120.1/12–745
The Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent) to the Ambassador in China (Hurley), Temporarily in the United States
Dear General: There is attached a digest88 made by Julian Friedman89 of the various Communist-Kuomintang proposals beginning with the Communists’ five points. They may prove useful to you in your forthcoming conversations.
Today in our talk about Russia there was some mention of the old adage about not putting all your cards on the table. Sometimes I think as democrats—not gamblers—we carry this poker analogy a little too far in our thinking on diplomatic negotiations. The analogy may have been all right in the days when diplomats reported only to kings and kings reported only to God but in a democracy when the body politic is putting up the stakes and wants to know the size and color of the hole card it is not so easy. The other day you said that you were moving more and more toward a belief in the Wilsonian doctrine of “open covenants openly arrived at”—and I think you are moving in the right direction (I don’t think you had far to move!).
The pertinency of these comments to your conversations in Moscow is this: I believe we have the Russians cold with the cards we have showing; all we have to do is shove them out in the middle of the table; we do not have to worry about the hole card (whatever it is).
Owen Lattimore,90 in his book, Solution in Asia, says: “The question is not what Russia is going to do, but what we are going to do. Russia will act only when we have sufficiently revealed the direction in which we are going, and she will be able to act with equal decisiveness whether we show that we are moving by choice or merely by drift.”
I believe if we assert firmly and with conviction the policy we intend to follow in China we have a good betting chance of gaining Russian agreement.
We want Chinese military unity now for more effective prosecution of the war against Japan; and we want China united territorially and politically in the post-war period so that she can in cooperation with us and the Russians make her contribution toward security and well-being in the Far East. The Russians can understand this; and they can understand the obverse: disunity in China will surely lead to dissension and threaten conflict among the Pacific Powers.
What I have said above and shall say below is not advice—it is [Page 324] not even new to you; it is simply my thinking on the problem of conversations in Moscow.
The Russians no doubt are fully informed of every step in the Communist-Kuomintang negotiations. They know not only of the original Communist five points but they also know that you approved those points. It might therefore be well to state frankly that we desire to obtain from Chiang agreement to those points unmodified in principle and as little modified as possible in detail.
Chiang, as you have said, does not move until he is forced to do so. His prejudice against the Communists is deep-seated and any concessions he makes will be on the basis of expediency—not conviction. The task therefore is to convince him of the expediency of agreement with the Communists without endeavoring to “convert” him. Your argument is good that military unity is worth any degree of political concession. As a corollary to that argument I think it well to point out to him our belief that lacking political unity, an attempt at military unity by force of arms may prove disastrous and will certainly receive no support from us.
I am in agreement with your belief—directive—that Chiang’s leadership should be supported and the National Government prevented from collapse—but I have been somewhat concerned over the use Chiang can make of his knowledge of this situation. I was therefore encouraged by your comment to the President (you told me of it) that Chiang might think you were going to create an “international incident” (the President had said he was not afraid of your creating such an incident) before you got through with him. Chiang will yield only to firm and consistent pressure—but he will yield—and he and his Government will not collapse in the yielding.
The Communists also require firm and consistent pressure. We have no apparent means of exerting such pressure effectively. The Russians do, if not directly, by indirection. Articles such as that appearing recently in the Red Star (copy of telegraphic report attached91) are illustrative of indirect pressure—in this case on the Kuomintang. I would call this article to the attention of the Russians, not to argue with its statements but to point out that it has calculated influence and that subsequent articles might be so directed as to serve a very useful purpose in furthering your efforts to bring about unity in China along lines beneficial to Russia as well as to us all. It is useless to bring Chiang around to “coalition” if you can’t count on the Communists and you can’t count on the Communists unless you can count on Russia. There may be other ways, more direct than press comment, in which Russia can implement its professed desire for unity in China and good relations with China. The conversations will [Page 325] probably make it apparent to you how far you can go in making suggestions.
As I told you today, I still believe, in spite of the reports on Rumania and Poland, that we can reach an understanding with Russia in regard to China on which we can rely. To reach such an understanding, it is essential that we make clear our interests, that our interests be real—not theoretical or sentimental, and that Russia be convinced of our determination to support our interests fully but not in a manner antagonistic to Russia.
I believe you can make this clear in Moscow. Good luck.