893.00/8–1744
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
No. 2884
Chungking, August 17,
1944.
[Received September 5.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s
telegram no. 1419, August 16, 2 p.m. on the subject of developments in
Sinkiang Province, and to enclose the originals of Tihwa’s despatches
addressed to the Department nos. 10, July 12, 1944,70 and 11, July 19, 1944, which deal
with various phases of this subject. The summary contained in Embassy’s
reference telegram was based in part on the contents of these despatches and
in part on recent telegrams from the Tihwa Consulate.
In connection with the views expressed by Mr. Smith in his despatch no. 11,
July 19, 1944, the Embassy invites the attention of the Department to
paragraph numbered 4 of its telegram under reference in which it is stated
that, in our view, the retention of General Sheng Shih-tsai in Sinkiang
constitutes an important barrier to the improvement of Chinese-Soviet
relations; that we strongly question whether there exists any possibility of
a rapprochement between General Sheng
[Page 807]
and the Soviet Union; and that we doubt
whether the Soviet Union will at this time embark on a program for the
restoration of active Soviet control in the Province of Sinkiang.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure—Extract]
The Consul at Tihwa (Smith) to the
Secretary of State
No. 11
Tihwa, July 19,
1944.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch
no. 10 of July 12, 1944,71 entitled “Kazaks, supplied from across Soviet
border, attack four Chinese Posts in Western Altai Region, Giving
Support to Suspicion that Early Declaration of a Semi-Autonomous State
may be Planned”, and to my telegram No. 59 of July 17, 11 p.m.,72 and
to previous despatches and telegrams regarding the Kazak Revolt and the
wholesale arrests of alleged Communist plotters in Sinkiang and to
summarize below the conclusions I have reached, after seven months of
observation, with regard to present Soviet policy in Sinkiang.
Summary: After seven months of observation in
Tihwa, the pattern of Soviet policy in Sinkiang appears to me to be
about as follows:
With a primary objective of securing a “friendly” regime or group of
regimes in what is now Sinkiang and of securing for Soviet Russia
assurance of controlling the development of the Tungsten, Gold and
Petroleum resources of the region and with a possible secondary
objective of securing a corridor for more direct aid to the Yenan
Communists if Russia intends to take a hand in China “within the
Wall” and in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria to ensure that “friendly”
regimes also control the larger and more significant areas, it has
been decided to try as opportunity can be made relatively safely
from an international point of view to—
- 1.
- Cut off all of the Altai and a large part of northern Hami
District from Sinkiang by giving to the Mongols a new
borderline in Sinkiang, including in Outer Mongolia almost
all of the Altai Mountain ridges and strategic passes,
almost all of the gold and Tungsten producing regions,
together with most of the best tillable land and almost all
of the best grazing land in Northeastern Sinkiang.
- 2.
- Cut off the agriculturally rich Tacheng, Chenghwasze and
Ining areas and all of the known oil-bearing ridges of the
Tien-shan to form a Semi-autonomous Kazak state out of the
best parts of Northwestern Sinkiang.
- 3.
- Cut off the rich Turfan and Hami areas south of the newly
set Mongol border and the southern slope of the Tienshan
down
[Page 808]
to and
including Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan to form one or more
semi-autonomous Tungan-Uigur states.
- 4.
- Cut off the strategically important mountainous areas
bordering Soviet Russia, Afghanistan, India and Tibet to
form a semi-autonomous Kirghiz state.
- 5.
- Cut the Chungking road through the Kansu corridor by
supplying munitions to and stirring to action the ten
thousand Kazaks living in the mountains south of the road in
the Corridor and by reinforcing and supplying the Mongols
now living in the Ma Tsung Shan region on the Northern side
of the Corridor.
It is believed that the implementation of point three will not occur
until after the complete cutting of the Chungking road in the
corridor and possibly not until after the fall of Kitai to the
Kazaks and Mongols. Point four will probably not be implemented
until after the fall of Ining to the Kazaks but may be in advance of
or coordinated with any Kashgar rising. Soviet support may become
more overt after the fall of Chenghwasze, which is believed to be
the first major objective of the Kazaks. From Chenghwasze the Kazaks
may logically be expected to declare the formation of a
semi-autonomous or autonomous state and to appeal to their brother
Kazaks of the Soviet Republic of Kazakistan for aid and
sympathy.
I have been reluctant to believe that Soviet aims in Sinkiang at
present were so disquieting but the following factors have largely
convinced me:
- 1)
- I am satisfied that a Communist plot for the overthrow of
Sheng’s Government on April 20, 1944, actually
existed.
- 2)
- The Kazak revolt has now spread into the area along the
Soviet Border west of the Altai and even into the Tacheng
district and Soviet and Mongol assistance continue to be
given without any plausible excuse of border
infringement.
- 3)
- I have come to believe that Sheng’s break with the Soviets
was a natural result of his unbending determination to
retain sufficient control to stay in power and succeeded
despite the Soviet opposition.
- 4)
- I do not believe that the aims of Soviet Russia in
Sinkiang have changed since the break and Petroleum
resources alone might be enough to harden Soviet
determination to regain control in Sinkiang, even if general
basic Soviet policy did not demand that an openly unfriendly
regime such as Sheng’s should not be permitted to continue
to exist in the territories bordering the Soviet
Union.
- 5)
- I have been shown maps marked as printed in Moscow in 1927
and 1940 which indicate a discrepancy in the new border
recently so forcefully supported that [it] adds a chunk as
large as Chekiang Province to Mongolia taken out of one of
the richest sections of Sinkiang.
While it is realized that the conclusions as to Soviet policy in this
region hang on a very slender thread of fact the habit of extreme
secrecy long ingrained by Soviet teachers and policemen in the best
informed members of the local regime makes it impossible to obtain
very much direct evidence in matters of this nature. From all that I
have so far seen and heard and experienced in Sinkiang such a policy
[Page 809]
appears not only
possible but probable. Even the possibility of such a policy
existing is so disquieting as to call for immediate reporting. If
such a policy does exist the local situation is highly favorable for
its success. No Chinese Army that can be brought up here in the near
future can possibly hope to stand up against the fighting force of
the Kazaks once it is fully organized and backed with Mongol
technical assistance and Soviet advice. If the Kazak revolt succeeds
the desperately unpopular Chinese control of the rest of Sinkiang
may be expected to be thrown off like bonds of rotten rope.
Soviet agents have not stopped at murder and the mutilation of the
dead faces of their fellow agents in their past attempts to gain and
retain control of Sinkiang and its resources and even if the program
outlined above is incorrect or does not succeed, it is believed that
Soviet aims are and will remain unchanged in Sinkiang and that if
China is to retain control here she must be prepared to tight a
major war. End of Summary73
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Respectfully yours,
