740.0011 P.W./7–2345
The Consul General at Kunming (Langdon) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 3.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose translations of two reports74 appearing in the Chou Pao, The Morning Post (independent) under date of June 26, 1945, of General Ho Ying-chin’s first press conference with Foreign Correspondents.
[Page 140]It will be noted that General Ho remarks rather freely on some subjects still handled with reserve by other Allied representatives, such as the future of the Northeastern Chinese provinces and Formosa, the holding of the Japanese Emperor to be a war criminal, the expressing of hope that the Soviet Union will join in the war against Japan and the allowing to pass of twenty to thirty years before Japan might be regarded as a “neighboring nation”.
On the whole, although he uses the phrase “my command” four times in one brief paragraph, and rather emphasizes the fact that all military elements in this theatre are under ultimate Chinese general command, it would appear that General Ho gives credit where credit is due as far as American participation in this theatre is concerned. One particularly optimistic element in his statements is his emphasis on the investigation into prevalent rumors concerning misuse of Lend-Lease supplies, the official result of which was apparently to disprove such rumors, and his description of the way in which distribution of such supplies is now handled, whereby American officers are in supervision at both ends of the line.
Certainly General Ho would appear to feel that all is basically well as to liaison between the Chinese and Americans in this theatre, as he goes so far as to state that “General MacClure and I had practically merged into one”. It might be appropriate here to refer to my despatch no. 171 of April 6, 1945, concerning the reorganization of Chinese Armies and relationship between American and Chinese military establishments, and to repeat an interesting opinion recently proffered by a fairly highly placed American officer. This was that since General Ho’s assignment as Supreme Commander of the Chinese Armies and concurrent Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo in the latter’s capacity as Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, he has exhibited, in contrast to his former qualities as Minister of War, when he was perhaps “held in” by the very nature of such a position in a Chinese cabinet, qualities of initiative and capability in “field work” which have stood China in far better stead than had previously been the case. That the General feels himself to be capable is indicated in one instance by the remark that he personally guarantees that every round of ammunition and every weapon available in China will be employed in the war against Japan.
To touch briefly on one or two of the more interesting remarks elicited from General Ho by the questions of the correspondents at the interview under report, mention might be made of his response to the question: “Since the Lukouch’iao Incident,75 has Japan built many war industries in Occupied China?” He replied that Japan [Page 141] started building war industries in Manchuria as early as after the Mukden Incident,76 thereby reminding us yet again that the war with Japan commenced in 1931. The General indicated China’s agreement with methods followed by the Allies in Europe when he said that as to receipt by China of man-power and materials from Japan subsequently to the latter’s defeat, the question would be dealt with after the views of the Allied nations as to such reparations; and again in his reply to a question as to disposition of her defeated enemy, when he replied that China would take measures to “completely eradicate the aggressive ideology of the Japanese so that Japan will not be able to wage another war”. In this connection the thought occurs to anyone familiar with the Far East that such a program entails approaching far more ancient institutions than in Europe; viz., Zen Buddhism, Bushido, the Noh Play and Kabuki (which are, after all, Japan’s “Mystery Plays”) and Shintoism, all of which will take rather more time to modify in spirit than will the recently upsprung National Socialism. When asked how many Japanese prisoners had been taken by the Chinese, General Ho stated that “the total would be around several thousands”, a rather vague figure. He expects that the enemy might put up fanatic resistance at such points as Canton, Hankow, Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin and Peiping. The General agrees with the bombing of the Emperor’s palace at Tokyo, and feels that the Emperor is a war criminal, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army, Navy and Air Force, and should be so treated. He states that the remark of Madame Chiang Kai-shek some years ago that if Japan ceased her aggressive war against China the latter would regard her as a neighboring nation is invalid in the light of the present situation, and that twenty to thirty years will have to pass before Japan may be regarded in a friendly manner, during which period the Japanese would have to receive “a thorough education in peace thoughts”.
Respectfully yours,