893.248/292
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 11.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose35 reports prepared by the Assistant Military Attaché for Air36 in regard to the Chinese Air Force as follows: (a) report of April 14, 1944, on morale in the Chinese Air Force; (b) report of April 14, 1944, on general conditions in the Chinese Air Force; and (c) report of April 17, 1944, on the Chinese Air Force Staff College at Chengtu. There is also enclosed a copy of an undated memorandum prepared by a reliable American reporting recent observations made by General Chow Chih-jou, Director of the National Aeronautical Affairs Commission.
Summary of Reports. The chief weakness of the Chinese Air Force is its top officers, who are interested in political manoeuvring and not in righting. Pilots are becoming rusty on the ground and many of them prefer assignment to the Chinese-American Composite Wing under General Chennault. The Chinese Air Force’s hoarding of planes, men and equipment may be for future use against the Chinese Communists or against possible rebellious provincial factions or for defense against Soviet Russia, but it seems clear the Chinese do not intend to engage in any extensive air operations against the Japanese. The Chinese-American Composite Wing under General Chennault should result in Chinese adoption of aggressive and modern air tactics and is valuable politically in that the Chinese people think of it as their Air Force. The officers of the Aeronautical Affairs Commission are, however, resentful of that unit. British R. A. F. instructors at the Chinese Air Force Staff College at Chengtu have been discouraged with their work at the College, feeling that they are reduced to giving elementary education instead of teaching advanced pupils and [Page 62] that the prevalent deadwood among the higher ranks of the Chinese Air Force blocks the progress of the whole Air Force. The British head of the R. A. F. group is of the opinion that as long as the younger officers are placed under the present politically-interested ranking officers they will learn nothing except personal politics, which are said to control all promotions and assignments in the higher ranks and to defeat any tendency to build a skilful and aggressive air force. End of Summary.
In the enclosed memorandum General Chow is said to have offered as an excuse for the inactivity of the Chinese Air Force the lack of planes, spare parts and gasoline. He appeared resentful of American criticism of China and spoke of American “reprisals”, consisting of refusal to give passage from Bombay to a group of Chinese pilots en route to the United States, because foreign military attachés were not permitted to visit the Chinese front about a year ago.
The circumstances reported by the Assistant Military Attaché for Air give further indication of the lack of whole-hearted cooperation on the part of the Chinese in the war against Japan, of the Chinese tendency to conserve men and matériel for use against some possible domestic enemy and of the demoralizing effect that political manoeuvring among high ranking Chinese military officers has both on the internal scene and the war effort.
Respectfully yours,