Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

893.00/2–745: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State ⁶⁸

Chungking, February 7, 1945—8 a.m.
[Received February 12—6:45 p.m.]

180. ReEmbstel 141, January 31, 6 p.m. Part 2. As stated in Part 1, General Chou returned to Yenan without having made any notable progress in his negotiations with the Government. In the meantime, I continuously discussed the relations between the Communist Party of China and the Government of China with the Generalissimo, and with T. V. Soong, Wang Shih-chieh and General Chang Chih-chung. Dr. Soong had now become at least an ex-officio member of the National Committee on negotiations with the Communists. I was often with the Generalissimo both in Chungking and in his residence in the hills across the Yangtze from Chungking. I finally convinced the Generalissimo that we could not expect a unified military force in China nor could he expect a strong, free, united, democratic China to emerge from the war without having achieved a settlement with the Communist Party. I convinced the Generalissimo that it would be necessary for him to make political concessions in order to obtain control of the unified forces of China. He began making concessions. The first was certain changes in the personnel of his Cabinet which resulted in better relations between the Chinese Government, the Chinese military establishment, the American military establishment and Embassy. The criticism of this action by the Communists, by American publicists and by others was that Chiang had not gone far enough. This criticism is, of course, correct, but those of us closest to the situation realized that he had gone a long way and would go further.

In my telegram to the President dated January 14, 1945, I outlined the concessions which the Generalissimo, the Kuomintang and the National Government were prepared to make in the Communist controversy. The concessions which the Generalissimo was ready to make are roughly as follows:

(1) Representation of Communists in the Government;

(2) Formation of a war cabinet with inclusion of Communists and other non-Kuomintang members (coalition war cabinet in fact but not in name[)];

(3) Establishment of a committee of 3 composed of a representative of the Government, Communist representative and a U.S. army officer to work out details of re-incorporating the Communist troops in the national army;

(4) An American Army officer to have overall command of the Communist troops (I could not agree to this point without direction from my Government and so stated; nevertheless, it was included as both parties desired it);

(5) Recognition of the Communists as a legal political party; and

(6) Convening of a National Congress before the end of the war, promised by Chiang in his New Year’s message.

I have pointed out to the Generalissimo that his approach to this subject has one weakness: In my opinion he is making the concession which the Communists desire and he is not receiving the quid pro quo, namely, submission of the Communist Army to the National Government, which is the main objective of these negotiations. The only document in which the Communists have stated the conditions under which they would submit control of their forces to the National Government is the 5-point proposal⁶⁹ submitted to me in Part 1.

The concessions by the Generalissimo and the Government were made at various times. I have put them all together here.

I now revert to the period at which Chou En-lai returned to Yenan. The 2d day after his return to Yenan he sent me a letter dated December 8, 1944; which is in substance as follows:

[Here follows substance of letter of December 8, 1944, from Chou En-lai; printed in Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, page 723.]

On December 11, I wired Chairman Mao in reply stating that I was sending an important letter to General Chou by Colonel Barrett and expressed the hope that no move would be made to publish the terms pending its receipt. (All of my communications with Yenan were without exception sent with the full knowledge and consent of the high officials of the National Government who were in charge of the negotiations, namely, the Generalissimo, T. V. Soong, Wang Shih-chieh and Chang Chih-chung.) This letter of identical date read, in substance, as follows:

[Here follows substance of letter of December 11, 1944, to Chou En-lai; printed in Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, page 732.]

(It should be said that I personally was not opposed to publication of the 5 points nor of the fact that I was at least co-author of them and had signed them as a witness to Mao’s signature, but the National Government was opposed to publication.)

General Chou’s reply to the above dated December 16 reads as follows:

[Here follows substance of letter of December 16, 1944, from Chou En-lai; printed in Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, page 139.]

In my telegraphic reply to General Chou of December 21[20],⁷⁰ I stated my belief that chances of success along the general lines of the Communist proposals would be brighter than ever before if he would again come to Chungking.

On December 24, I received a telegram,⁷¹ paraphrased and transmitted by the Army, from Chairman Mao stating that General Chou was occupied with “important conference preparations” making his departure from Yenan difficult. Mao also stated that the National Government had not shown sufficient sincerity to warrant continuing negotiations on the basis of the 5-point proposal and suggested a conference in Yenan with Colonel Barrett attending if possible. This was followed by a letter from General Chou dated December 28⁷² and brought to Chungking by Colonel Barrett stating that I had apparently misunderstood the previous telegram due to “mistakes in paraphrasing” and that Colonel Barrett would inform me of details. (Barrett informed me orally that neither had a conference in Yenan been suggested nor had his presence been requested at a conference, although subsequent communication with American officer temporarily in charge of the observers section at Yenan have shown that the telegram as originally received was a substantially accurate paraphrase of Mao’s message.) General Chou then went on to state that the Communists would not be willing to continue abstract discussions on the question of accepting their proposal for a democratic coalition government. He mentioned instead four additional points which he requested be communicated to the authorities concerned “to see whether they are determined to realize democracy and unity.” These points were:

(1) Release of all political prisoners including Chang Hsueh-liang;⁷³

(2) Withdrawal of Kuomintang forces surrounding the border region and those attacking the New Fourth Army and the South China ‘anti-Japanese column’;

(3) Abolition of all expressive regulations restricting People’s freedom; and

(4) Stopping of all special secret service activity.

