[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Service)
[Chungking,] April 7, 1944.
Subject: Situation in Sinkiang
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G–231a
[Here follows detailed report, summarized above.]
This explanation of the Sinkiang situation as having direct Central
Government motivation may be considered too dogmatic. But it is hardly
probable that Sheng Shih-tsai, weakened by the withdrawal of his former
mainstay—Russian military forces and aviation, and certainly preoccupied
with the maintenance of his position in the face of growing Central
Government control, would independently, or even willingly, seek trouble
for himself by campaigning against the redoubtable Kazaks and attempting
to establish his frontier in areas known to be disputed with Outer
Mongolia. As mentioned in my memorandum of March 22nd,32 some well
informed Chinese believe that Sheng was under direct orders from the
Generalissimo to create a military base in this area, strategic for
possible future pressure on Outer Mongolia. The fact cannot be denied
that China, in the face of internal troubles and a stagnant war effort,
is showing an amazing concentration on peripheral problems—Tibet,
Northwest development, the status of North Burma, and even the borders
of Indo-China and Thailand. Also it cannot be denied that China’s
relations with Russia have steadily deteriorated to a point of tension:
There was bickering and bad feeling over the withdrawal of Russian
interest from Sinkiang; the movement of Russian planes and trucks in
China has been practically stopped; Russian military advisors are no
longer welcomed or consulted; trade and barter are at a near standstill
and Russia claims that the Chinese have not lived up to their promises;
attempted transport arrangements have so far been a failure; Chinese
feeling against Russia has become more outspoken; and, as mentioned
before, the Chinese lost no time in trying to exploit the anti-Russian
angles of the present incident.
Crediting the Chinese with at least a lack of concern over complicating
their own and their allies relations with Russia may also be objected to
on the ground that China is anxious to have Russia
[Page 778]
enter the war against Japan. I do not
believe that such is actually the case. General Chinese public opinion
may desire to have Russia enter the war at an early date in the hope
that this will ensure the speedy defeat of Japan. But the Kuomintang’s
leaders, I suggest, give only lip service to this idea. On the contrary,
if they are as calculating as we must assume they are, they will very
much prefer to have Japan defeated by the United States, which they hope
will continue to be friendly to the Kuomintang and opposed to the spread
of Communist influence in China. By the same reasoning the Kuomintang
dreads the active participation by Russia in the defeat of Japan because
this will give Russia an undeniable voice in Far Eastern affairs and
will greatly increase her prestige and the influence of Communism with
the people of China. We can expect, therefore, that as American strength
in the Pacific increases and our war against Japan progresses
favorably—as it is doing at present—the Chinese government will become
more and more anti-Russian.
These may have been the Chinese motives in Sinkiang. What has been the
Chinese success?
The pretext has been provided for sending large Central Government
military forces into Sinkiang. These may by force, overcome any
unorganized local resistance and break up minority groups such as the
Kazaks inside of Sinkiang. They should also ensure—perhaps after a
period of maneuver and face saving—the eventual removal of Sheng
Shih-tsai and his replacement by a nominee of the Central Government.
They probably will not, however, be able to establish the disputed
boundary claimed by China, because the Outer Mongols, even without
direct Soviet participation, appear to have an efficient and well
equipped military force. There is also the danger that Central
Government military control may prove a boomerang by provoking rebellion
in Sinkiang, either spontaneously from the resentment of the largely
Mohammedan population, or through Russian connivance and support of such
leaders as the mysterious General Ma Chung-ying—reportedly “kept” by the
Russians for the past ten years for just such a possible eventuality.
Chinese concern is shown by the numerous rumors of Ma’s appearance and
by the anxiety to get the Chinese 42nd Army—one of General Hu
Tsung-nan’s best units—to Sinkiang as rapidly as possible. All trucks in
Kansu are reported to have been commandeered for this purpose.
Russian policy, at least in regard to Outer Mongolia, appears to have
been clearly tested. It is obvious that the Russians intend to stand by
Outer Mongolia and to keep the country free—in other words, an
autonomous republic under Soviet influence.
This stand which the Russians have been maneuvered into taking may
convince some sections of Chinese and foreign opinion that
[Page 779]
Russia has sinister designs in
China and the rest of East Asia. But if the Chinese expected active
British and American support, they have so far been disappointed. The
foreign press seems to have given the matter little notice. The United
States has shown little desire to complicate its relations with an
important ally over what appears to be a border incident, possibly
arising from Chinese provocation. And we have declined the bait of
modified involvement by sending representatives to investigate, under
Chinese auspices.
