Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

893.00/3–745

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine)³⁶

[Washington,] March 7, 1945.

There is attached a memorandum of conversation with Ambassador Hurley dated March 5, 1945,³⁷ in regard to Chungking’s telegram no. 324 of February 28. A copy of the telegram is also attached.

So far as we can determine, there is no difference of view between Ambassador Hurley and us (or Mr. Atcheson) as to the objective of our policy in China.

Our short-term objective is to bring about a mobilization of all of China’s human and material resources for prosecution of the war against Japan. Our long-term objective is the development of a China which will be capable of contributing to security and prosperity in the Far East.

We have believed that political and military unity in China was the most effective means of achieving these objectives. A united, progressively democratic, and cooperative China we view as indispensable to the achievement of the long-term objective. Unity in China of political and military forces would, without doubt, be the most effective means of achieving the short-term objective; but if this means should fail, a contingency for which we should be prepared, the importance of utilizing all available resources to defeat Japan makes it imperative that we seek other means for achieving our objective. One alternative means might be military unity under an over-all American command. A less preferable, but possible, means would be giving aid to all military forces in China, irrespective of their political affiliations, capable and willing to cooperate with us in the fight against Japan. This would mean giving aid to elements of the Chinese Communist armies.

The following paragraph is quoted from our memorandum of January 29 addressed to the Acting Secretary:³⁸

“We would like to see the rearmament, to such extent as may be practicable, of all Chinese forces willing to fight the Japanese, but the present unsatisfactory relations between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists makes it impolitic to undertake measures for the rearmament of the Chinese Communists even though it is generally conceded that they could effectively use quantities of small arms ammunition and demolition materials. However, if operations are undertaken along the China coast it is suggested that our military authorities should be prepared to arm any Chinese forces which they believe can be effectively employed against the Japanese, and that they should at an opportune time so advise the Chinese military authorities.”

Mr. Atcheson has, in his telegram no. 324 of February 28, made the following recommendation:

“Predicated on the assumption that the military necessity exists, the first step we propose for consideration is that the President inform the Generalissimo in definite terms that military necessity requires that we supply and cooperate with the Communists and other suitable groups who can assist the war against Japan …³⁹ and that we are taking direct steps to accomplish this end. We can assure the Generalissimo that we are not contemplating reducing our aid to the Central Government … We may include in the statement that we will keep the Central Government informed of the extent and types of such aid.”

Mr. Atcheson prefaces the foregoing recommendation with a statement of the view that the achievement of military and political unity in China in the near future is most unlikely.

As we understand it, General Hurley is seriously concerned that the supplying of any military equipment to the Communists would (1) constitute recognition of their “belligerent” status vis-à-vis the National Government and (2) result in the speedy overthrow of the National Government. With regard to the first point in our opinion no question arises of recognition of a separate “belligerent status”. It is our considered opinion that the assistance given to the Communists and other suitable groups should be limited strictly to the furnishing of such military equipment as our military authorities believe could be effectively used against the Japanese and that there is involved no question of the conclusion of any formal agreement or the taking of any steps which would constitute in any sense recognition of belligerency on the part of the Communists or other groups. Furthermore, attention is called to the fact that we would continue to recognize the National Government, to supply arms and military equipment in increasing quantities to that Government and to give it support in other ways. As to the second point, we are of the opinion that in view of the extensive arming and training of National Government troops which is now being undertaken by our military and the relatively small amount of light equipment which it is understood our military would supply to the Communists for purposes of engaging in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese, there is no danger of the military strength of the Communists being sufficiently augmented to effect the overthrow of the National Government by force of arms. Nor do we believe that aid to the Communist forces would encourage and fortify political opposition to the National Government to an extent which would create a serious risk of its downfall.

In our estimation, a statement to the Generalissimo that, with a view to expediting operations against the Japanese in the Far East, our military authorities may give limited quantities of military equipment to the Communists or any other Chinese group which in their opinion would effectively use such equipment in carrying on guerrilla warfare against the Japanese, would:

(1) Aid in the prosecution of the war against Japan.

(2) Stimulate the Generalissimo

(a) To reach an agreement with the Communists

(b) To carry out reforms in the government and his military forces

(c) To accelerate plans to institute a constitutional government.

Mr. Atcheson’s plan was proposed as a method for dealing with a deadlock. If there should be no deadlock and if an agreement is reached between Chiang and the Communists, which Ambassador Hurley feels confident will be achieved by the end of April, then the question of adopting any alternative plans, including that of Mr. Atcheson, does not arise.

J[oseph] W. B[allantine]

36. This memorandum was drafted in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and sent to Assistant Secretary of State Dunn. It was initialed by the Deputy Director of the Office (Stanton) and by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent) in addition to Mr. Ballantine.
37. No record found in Department files, but see memorandum of March 6 by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, supra.
38. Ante, p. 37.
39. Omissions indicated in the original memorandum.