740.0011 Pacific War/3913

Memorandum by Mr. Augustus S. Chase of the Division of Chinese Affairs to the Secretary of State 40

Mr. Secretary: The following aspects of the Chinese situation, gathered from recent reports, will be of interest to you:

“There are no indications that the Chinese are capable or desirous of offensive operations against the Japanese in north China”. Chiefly to blame is the Kuomintang, which does nothing to better the soldiers’ poor physical and mental conditioning, employs the best troops to blockade the “Communists”, and husbands military supplies to safeguard Party interests. (Chungking’s despatch no. 2039, January 18; later reports).

While the Kuomintang controls two-thirds of the Central forces, its military capabilities vis-à-vis the “Communists” are conditioned (1) by provincial military groups and minority political factions, which, fearing the progress of Kuomintang government centralization as a threat to their existence, gravitate toward a common anti-government front; and (2) by puppet forces which utilize their position in occupied areas and the threat of cooperation with the “Communists” as bargaining points to obtain assurances from the Kuomintang of forgiveness and post-war favors. These various groups would seek their own interests in the event of the Kuomintang’s collapse or embroilment with the “Communists”. Neither eventuality appears likely during the war. Civil conflict may well eventuate after the war, but it is likely to result in the firm establishment of a more progressive Kuomintang or a “Communist” regime. “The war has stimulated political consciousness to a point where the loose separatism” desired by provincial groups is believed impossible. (Chungking’s despatches 2160 and 2303, February 15 and March 1441).

The Kuomintang has been resorting to persecutory measures, which include camps for the “thought correction” of “radically-minded” students. It is reliably reported that such camps are being operated by the Kuomintang in at least nine provinces, and also by Tai Li’s Gestapo-like [Page 70] secret service in the vicinity of Chungking. (Chungking’s despatch 1957, December 24, 194342).

Among evidences of the extent to which the Chinese are influenced by American public opinion has been the Generalissimo’s continued efforts to settle the “Communist” problem by political means, his reported recent impatience to bring about at least the form of constitutional government and Party democratization, authorization of a foreign press correspondent’s visit to the “Communist” area, recent assurances by Chungking spokesmen that “justified reforms” are under consideration, and the emboldening of Sun Fo and other liberals to denounce fascist trends as jeopardizing Sino-American relations. Constructive American criticism, combined with effective aid, can help materially in stimulating China’s war effort and interest in democracy. (Chungking’s despatches 2351 and 2357, March 23 and 27;43 telegrams 673 and 775, April 18 and May 444).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

There are signs that Chinese opinion, influenced partly by fear of the U. S. S. R. and suspicion of Britain, is developing in favor of close post-war association with the United States. For example, an influential Chungking paper has advocated “an alliance” with the United States, “friendship with Britain” and “maintenance of peace” with Russia. Several Chinese of influence in Kuomintang and journalistic circles have privately expressed the opinion that Chinese and American views on post-war Japan are identical. (Chungking’s despatch 2323, March 17; telegram 648, April 13.45)

Although many stories indicating that T. V. Soong’s difficulties in Chungking have been occasioned by the Generalissimo’s displeasure with some aspects of his work as Foreign Minister, it is believed that rivalry in the economic field between Soong and Kung actually accounts for Soong’s difficulties. An informed Chinese in Washington recently stated that Chiang was so irritated with Soong, largely on personal grounds, that he intended to remove him from all substantive posts but that Kung “interceded” suggesting that he be removed only from his post as Chairman of the Board of the Bank [Page 71] of China. The fact that Soong, while retaining his Foreign Ministership, is losing to Kung his sources of economic power (Chairmanship of the Board of the Bank of China being an outstanding illustration) suggests that the current attack on Soong should be regarded primarily as a move by Kung, supported by Chiang, to divest Soong of his economic influence, particularly in the field of post-war rehabilitation and industralization of China. (Chungking’s despatch 2322, March 17.46)

  1. Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Grew) with his memorandum of May 15, which stated: “You may wish to bring the contents of this memorandum to the attention of the President.”
  2. Post, pp. 331 and 377, respectively.
  3. Foreign Relations, 1943, China, p. 391.
  4. Despatch No. 2351 not printed, but see footnote 98, p. 37; for despatch No. 2357, see p. 385.
  5. For telegram No. 775, see p. 410.
  6. Latter not printed.
  7. Not printed.