The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)
596. Ambassador Wei called on me April 2935 at his request. He observed that in China support for the United Nations’ cause, although not all that would be desired, was nevertheless good. I expressed the hope that this spirit, which would be invaluable in future to China and the United Nations, could be preserved. He said that T. V. Soong had much work to do in China and would remain there at least for the present.
Ambassador Wei spoke of the seriousness of inflation—but said that China would find some way through the difficult period.
With reference to the recent Soviet-Japanese agreement regarding Sakhalin oil concessions, the Ambassador said that the agreement [Page 785]indicated that the Soviet Union was extending its political moves to the Far East, and that the agreement has made possible the release of about four Japanese divisions for operations in China to fight the United Nations. He appeared to be concerned regarding possible future Soviet moves in the Far East and gave special emphasis to the Communist aspect of the matter. When he inquired what I thought about the Soviet situation, I repeated approximately what I have said in recent public statements, observing that the important nations like China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States will have to exercise patience with each other in order to achieve that post-war working relationship which would furnish the necessary leadership in the world and that where one of the Powers is in error there must be made a patient effort to cause it to adjust its attitude for the sake of cooperation. I said that failure to discuss defects and misunderstandings and to find effective ways to further international cooperation would mean that our fight had been in vain. Ambassador Wei expressed full appreciation and approval of that view.
The Ambassador’s remarks in regard particularly to the subject of the Soviet Union were another indication, of which there have been several of late, coming to the attention of the Department, that the National Government has in mind laying the foundation for future enlistment of sympathetic American support for China in respect to anticipated problems arising out of Sino-Soviet relations.
The Department has no evidence in support of the thesis that the Russo-Japanese Agreement of March 30 was a mark of Soviet appeasement to Japan or that the reported removal of Japanese divisions from Manchuria had any connection with that agreement. See in this general connection the Department’s telegram no. 490 of April 13.36