Nanking Embassy Files–Lot F–73
Memorandum by Messrs. John S. Service and Raymond P. Ludden to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater (Wedemeyer)
American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of American lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations should be subordinate.
The attainment of this objective demands the effective mobilization of China in the war against Japan. Operating as we are in a land theater at the end of a supply line many thousands of miles in length, the human and economic resources of China increase in importance as we draw closer to Japan’s inner zone of defense. Denied the effective use of these resources the attainment of our primary objective will be unnecessarily delayed.
There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang Government the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation in power. China’s military failure is due in large part to internal political disunity and the Kuomintang’s desire to conserve such military force as it has for utilization in the maintenance of its political power. The intention of the Generalissimo to eliminate all political opposition, by force of arms if necessary, has not been abandoned. In the present situation in China, where power or self-preservation depend upon the possession of military force, neither the Kuomintang nor opposition groups are willing to expend their military resources against the Japanese through fear that it will weaken them vis-à-vis other groups. A recent instance is the lack of resistance to the Japanese capture of the southern section of the Hankow–Canton railway. Equally, the Kuomintang is jealously intent on preventing the strengthening of other groups: witness the blockade of the Communists.
The aim of American policy as indicated clearly by official statements in the United States is the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable preliminary to China’s effective military mobilization. The execution of our policy has not contributed to the achievement of this publicly stated aim. On the contrary, it has retarded its achievement. It has had this undesired and undesirable effect because our statements and actions in China have convinced the Kuomintang Government that we will continue to support it and it alone. The Kuomintang Government believes that it will receive an increasing flow of American military and related supplies which, if past experience is any guide, it will commit against the enemy only with great reluctance, if at all.
[Page 217]We cannot hope for any improvement in this situation unless we understand the objectives of the Kuomintang Government and throw our considerable influence upon it in the direction of internal unity. We should be convinced by this time that the effort to solve the Kuomintang–Communist differences by diplomatic means has failed; we should not be deceived by any “face-saving” formula resulting from the discussions because neither side is willing to bear the onus of failure. We should also realize that no Government can survive in China without American support.
There are in China important elements interested in governmental reform by which unity and active prosecution of the war may result. Aside from the Chinese Communists, however, all of these elements are cowed by a widespread secret police system and lack any firm rallying point. They will remain helpless to do anything constructive as long as statements of our policy indicate that we are champions of the status quo.
At present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill’s declaration of support for Marshal Tito.82 That statement was as follows:
“The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological preferences for one side or the other.”
A similar public statement issued by the Commander-in-Chief with regard to China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary and unwise. It would serve notice, however, of our preparation to make use of all available means to achieve our primary objective. It would supply for all Chinese a firm rallying point which has thus far been lacking. The internal effect in China would be so profound that the Generalissimo would be forced to make concessions of power and permit united front coalition. The present opposition groups, no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding themselves, would be won wholeheartedly to our side and we would have in China, for the first time, a united ally.
Whether we like it or not, by our very presence here we have become a force in the internal politics of China and that force should be used to accomplish our primary mission.… The Communist movement is merely the most prominent manifestation of a condition which is potentially present throughout China. Other important groups [Page 218] favor the same program as that espoused by the so-called “Communist”—agrarian reform, civil rights, the establishment of democratic institutions—but the Communists are the only group at present having the organization and strength openly to foster such “revolutionary” ideas.
Our objective is clear, but in China we have been jockeyed into a position from which we have only one approach to the objective. Support of the Generalissimo is desirable in so far as there is concrete evidence that he is willing and able to marshal the full strength of China against Japan. Support of the Generalissimo is but one means to an end; it is not an end in itself, but by present statements of policy we show a tendency to confuse the means with the end. There should be an immediate adjustment of our position in order that flexibility of approach to our primary objective may be restored.
- Raymond P. Ludden
- John S. Service
- Josip Broz, Secretary-General of the Yugoslav Communist Party and Chairman of the Communist Yugoslav National Committee of Liberation.↩