The carrying out of the points, Chou continued, would indicate the eventual possibility of abolishing one-party dictatorship and of establishing a democratic coalition government.

I replied to the above in a letter to Chairman Mao and General Chou dated January 7, stating that the additional four points outlined in Chou’s letter constituted a departure from our original agreed procedure which was to arrive at an agreement on general principles before discussing specific details. I also stated that I was convinced that the National Government was sincerely desirous of making such concessions as would make a settlement possible but that such matters obviously could not be discussed by telegram or letter. I then suggested, after securing the approval of the National Government, (1) that T. V. Soong, Wang Shih-chieh, Chang Chih-chung and myself make a brief visit to Yenan to discuss matters in person, and (2) that Chairman Mao and General Chou both return with us to Chungking, if agreement in principle were reached, to conclude the agreement.

Chairman Mao in his reply on January 11 stated that the 5-point proposal of the Communist Party had been refused by the National Government and that it was extremely difficult for the Communists to agree to the National Government’s 3-point counter proposal. The National Government, he stated, had been requested first to carry out voluntarily four points including the release of political prisoners as proof that the Government was sincerely desirous of solving national problems on a democratic basis. He said that my proposal for a conference between both parties to be held at Yenan was greatly appreciated, but that he felt nothing could be achieved other than my own personal inconvenience as all such secret negotiations during past 8 years have proved the insincerity of the National Government. Mao suggested in return that a preparatory conference be called in Chungking for the purpose of convening a national affairs conference; that the preparatory conference include Kuomintang, Communist and Democratic Federation delegates; that the proceedings of the conference be made public; and that the delegates have equal standing and freedom of travel. If the National Government agreed to these proposals, he stated, General Chou would proceed to Chungking for discussions.

In my message to the President (January 14) I stated that a military plan had been evolved at U. S. [Army?] Headquarters during the absence of General Wedemeyer which outlined what American troops would be used in the Communist area, how the Communist troops would be organized in guerrilla warfare, and how they could be supplied. I said that this plan had become known to the Communists and had led them to the conclusion that they could bypass the National Government, and incidentally myself, going directly through the military establishment to Washington.

General Marshall sent a telegram to General Wedemeyer quoting an excerpt from my report and asked the latter to give him the facts in the premises. Wedemeyer made a hasty examination of the subject and replied stating that I concurred in his report which he submitted to me before sending. I added that I concurred in General Wedemeyer’s recommendation but that I did not agree to his statement of facts that the military plan was not revealed to the Communists by an officer of his command. Wedemeyer had implied that the plan may have leaked to Communists through General Chen Cheng⁷⁴ or T. V. Soong as they both had knowledge of the plan and the latter was conducting negotiations with the Communists. In reply to this message from Wedemeyer, General Marshall requested him to make further investigations which disclosed that Colonel Barrett, who was my emissary and who carried my messages to Chairman Mao and General Chou, had discussed the military plan in detail with the Communists without my knowledge and that Colonel Bird, also under the direction of military headquarters, had gone to Yenan and had not only discussed the military plan in detail but had made a report to headquarters outlining the nature of the discussions.

General Wedemeyer then asked Colonel Barrett and General McClure⁷⁵ for statements on the subject. Their statements and that of Colonel Bird were conclusive of the fact that the military plan had become known to the Communists through these military officers.

The result was that the following two proposals were made by Chairman Mao and General Chou direct to General Wedemeyer in an eyes alone telegram dated January 9,⁷⁶ through Army channels, the second “strictly off the record”: (1) that the Yenan Government dispatch an unofficial group to the United States to “interpret and explain” the problems of China to interested American civilians and officials, and (2) that Mao and Chou were available to proceed to Washington immediately for an exploratory conference in event that the President should express a desire to receive them at the White House as leaders of a primary Chinese political party. Mao and Chou also specifically requested that their willingness to go to Washington be kept secret in the event that Roosevelt’s invitation was not forthcoming in order to protect their political status vis-à-vis Chiang. There was a second telegram⁷⁷ that indicated the Communists’ desire to bypass both the National Government and myself. However, that telegram is more pertinent to another situation that will be reported later.⁷⁸

If the suggestions made to the Communists by Barrett and Bird at the direction of McClure had been approved by the United States and if the requests made by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai referred to had been granted, the result would have been a recognition of the Communist Party of China as an armed belligerent. All this was predicated on the proposition adhered to by McClure that [the U. S.] reserves the right to fight its enemies where and when it finds them and with whatever means are available. There are times when this theory is practicable, but on this instance it was assumed that the U. S. Army and not the civil government had the policy making power. The civil government could decide on the action to be taken in the premises and could have directed the Army as an instrumentality of the Government to make the policy effective. But in the circumstances the proposed action was in conflict with the policy of the Government. It would have defeated the United States policy of sustaining the National Government of China. I was of the opinion that the recognition of the Communist Party as an armed belligerent through our Army would immediately cause chaos and civil war and a defeat of America’s policy in China. As soon as I sensed this situation my opposition was more than aggressive, it [was] impeccable and, as the results have indicated, successful.

