893.00/15314
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
No. 2286
Chungking, March 11,
1944.
[Received March 25.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s
telegram no. 422, March 4, 3 [4] p.m. in regard to an
attack on an American military convoy on February 19 some 40 miles east of
Amichow–Kaiyuan, Yunnan, and to the Embassy’s despatch no. 2285, March 11,
1944 and other correspondence in regard to two previous attacks upon Army
convoys in the same general area.
This third serious attack was first brought to the Embassy’s attention by Mr.
J. S. Service, Second Secretary detailed to General Stilwell’s22 headquarters, who had
been instructed by that headquarters to inform the Embassy of the incident
by delivering to us a copy of a letter of March 3, 1944 which Major General
T. G. Hearn, General Stilwell’s Chief of Staff, had addressed to General
Shang Chen, Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the National Military
Council. A copy of this letter is enclosed.23
In his despatch no. 36, March 1, 1944 (copy enclosed)24 the Consul at Kunming gives an account of the
incident which is substantially the same as that contained in General
Hearn’s letter which was summarized in the Embassy’s telegram under
reference, and states that although Headquarters Y Force had reported the
matter to Headquarters in Chungking it had not so far lodged a protest with
the Kunming Chinese military authorities and had not officially informed the
Consulate General, but that pending the receipt of adequate reparation and
assurances that the situation is under control, it had suspended the
military training program in southern Yunnan.
In the temporary absence of the Foreign Minister I saw the Political Vice
Foreign Minister, Dr. K. C. Wu, on March 7 and handed him a note on the
subject dated March 4, 1944, a copy of which is also enclosed,23 together with a copy of a
memorandum of my conversation with him.
Respectfully yours,
[Page 1107]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in
China (Gauss)
[Chungking,] March 8, 1944.
I called by appointment at 4 p.m. yesterday on Dr. Wu (in the absence
from Chungking of Dr. T. V. Soong, the Minister for Foreign Affairs) and
handed him my formal note of March 4th, addressed to> the Foreign
Minister, in reference to the bandit attack on the American military
convoy in the Kaiyuan district of Yunnan. I made comment on this matter
to Dr. Wu along the lines of the note, expressing my deep concern as to
the effect of a continuance of these incidents on the relations between
our military people and the Chinese; in fact, on the problem of American
assistance to China in the war—assistance which China has been asking
for so persistently and which, when given, is complicated by incidents
such as these.
Dr. Wu expressed himself as greatly concerned over this and the preceding
incidents. He said that my note to the Foreign Minister would be brought
immediately to the attention of the Generalissimo, who, he knew, is much
exercised over the situation.
Dr. Wu then went on—saying he was speaking privately and not
officially—to tell me that he has been having conversations on
this-important subject with Yunnan representatives in Chungking. They
had pointed out to him that there are large areas of Yunnan, especially
in the south and southeast, which are thinly populated, or not populated
at all, jungle areas near the French Indo-China border, and other areas
not unlike our “wild and wooly west”, where there are few inhabitants
and where bandits can move about at will, where it is difficult to find
them and suppress them, etc., etc., all more or less like, at one
period, we found the situation in the West in the United States. He then
went on to say that these Yunnan representatives had emphasized the
desirability of our Army informing the provincial government whenever
convoys are being sent out through such areas, in order that protection
may be given.
I commented that the U.S. Army cannot be expected to ask permission and
inform the Yunnan provincial officials when and as our military people
travel throughout the province to join Chinese military units for
instruction purposes; after all, we are out here—as the Yunnan
provincial government should know and as the people in Yunnan should be
made to understand—to help China, and we must be able to move about
freely in doing so. It is the Chinese Government’s responsibility to see
to law and order behind the military lines, so that our assistance to
China can be given without such incidents occurring.
In further discussion of the matter, in which Dr. Wu emphasized the
desirability of cooperation between our military and the Chinese in
[Page 1108]
regard to travel through
bandit areas, he suggested that perhaps any restrictions might be
applied only as to certain areas in which bandit difficulties were being
found. He wanted to know whether I could not do something in advising
our military to work out some arrangement with the Yunnan authorities
for such special areas. I suggested that it seemed to me that anything
of that sort should be worked out on the spot in Kunming. The Yunnan
authorities might be well advised to establish friendly liaison with our
“Y” Force Headquarters. The Yunnan authorities certainly must receive
reports from time to time that bandits are operating in this, that or
the other area of certain hsien districts. Would it not be possible for
them to pass such information on to the “Y” Force Headquarters as it is
received, from time to time, and then perhaps to suggest to such
Headquarters that if convoys are passing through one of the affected
areas at such a time, there be liaison between the Y headquarters and
the Yunnan authorities, so that if necessary special precautions might
be taken by the Yunnan authorities to see that the convoy passes safely
and without molestation. This will place a great responsibility on the
Yunnan authorities, of course. I did not believe that the U.S. Army
authorities could agree to any arrangement which would restrict the
movement of our people—any arrangement requiring advance notice, the
awaiting of “permission”, or anything of that sort—but perhaps they
might find it desirable, if the Yunnan authorities evidenced a desire to
cooperate by keeping our Army people informed of what was transpiring in
the bandit suppression efforts—by giving them information on various
districts and routes, etc., etc.—our Army authorities on their part
might be willing to try to meet the situation in a realistic way in
liaison with the Yunnan authorities.
In short—our Army would not be asked to report to the Yunnan authorities
whenever a convoy is leaving, asking permission or awaiting an “all
clear”; but they could be informed by the responsible Chinese
authorities of the developments in the bandit situation, being told of
this, that or another route, and, when they saw fit, informing the
Yunnan authorities of the probable despatch of a convoy, putting the
Yunnan authorities on notice so that they could take any necessary
precautionary measures along the route to ensure that the convoy passes
in safety.
Dr. Wu said that he thought that he would have a talk along these lines
with General Shang Chen, the director of the Foreign Affairs section of
the Military Council.
As I left, Dr. Wu again said that he would see that the Generalissimo is
informed immediately of the matter—he would bring my formal note on the
subject to his attention.