It seems significant that up to the time that the Tass report reached the
world press and it had become obvious that foreign reaction was slight,
the Chinese emphasized the aspect of Outer Mongol-Russian aggression and
made sure, officially in Sinkiang and unofficially in Chungking, that
the story was spread widely in all quarters. After that time, however,
the Chinese have shown obvious confusion over the publicity policy which
should be adopted and have stopped any efforts to play up the story. The
Tass report was excluded from the Chinese press, and any news of the
present situation in Sinkiang is unobtainable. The attitude of the
spokesmen at the reported press conference strongly supports the general
rumor that no Sinkiang news is to be released except by or with the
express approval of the Generalissimo himself. Exceptions to this
behavior have been a few officials, such as Sun Fo, who from the
beginning seem to have seen the dangers of the situation and disagreed
with attempts to distort and magnify it, even though these attempts seem
to have sprung from the Generalissimo.
The occurrence of this incident, and the likelihood of its repetition in
other forms if the Chinese leaders continue in their present course,
raises the important question of the attitude which the United States
should adopt toward Sino-Soviet differences. In a broader sense this
question involves our over-all relations with both Russia and the
present Chinese Government.
We must be concerned with Russian plans and policies in Asia because they
are bound to affect our own plans in the same area. But our relations
with Russia in Asia are at present only a subordinate part of our
political and military relations with Russia in Europe in the over-all
United Nations war effort and post-war settlement. We should make every
effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are. A good way of gaining
material relevant to this will be a careful firsthand study of the
strength, attitudes, and popular support of the Chinese Communists. But
in determining our policy toward Russia in Asia we should avoid being
swayed by China. The initiative must be kept firmly in our hands. To do
otherwise will be to let the tail wag the dog.
[Page 780]
As for the present Chinese Government, it must be acknowledged that we
are faced with a regrettable failure of statesmanship. Chiang’s
persisting in an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies
(or lack of them) are accelerating economic collapse and increasing
internal dissention, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism.
The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious.
But it would also appear that Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to
Russian dominance in Eastern Asia by internal and external policies
which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to
serve as a possible counter-weight to Russia. By so doing, Chiang may be
digging his own grave; not only North China and Manchuria, but also
national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of
the Soviets.
Neither now, nor in the immediately foreseeable future, does the United
States want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia; nor
does it want to see Russia have undisputed dominance over a part of [or?] all of China.
The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is
to give, in either fact or appearance, support to the present
reactionary government of China beyond carefully regulated and
controlled aid directed solely toward the military prosecution of the
war against Japan. To give diplomatic or other support beyond this limit
will encourage the Kuomintang in its present suicidal anti-Russian
policy. It will convince the Chinese Communists—who probably hold the
key to control, not only of North China, but of Inner Mongolia and
Manchuria as well—that we are on the other side and that their only hope
for survival lies with Russia. Finally, Russia will be led to believe
(if she does not already) that American aims run counter to hers, and
that she must therefore protect herself by any means available: In other
words, the extension of her direct power or influence.
It is important, therefore, that the United States have the following
aims in its dealing with China:
- 1.
- Avoid becoming involved in any way in Sino-Soviet relations;
avoid all appearance of unqualified diplomatic support to China,
especially vis-à-vis Russia; and limit American aid to China to
direct prosecution of the war against Japan.
- This may involve soft-pedalling of grandiose promises of
post-war aid and economic rehabilitation—unless they are
predicated on satisfactory reforms within China.
- 2.
- Show a sympathetic interest in the Communists and liberal
groups in China. Try to fit the Communists into the war against
Japan.
- In so doing, we may promote Chinese unity and galvanize the
lagging Chinese war effort. The liberals, generally speaking,
already consider that their hope lies in America. The
Communists, from what little we know of them, also are friendly
toward America, believe that democracy must be the next step in
China, and take the view that economic collaboration with the
United States is the only hope for speedy post-war
rehabilitation and development. It is vital that we do not lose
this good will and influence.
- 3.
- Use our tremendous and as yet unexploited influence with the
Kuomintang to promote internal Chinese unity on the only
possible and lasting foundation of progressive reform.
There is no reason for us to fear using our influence. The Kuomintang
knows that it is dependent on us; it cannot turn toward a Japan
approaching annihilation; it is inconceivable that it will turn toward
communistic Russia; and Great Britain is not in a position to be of
help. American interest in the Chinese Communists will be a potent force
in persuading Kuomintang China to set its house in order.
The Communists would undoubtedly play an important part in a genuinely
unified China—one not unified by the Kuomintang’s present policy in
practise of military force and threat. But it is most probable that such
a democratic and unified China would naturally gravitate toward the
United States and that the United States, by virtue of a sympathy,
position, and economic resources, would enjoy a greater influence in
China than any other foreign power.
