761.93/7–1444
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Grew) to the Secretary of State 63
Mr. Secretary: With reference to your talk with us this morning in regard to possible means of bringing about an improvement in relations between China and Soviet Russia through such influence as we might exert with the Chinese Government, we feel that the attached message which the President has approved sending to Chiang Kai-shek64 is calculated to contribute to the objective which you have in mind. The telegram contains reference to assurances by Chiang Kai-shek in regard to negotiations now in progress with the Chinese Communists to effect a solution by political means. It also refers to Chiang Kai-shek’s professed desire to effect improvement in China’s relations with the U.S.S.R. It is thus believed that the telegram touches upon the most vital factor affecting Chinese-Soviet relations.
There have of course been three other principal causes of difficulties between the two Governments, namely:
- (1)
- The dissemination of propaganda by the Chinese that there were secret provisions in the Japanese-Soviet agreements of March 30 last, on account of which Japan found it possible allegedly to withdraw large bodies of troops from Manchuria to fight in central China. Apparently the Chinese Government has now discontinued giving currency to these rumors although the press continues to allude to them.
- (2)
- Another disturbing element in the situation was the border clashes last March between Outer Mongolian and Chinese forces but there has apparently been no further development of that situation in recent months.
- (3)
- A still further cause of friction was the treatment of Soviet diplomatic and consular representatives in China, who were under constant surveillance by Chinese secret police and who were not permitted to have normal contacts with the Chinese officials or people. Russian military advisers in China were accorded similar treatment which led to their being withdrawn from China by the Soviet Government.
Although much of this is now water over the dam, the feeling engendered by these matters undoubtedly still is a factor in the situation.
It occurs to us that measures which might be taken by us at this time in addition to the dispatch of the President’s telegram would be to endeavor in some appropriate way to impress upon Chiang Kai-shek the serious danger of the proposed four-power talks not developing satisfactorily unless there is a marked improvement in relations [Page 803] between China and the Soviet Union. This might be done in a number of ways: (1) through talks which you or the President might have here with H. H. Kung; (2) through talks which our Ambassador at Chungking might have with Chiang Kai-shek; and (3) by the dispatch of a special representative as proposed in the conversations between Vice President Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek.
At the same time, while we realize the differences in the practical aspects of the position of China and the position of the Soviet Union, we wonder whether it would not be very useful to explain fully to our Ambassador at Moscow all the steps we have taken to influence China in this situation, and have the Ambassador explain this to the Soviet Government and urge the Soviet Government to receive sympathetically any approaches that the Chinese Government might make to it to resolve this situation.