893.50/7–1445
Memorandum by Mr. Everett F. Drumright of the Division of Chinese Affairs
Attached is an interesting article published in the Baltimore Sun, July 13, 1945,70 by its competent reporter Mark S. Watson, who has recently been in China and who has contributed a series of noteworthy articles to that newspaper on conditions in China.
[Here follows report on article cited.]
Comment: There is little or no question but that the Generalissimo realizes that the United States is straining every resource at its command to supply China’s war and other needs over the “hump”. If that is so, he can scarcely voice any complaint on that score. What, then, is the real source of his dissatisfaction and his call for more economic aid?
[Page 136]The logical response is that he must be calling in rather oblique terms for the landing of American materials on the East China Coast, a section of which (the area lying between Ningpo and Amoy) is now free of the Japanese. It is probable that the Generalissimo is restive over American failure to land and build up supply bases on the coast. Continued American inaction in this respect is likely, unless explained to the Generalissimo, to become a sore point with him and may even bring apprehension as to American motives.
Although it might be argued that the coastal area now open to American landings is inaccessible and of little value in granting Chiang the assistance he desires, it might equally be argued that it is no more remote and difficult from the point of view of communications than the route over the “hump”. Indeed, landings on the lower China coast would enable American forces to link up with Chiang’s forces in the Third War Zone (Chekiang, Fukien and Kiangsi), roads could be built, and air fields developed, so that goods could be shipped into the eastern China provinces and flown west into Kwangsi, Kiangsi, and Hunan where large airfields are in the process of being recovered. Moreover, Chinese forces in the Third War Zone, like those in the Yunnan area, could be reconstituted and made the striking force for attack on the Shanghai and other central China enemy positions. It may be pointed out that if American consumer goods were to become available on the China coast, the Chinese might be expected, no matter how difficult transport might be, to devise ways and means of getting them transported to the interior. This has been proved time and again in the transport of goods from the occupied areas of China and Hong Kong to the Chinese hinterland. Also, an American landing on the China coast would lend impetus to Chinese desires to eliminate the Japanese corridor along the Canton–Hankow railway zone.
Important results would also accrue from the psychological point of view. American landings on the China coast would be of value from the military, political and economic points of view. It would be further evidence of the deterioration of the Japanese military position; it would indicate that the United States was determined to assist in forcing the Japanese from China; it would weaken the Japanese hold on the Chinese people and puppet armed forces in occupied China. From the political point of view, it would indicate that the United States was stepping up its assistance to the National Government and helping it in driving the Japanese from East China; it would also tend to check the activities of dissident elements who have been hoping for American assistance without reference to the National Government. From the economic point of view, it would enable the United States to commence, perhaps on a token scale, the landing of consumer commodities which are so sorely needed. It would bolster Chinese [Page 137] faith in the Chinese Government, perhaps help check the inroads of inflation, and bolster the Chinese economy. Conversely, it might be expected to have a disastrous effect on the Japanese-controlled economy of occupied China, which is already showing signs of collapse.
In the event that the foregoing conclusions are well grounded—and it is believed that they are—it would seem that it is incumbent on the United States Government agencies concerned to consider whether or not it would be advantageous to effect landings on the China coast at an early date, and if it is so ascertained, to take steps to effect such landings. It is believed that they are justified from the political and economic points of view. Whether they are justified from a military point of view would appear to be a matter for the consideration of the United States military and naval authorities.
Addendum:
July 15, 1945.
Since preparing the foregoing there has come to hand a clipping from the Evening Star, July 14, 1945, purporting to outline General Chennault’s views on American landings on the China coast. This clipping is attached.71