, the government influencing that development largely through the improvement of transportation and communication rather than through direct control.*

3. Government Ownership: The Government should own “natural monopolies” such as public utilities and railroads. This category does not, however, include petroleum, or the so-called “heavy industries”.

Opposition to “bureaucratic capitalism”, especially joint government-private enterprises, is expressed on the ground that such enterprises would be inefficient and would discourage private enterprise and [Page 359]initiative. The extensive use of government ownership is opposed in the belief that it would prove inefficient, corrupt, discouraging to initiative and hence would not be suited to this stage of China’s development.

Chairman Mao is reported in an interview to have predicted that in large cities there would be some government enterprise, and large scale private enterprise. He is said to have asserted that Communist proposals to the Kuomintang have included a recommendation that private capital be welcomed, and that present Kuomintang controls be relaxed so that private capital could flourish.§

The above views seem compatible with the ideological position taken by Mao Tse-tung, and referred to earlier in this discussion. At the same time, their emphasis on the limitations to State activity at this stage is more marked than any statements in Mao’s New Democracy. In the latter, it is stated merely that “The economy of China must travel the road of ‘restriction of capital’ … , and should never be monopolized by a minority of the people”.

4. Trade Policy: Little information is available regarding attitudes toward foreign trade policy. Party leader Mao Tse-tung, however, is reported to have said that Chinese Communists wish to substitute the principle of free trade between nations for the Japanese principle of colonization of China. Whether this comment had reference only to a policy of non-discrimination in trade, or implied also a belief in low tariffs or “free trade”, is not clear.

5. Foreign Investment: ** Foreign investment is necessary. China cannot provide her own capital and is too poor to force a reduction in living standards, as was done by Soviet Russia. It is recognized, however, that such investment will not occur unless there is assurance of an opportunity to amortize investments, as well as to profit therefrom. Consequently, the State should either guarantee a long period, say 30 years, in which ownership and opportunity to amortize would be [Page 360]undisturbed, or guarantee public purchase if government policy should change, or both.

Communists told Mr. Service that it was planned to use tax exemption and tariff manipulation to encourage foreign investment. Profits should not be limited since high profits would benefit China by inducing increased investment.

The United States is referred to as the best source of capital and production experience. It is argued that Britain tends to tie strings to its investments, while Russia’s own needs preclude her assistance.

6. The Future Economic Position and Policies of Japan: The general attitude of Communist leaders, as reportedly expressed by Po Ku†† (member of the Polit Bureau and head of public information), is extremely “liberal”: Japan must be given an opportunity for peaceful commercial development and should have access to markets and raw materials. She cannot live entirely within her own islands. Japanese should be welcome in the industrialization of China and should not be discriminated against. They should be given the same opportunities as are afforded other foreigners so long as they do not work against China’s interests.

Communism is as impractical in the near future in Japan as it is in China. Japan must progress, for a long time to come, on the basis of democratic capitalism. Accordingly, Chinese Communists abjure such slogans as “down with the capitalists”. Power, however, must be prevented from entering in the hands of the few large capitalistic families, who were the willing allies of the militarists.

The postwar economic policies advocated by Japanese Communists, as reported to American observers in Yenan by Okano Susumu, are said to resemble the views expressed by Chinese Communists and described in this memorandum. A rather detailed program of the Japanese Communist Party, obtained from Okano, calls for a gradual evolution toward socialism, following an initial period of democratic capitalism.‡‡ (Okano Susumu was a member of the Presidium of the Comintern in Moscow, and reached Yenan in 1943. He is said to be regarded in Yenan as the representative of the Japanese Communist Party.)

In the opinion of Mr. John Emmerson, Foreign Service Officer attached to the U. S. Army Observer Section in Yenan in 1944, the Communist Party in Japan has maintained a small underground organization [Page 361]during the war, and is a factor of considerable potential significance in the post-war situation in that country.§§

Summary

Judged by the expressed views of her principal leaders, Communist China regards a socialistic state as a goal, to be realized in the rather distant future. That goal is to be achieved through evolution, and prior to its accomplishment China must first reach a much higher level of economic and political development than she now possesses. For a considerable period of time China must employ a system of “democratic capitalism”.

