893.00/8–1744
Memorandum by Mr. Augustus S. Chase of the Division of Chinese Affairs
Reference Chungking’s despatch no. 2884, August 17, 1944. …
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Tihwa’s despatch no. 1175 provides a lengthy and not very convincing general indictment of the Soviet Union. Aside from accepting as facts the existence of a Communist plot to overthrow Sheng in April and Soviet-Mongol support of the recent Kazak uprising, Consul Smith gives it as his considered opinion that Soviet policy is consistently aimed and still aims to effect complete domination of Sinkiang; that ultimate Soviet plans (to be effected as international opportunity permits) call for the apportionment of most of Sinkiang among Outer Mongolia and other proposed semi-autonomous states under Soviet control and Soviet control of the Kansu corridor to assure communication with the Chinese “Communists”; that recently Soviet machinations have been concerned with a plan to incorporate in Outer Mongolia a part of northern Sinkiang as large as Chekiang Province; that the Soviet Union’s failure thus far to accomplish its aims has been due solely to its preoccupation with the European war and to Sheng’s steadfast maintenance (even during the period of his supposed cooperation) of an undercover system of opposition to Soviet intrigue; that Soviet plots and methods stop at nothing; and that “strenuous action” (including the willingness of China or her allies to fight Russia) is necessary if Sinkiang is not to be dismembered in the next six or ten months.
Consul Smith admits that these conclusions are based on extremely slight evidence, plus an instinctive conviction. Such little evidence as he does present is all from Chinese sources. While apparently feeling that Chinese sources are trustworthy, he has no faith in the statements of his Soviet colleagues (page 3). Commenting on his conclusions, the Embassy “doubts whether the Soviet Union will at this time embark on a program for the restoration of active Soviet control in the Province of Sinkiang”. The Embassy’s views would seem logical, and one wonders why Consul Smith does not discuss the possibility that such action as Soviet agents may have taken in Sinkiang recently may not reflect a desire to frighten the Chinese Government into replacing Sheng and meeting Soviet desires in other respects rather than a deliberate plan to seize Sinkiang.
The essential information in both despatches was adequately summarized in Chungking’s telegram no. 1419, August 16 (copy attached).75a [Page 813] In view of this and of the unproven reliability of most of the very detailed material provided, your reading of the Embassy’s covering despatch, the first brief enclosure (Tihwa’s no. 10)76 and the two page summary of the second, lengthy enclosure (Tihwa’s no. 11) should be ample.
In connection with Sinkiang, there is also attached Lanchow’s brief despatch no. 11, August 8,76 providing information on Sinkiang developments, which, it will be noted, includes no such drastic charges against the Soviet Union as those made by Mr. Smith’s informants.