General Wedemeyer cleared the situation completely in a telegram to General Marshall and expressed regret for what had occurred. Wedemeyer was of the opinion that the negotiations between the Army and the Communists were not the sole cause of the breakoff of negotiations between the Communists, the National Government and myself. I, of course, agreed that there were other factors. But the Communists did take the Army plan and the conferences in regard to it as evidence that they could bypass the National Government and myself and obtain recognition by the United States of the Communist armed party without first reaching an agreement with the National Government.

It has been suggested to me that I pursue the military investigation further. Both General McClure, Wedemeyer’s Chief of Staff, and Colonel Barrett have in the meantime been transferred to field commands. I have decided that it would be better for us not to indulge in a slugging match between ourselves and that we should permit the incident to be closed. This is especially true when we consider that when I began using Colonel de Pass, the Military Attaché, as my emissary in the negotiations with the Communists without any explanation to the Communists or the National Government of what had transpired, we were able immediately to reopen discussions with the Communist leaders as the subsequent correspondence will indicate. Moreover, General Chou has now returned to Chungking and we are pursuing our negotiations amicably without having made any reference to our internal episode which is outlined very briefly above. I recommend that the State Department take no action whatever in regard to the communications of the military plan to the Communist Party as to do so would only continue a controversy among ourselves and detract from our main objective which is the unification of all forces in China. Wedemeyer has my confidence and I have his and we are cooperating fully.

It has come to my attention that there have been several cases of special interests antagonistic to the National Government who at one time or another have approached this or that representative of the American Government with requests for special consideration from the American Armed Forces; that they have asked for the dispatch of representatives of the American Government to areas under their control or that they have asked that they be furnished with American [arms?] or equipment. It seems likely that such approaches will continue as long as unification of China remains incomplete. I recommend that all such requests, no matter how reasonable they may seem to be, be universally [refused?] until or unless they receive the sanction of the National Government and of the American Government. It is our steadfast position that all armed warlords, armed partisans and the armed forces of the Chinese Communists must without exception submit to the control of the National Government before China can in fact have a unified military force or unified government.

In a letter to Chairman Mao dated January 20, 1945, which was carried to Yenan by Colonel de Pass, I stated that I was convinced that the National Government was ready to make such important and concrete concessions as to make a settlement really practicable; that the Government had decided to create a “war cabinet” with extensive powers which would include non-Kuomintang members; and that Communistic representatives would be invited to join this important policy making body. I suggested that Mao again send General Chou to Chungking to talk over matters with the Government even if only for a few days.

He [As?] mentioned above, General Chou returned to Chungking with Colonel de Pass on January 24 and negotiations are now proceeding. These negotiations will be the subject of part 3 which will follow shortly by telegraph.⁷⁹

In closing part 2, I pause to observe that in this dreary controversial chapter two fundamental facts are emerging: (1) the Communists are not in fact Communists, they are striving for democratic principles; and part (2) the one party, one man personal government of the Kuomintang is not in fact Fascist, it is striving for democratic principles. Both the Communists and the Kuomintang have a long way to go but, if we know the way, if we are clear minded, tolerant and patient, we can be helpful but it is most difficult to be patient at a time when the unified military forces of China are so desperately needed in our war effort.⁸⁰

Hurley

68. This telegram is part 2 of an extensive report. Part 1 is telegram No. 141, January 31, 6 p.m., p. 192; part 3 is telegram No. 238, February 17, 7 p.m., p. 220; part 4 is telegram No. 242, February 18, 11 a.m., p. 223.
69. Dated November 10, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 687.
70. Ibid., p. 744.
71. Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 745.
72. Ibid., p. 755.
73. The “Young Marshal”, former Manclrarian warlord, who detained Generalissimo Chiang from December 12 to 25, 1936; see ibid., 1936, vol. vi, pp. 414 ff.
74. Chinese Minister of War.
75. Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure, Chief of Staff to General Wedemeyer.
76. No. 322, not printed.
77. No. 324, January 10, not printed.
78. See telegram No. 238, February 17, 7 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 220.
79. See telegram No. 238, February 17, 7 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 220.
80. In a memorandum of February 13 to the Under Secretary of State (Grew) the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) summarized in some detail the contents of this telegram, stating in conclusion that “It is believed that no action is called for by the Department, at least until section 3 of the telegram comes to hand.” (893.00/2–1345)