Present policies include certain comparatively mild (by western standards) measures of control, including limitations of rent and interest, progressive taxation, the use of tax or other subsidies to aid immigration and desired types of production, and the control of interest rates. Cooperatives are fostered, although earlier methods of compulsion allegedly are being abandoned. Membership in labor unions is encouraged but is not required. Hours of work are limited to ten, and there appears to be compulsory arbitration of wage disputes.

The present policies of Communist China, except as they indicate a willingness to pursue a policy of gradualism, may not be of too great significance in judging the future plans of its leadership. The immediate concern is organization for war in a primitive community, and gaining the support of the people in areas not previously ruled by the Communists. The Regime controls no areas of considerable commercial or industrial importance, and so has not been faced in marked degree by certain economic complexities that can be expected to arise subsequently, if its jurisdiction continues to expand.

With regard to policies for the immediate postwar period, Communist leaders apparently intend to rely rather heavily on private enterprise. Industrialization is said to be viewed as a means of raising the standard of living of the people, rather than of building a defense economy. They stress the necessity of foreign investment to aid in raising the standard of living of a non-militaristic China. While leaders express a belief in economic planning, ideas in this respect are not clearly formulated. Certain views attributed to them appear to be more favorable to private enterprise than those expressed currently by Kuomintang leadership.

The reported views of the Chinese Communist with regard to the treatment that should be accorded Japan are extremely liberal. They profess to be ready to welcome the Japanese on equal terms with other foreigners in effecting the future economic development of China.

  1. Report No. 40 from Yenan by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Service), transmitted to the Department as enclosure to despatch No. 3174, November 22, from the Chargé in China (Atcheson); Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 707.
  2. In a memorandum of June 1 to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine), the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent), discussing Ambassador Hurley’s comments on Mr. Service in this despatch, concluded:

    “Mr. Service has proved to the entire satisfaction of CA that he is an exceptionally competent and useful observer and reporting officer. (Incidentally, Ambassador Gauss has spoken highly of his ability in this respect). Furthermore, a careful comparison of his reports with those of other American and foreign (non-Chinese) observers who have visited Chinese Communist areas reveals substantial agreement with the majority of them, with respect both to facts and to general appraisal thereof.”

