893.00/3–2445
Proposed Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 79
Subject: Effect of Developments in China on U.S.–U.S.S.R. Relations.
The trend of developments in China is a cause of grave concern to us.
The Russian press has recently become increasingly critical of Chinese Government leadership. The Red Star on March 13 accuses the reactionary elements in the Chinese Government of preventing acceptance of the Chinese Communist proposals for creation of democratic government.
A recent official report from Yenan states that the Communist Party is considering the establishment of a “Federal Council of Democratic Liberated Areas” and that conflicts between the Kuomintang and the Communist forces are widespread. Recent reports from military sources indicate that the Chinese Communist forces north of Shanghai are penetrating into areas along the China coast south of Shanghai.
Efforts to bring about an agreement between the National Government and the Communists are prejudiced by Chiang Kai-shek’s statement of March 180 that the Kuomintang cannot relinquish its “power of ultimate decision and final responsibility” and that “it definitely cannot abdicate to a loose combination of (political) parties”; and by the Communists’ unrestrained criticism of Chiang’s statement and their refusal to participate in the Government in any manner subordinate to the Kuomintang.
Chinese political and military unity is important (1) for more effective prosecution of the war, (2) for post-war stability in the Far East, and (3) for avoidance of a source of future friction between the United States and Russia.
Ambassador Hurley has worked unflaggingly to bring about Chinese unity. In his telegram of February 1881 to the Department, Ambassador Hurley stated that: “Perhaps …82 my visit with the State Department will clarify my mind on the distance I will be able to go [Page 306] in promotion of the war effort by inducing or compelling the unification of Chinese armed forces and a coordination of effort to assist in the defeat of Japan”.
The attitude of the U. S. S. R. is a primary factor in determining the distance to which we could go in “inducing or compelling the unification of Chinese armed forces”. Russian entrance into the war in the Far East would make the problem acute. At present the U. S. S. R. officially is following a “hands off” policy with regard to Chinese internal policy. The Russian press however, as noted above, is outspoken in its criticism of the Kuomintang and in its support of the Communists.
Measures to “compel” unity would call for a different approach from that hitherto used. We might be able to use some degree of compulsion on Chiang to reach an agreement with the Communists but we have no apparent means of using compulsion to cause the Communists to reach an agreement with Chiang. Any steps we might take to compel Chiang to reach an agreement should be predicated on a clear understanding that the Communists would abide by reasonable terms for cooperation in the Government.
It is desirable that there should be an equally clear understanding that the U. S. S. R. would refrain from courses which would be prejudicial to our effort to bring about unity in China and that it would support our efforts. In view of the very great American interest in China and the Far East it is especially important that there should be such an understanding if a serious source of discord is to be avoided.
- Drafted on March 24 by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent) and the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine and Stanton) for Acting Secretary Grew to present to President Roosevelt as a follow-up to a conversation Ambassador Hurley was scheduled to have with the President that day regarding the Russian angle to the situation in China. No record of this conversation has been found in Department files; notation on ribbon copy of memorandum: “Not sent”. President Roosevelt by March 27 had left for Warm Springs, Georgia.↩
- See telegram No. 343, March 2, from the Chargé in China, p. 254.↩
- Telegram No. 242, p. 223.↩
- Omission indicated in the original memorandum.↩