Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI

893.24/2–2444

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)^72a

[Washington,] February 24, 1944.

Mr. Stettinius: For many months, this Government has been, without any success, negotiating with the Chinese Government to effect an equitable exchange arrangement for United States military expenditures in China. The goods and services obtained in China now cost us from eight to ten times more than similar goods and services would in the United States.

The paramount question, into which this particular problem essentially resolves itself, whether or not military operations planned for China are vital to hasten attack on Japan is now before the Secretary of War and General Marshall. Should the War Department decide that the risk of having to curtail operations for a time in China may be taken, decision at a very high level, presumably by the President in consultation with Cabinet officers, might be required whether this Government should or should not adopt vis-à-vis the Chinese a firm stand backed up by a willingness, if necessary, to retrench in China and to curtail diplomatic, financial and military cooperation with the Chinese.

Our Embassy and the financial experts of the Army and Treasury in Chungking are all convinced that the Chinese Government, if it can avoid so doing, has not the least intention of cooperating with the United States in finding a realistic way to avoid continuing exploitation of United States military expenditures in China.

Ambassador Gauss believes that if the plans for military activity in China could be abandoned at least in part without causing delay in the attack on Japan, a policy of retrenchment on our part would be likely to bring the Chinese to a realization of their responsibility not only to China itself but also to us; that a sound and reasonably reciprocal basis for our relations with China is vital both to the war effort and to American-Chinese cooperation in the post-war world; and that once the Chinese were brought to the realization that this Government had adopted a realistic attitude great benefit to relations between the two countries would result and those relations would be put upon a sound and reasonably reciprocal basis.

There are involved in this matter important political questions affecting our relations with China.

(1) While we recognize that the Chinese Government is beset by serious economic difficulties and that it has some basis for its grievances, we believe that even within the scope of its limited military potential China is not making a reasonable contribution in the war against Japan.

(2) It is felt that the Chinese attitude does not reflect any major change in Chinese political thinking, which calls for close friendly relations with the United States for the time being at least. Nor is there apparent any basic change in economic relationships which must call for major Chinese dependence on the United States for reconstruction. The Chinese attitude would seem to spring primarily from a desire to achieve as strong a financial position as possible. The Generalissimo and Dr. Kung (not the Chinese Government as a whole or the Chinese people) probably smarting under disappointment at the negative decisions made at Cairo apparently decided to place the greatest possible emphasis on “real” Chinese difficulties and “grievances” in order to obtain the greatest possible measure of financial aid.

(3) Notwithstanding the two foregoing factors we believe that any position which this Government adopts toward the Chinese Government should give full weight to the following considerations: that China and Chiang Kai-shek have come to hold in wide sections of public opinion throughout the world a unique position as the leaders in Asia of the war against the Axis; that our association with China is a powerful force in offsetting enemy propaganda; that China’s geographic position could be of great value in our military operations against Japan; and that the outbreak of serious difficulties or disagreements between this Government and the present Chinese Government might, if worse came to worst, bring about the downfall of the Chiang Kai-shek Government, chaos in China, and considerable aid and comfort to the enemy.

So long as we avoid telling the Chinese frankly that we feel that they have not cooperated with us to the extent of their ability and resources in connection with joint efforts in China against Japan, we may expect the Chinese to continue to give us little more than lip service. In pursuing a friendly but firm policy vis-à-vis the Chinese we should of course give full weight and consideration to China’s real difficulties. We should give force to such a policy by a willingness to retrench in China and to reduce our cooperation to match Chinese cooperation with us. We should make it plain that if the Chinese want assistance in connection with reconstruction and other problems, we expect concrete manifestations of a reciprocal desire on the part of the Chinese to aid and assist us, particularly in connection with our military operations in China. Such a policy might of course meet with some Chinese resentment and even public recrimination, but it is believed that the Chinese would soon come to understand that this Government’s realistic attitude is essentially a friendly attitude and is designed to place our relations on a sound and reciprocal basis which would be of great benefit to future cooperation and understanding between the United States and China.

J[oseph] W. B[allantine]

1. Drafted by Max W. Bishop, of the same Office.