  3. Footnotes throughout this document are in the original.
  4. Mr. Service was in Yenan in the summer and autumn of 1944, and for several weeks in the spring of 1945, as a member of the U. S. Army Observer Section.
  5. Oral statement of Mr. Service to the writer.
  6. See Embassy despatch no. 3043, October 9, 1944. [Not printed.]
  7. The Communists stress the catholicity of their intellectual background. Thus, Mao Tse-tung, in an interview with Maurice Votaw (American employee of the Kuomintang Ministry of Information) July 18, 1944, is said to have stated that the Chinese Communist Party has accepted Leninism from Russia, Marxism from Germany, 18th Century French philosophy, Feuerbach’s materialism, and the democracy exemplified by Washington and Lincoln. See Report no. 3, U. S. Army Observer Section, July 30, 1944, enclosure to Embassy’s despatch no. 2923, September 1, 1944. [For despatch No. 2923, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 536.]
  8. New Democracy, by Mao Tse-tung, a pamphlet originally appearing as “The Politics and Culture of New Democracy” in the magazine Chinese Culture, Jan. 15, 1940, section IV.
  9. Ibid., section VIII.
  10. Oral statement to the writer, February, 1945.
  11. From notes of an interview of Mrs. Jacoby and Mr. White, with Dr. Sun Fo, Embassy files, Chungking. [Omissions indicated in the original memorandum.]
  12. Section IV.
  13. Ibid., section VI. It may well be, however, that Mao does not realize the degree of state intervention in the European and American economies.
  14. Interview with Maurice Votaw, cited above.
  15. U. S. Army Observer Section, report no. 26, Sept. 10, 1944, enclosed with Embassy’s despatch no. 3022, Sept. 27 [29], 1944. [For cited documents, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, pp. 622 and 623.]
  16. In a Communist pamphlet, The Liberated Regions of China Behind the Enemy Lines, vol. 1, March, 1945, p. 32, it is stated that the meeting of the Congress of the Provisional Peoples Council of the Shensi-Suiyuan Border Region in October, 1942, included 145 councilors of whom only 47 were Communists.
  17. Enclosure to report no. 47, U. S. Army Observer Section, October 17, 1944. [Not found in Department files.]
  18. Lin Tsu-huan, Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, estimates illiteracy at 90 percent. “Report to the Border Region Peoples’ Congress”, Dec. 5, 1944, in Our Task in 1945, p. 23.
  19. Interview with Guenther Stein, July 14, 1944, as reported in U. S. Army Observer Section report no. 3, July 30, 1944, enclosed with Embassy despatch no. 2923, September 1, 1944. [For despatch no. 2923 see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 536.]
  20. It may be, of course, that Communist leaders have been influenced to some extent by a desire to “make a good impression” on Americans. Certainly, the presence of Americans in Yenan has encouraged them to consider and to express themselves on postwar matters.
  21. Based largely on oral statements of John S. Service to the writer.
  22. Section VI.
  23. Interview with Guenther Stein, July 14, 1944. cited above.
  24. Interview of Guenther Stein with Mao Tse-tung, cited above.
  25. Statement of Mao Tse-tung to John S. Service, reported in U. S. Army Observer Section report no. 15, August 27, 1944; enclosed with Embassy’s despatch no. 3018, September 28, 1944. [For cited documents, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, pp. 599 and 602.]
  26. General attitudes of principal Communist leaders as expressed to the writer by John S. Service.
  27. Theodore White, American correspondent who spent two to three weeks in Yenan in 1944, told the writer that in his opinion the Communists would formulate a highly detailed economic plan, and make it work, once they had the necessary technical personnel and information. He advanced no evidence, however, to support his opinion.
  28. The Supreme Nat! Defense Council (Kuomintang) in its recent statement of “General Principles on Economic Enterprises During the First Period of Reconstruction” would control economic development including industry location by formulating a “General Plan for Reconstruction”. See Embassy’s despatch no. 53, Jan. 3, 1945, p. 1332.
  29. Based on statements of John S. Service to the writer.
  30. Compare the position recently taken by the Kuomintang (Supreme National Defense Council) which, in a statement of “General Principles on Economic Enterprises During the First Period of Reconstruction”, has proposed the establishment of joint enterprises of the Government and either domestic or foreign private capital.
  31. Based on statements of John S. Service to the writer.
  32. Interview with Maurice Votaw, cited above.
  33. New Democracy, section VI, “Economy of New Democracy.” The phrase “restriction (or regulation) of capital” is that of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the San Min Chu I. Dr. Sun advocates extensive state ownership. It is not clear to what extent, in endorsing the teachings of San Min Chu I, Communist leaders would modify its economic doctrines. Problems of interpretation of elastic phrases make it impossible, in the absence of more precise statements, to be at all certain as to just how far it is intended to go in endorsing the use of private ownership in the initial postwar development of China.
  34. Interview with Guenther Stein, cited above.
  35. Based chiefly on statements of John S. Service to the writer.
  36. John S. Service’s memorandum of conversation, Sept. 12, 1944, transmitted with Embassy despatch no. 3092, Oct. 25, 1944. [Despatch not printed: for the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 586.]
  37. See U. S. Army Observer Section report no. 24, Sept. 8, 1944, an enclosure to Embassy despatch no. 3021, Sept. 29, 1944. [Neither printed.]
  38. A despatch dated January 5, 1945. Sent to the Department by Emmerson from New Delhi. [Not found in Department files.]