Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI

893.34/5–1944

Memorandum by Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State ⁶⁵

[Washington,] May 23, 1944.

It is understood that the Chinese Government has applied to this Government, in a communication to the Secretary of the Navy,⁶⁶ for allocation to China, under Lend-Lease, of four small destroyers and four small mine layers—for delivery in 1945.

It is understood that the Chinese affirm in connection with this request two objectives: first, they desire to assist in the war effort; second, they desire to begin the creation of a coast guard service and of a navy.

Comment:

1. The Chinese might conceivably be able to make some advantageous use of such vessels in connection with the war effort. The most likely contribution, however, which granting of the Chinese request might make would, in all probability, be the influence which the granting would have in boasting Chinese confidence in the good will of the United States and in boosting Chinese morale.

2. China needs a coast guard service. It would be to the advantage of the powers, including the United States, for China to have a good coast guard service. Extraterritorial jurisdiction in China having been abolished, it may be assumed that foreign naval vessels will not henceforth operate on China’s inland water ways and will in the future perform less of service than in the past by way of keeping down piracy on China’s coasts. The foreign powers have given up and the Chinese have assumed various responsibilities for the acceptable discharging of which the Chinese need to have suitable instrumentalities and to develop suitable Services. Small destroyers would be of some help in that connection. Acquisition of the destroyers and the mine layers under reference would give China’s new naval cadets something with which to gain experience and would give the Chinese Government a reason for developing some facilities for the handling and servicing of some types of naval vessels.

3. We should neither hope nor fear that China will develop into and become a naval power. The Chinese have not the traditions, the attitude, the genius, the resources or the wealth which go into the making of naval power. Twice during the past 75 years they have made efforts in that direction, and twice they have failed. Not for many decades at least could they possibly develop enough of a navy to make their country in any way formidable by virtue of naval strength. Many of their own leaders fully realize this and at the same time realize that there are other things which China far more greatly needs and on which China can far more advantageously spend her efforts than on the creating of a navy. As for those Chinese leaders who may desire to make that effort, we should discreetly endeavor to divert their thought to more profitable objectives.

4. However, the fact that China may desire and might try to create a navy should not worry us and need not influence our decision in the matter under reference. We should decide to grant or not to grant the Chinese present request on the basis of current short swing “war emergency” considerations and of current short and long swing political considerations. If we do not expect to be able by the middle of 1945 to spare these ships without damage to our own war effort, we should go slow about promising to turn them over to the Chinese. If, however, we expect to be able to spare a few such ships, we should thoughtfully consider the relative political advantages, current and future, of a “yes” answer or a “no” answer to the Chinese request.

5. The Chinese have since 1937, and especially since Pearl Harbor, addressed to us many requests in great variety for material assistance. We have made to them many promises, usually in broad terms, in affirmation of our desire to be of “all possible assistance” to them; and we have been able to send them, by way of making good our promises, far less than they have expected and we have hoped that we would be able to send them. However well warranted our—together with British—explanations of and excuses for failure thus far to have given China substantial material assistance, many of China’s leaders have been irked by what they regard as deliberate favoring by us of the British and the Russians, and not a few of them affirm that the British certainly and the Americans probably are reluctant to see China develop military strength.

The United States has made enough of an investment in China’s war potentialities during the past eight years to indicate that we consider those potentialities valuable from point of view of our interest; and we should continue to support the investment which we have already made on that theory in that field.

6. The United States has been pursuing for over a hundred years a policy of supporting China. We have recently become very definitely committed to the policy of regarding China as an essential member in a grouping of the stronger powers for the purpose of successfully bringing the war to a decisive conclusion in favor of the United Nations, and for the purpose of creating an international organization which will give security and peace. We are definitely committed to this policy by the antecedents of and the action taken at the Moscow Conference. The Secretary of State has affirmed and reaffirmed our commitment to this policy. (See Annex.)

To make this policy effective, it is essential that we support China now in every manner that is reasonably practicable; essential that we keep the Chinese convinced of our good will toward them and our confidence in them; essential that we give China material assistance and moral assistance; essential that we endeavor to cause Great Britain and the Soviet Union to do likewise; etc., etc.

7. Incidentally in connection with the matter of Mr. Wallace’s visit to Chungking⁶⁷ and of certain features of what are assumed to be his instructions, it is believed that, if practicable, a reply to the Chinese in the affirmative in advance of or simultaneously with Mr. Wallace’s arrival in Chungking would be opportune in relation to the objectives of Mr. Wallace’s mission.

8. In these premises, it is believed that the question whether to promise or not to promise to give the Chinese the ships under reference is a question of substantial political import. It is believed that there would flow from an affirmative reply substantial political advantage, and from a negative reply some political disadvantage. It is believed that, should we make the promise and in due course deliver the ships (which we might or might not, when the time came, be asked to do), there would be little likelihood of there resulting any train of developments which would be to our disadvantage and that there would be a considerable chance that there would result developments which in the long swing would be to our advantage.

[Annex]⁶⁸

1. In the Moscow Joint Four-Nation Declaration,⁶⁹ the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China affirmed themselves: “united in their determination … to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;” and jointly declared: “That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security”; and “That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.”

2. In the course of his address on April 9, 1944 on foreign policy of the United States of America, the Secretary of State said:⁷⁰

“However difficult the road may be, there is no hope of turning victory into enduring peace unless the real interests of this country, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union and China are harmonized and unless they [those countries]⁷¹ agree and act together. This is the solid framework upon which all future policy and international organization must be built.… But without an enduring understanding between these four nations upon their fundamental purposes, interests and obligations to one another, all organizations to preserve peace are creations on paper and the path is wide open again for the rise of a new aggressor.

“This essential understanding and unity of action among the four nations is not in substitution or derogation of unity among the United Nations. But it is basic to all organized international action, because upon its reality depends the possibility of enduring peace and free institutions rather than new coalitions and a new pre-war period. Nor do I suggest that any conclusions of these four nations can or should be without the participation of the other United Nations. I am stating what I believe the common sense of my fellow countrymen and all men will recognize—that for these powers to become divided in their aims and fail to recognize and harmonize their basic interests can produce only disaster and that no machinery, as such, can produce this essential harmony and unity.

“… Agreement can be achieved only by trying to understand the other fellow’s point of view and by going as far as possible to meet it.”

65. Addressed to the Under Secretary of State; submitted to the Secretary of State by the Under Secretary with his memorandum of May 24, p. 83.
66. See letter of May 12 from Mr. Sze, p. 71.
67. For correspondence concerning the mission of Vice President Henry A. Wallace, see pp. 216 ff.
68. The omissions in this annex are indicated in the original.
69. Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 755.
70. Department of State Bulletin, April 15, 1944, pp. 335, 338.
71. Brackets appear in the original.