893.00/12–2744
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Davies)10
Visit to Yenan December 15–17
On my brief second visit to Yenan I was reimpressed by the evident supremacy of Mao Tze-tung over all of the other Communist leaders. There seems to be no question as to who runs the Chinese Communist Party. The absence of General Peng Teh-huai, one of the strongest military figures among the Communists, from a big dinner given the Observer Section and from conversations which we had, seemed to lend color to the suggestion that Peng may either have little faith in what the United States will do to help the Communists or may be actively anti-American. Chou En-lai was his usual engaging and shrewd self. Generals Chu Teh and Yeh Chien-ying were demonstratively cordial.
The reception and farewells which Colonel Barrett and I received gave me the impression that the Communists may have felt that they had been unduly brusque to the American go-between, Colonel Barrett, when they rejected the Generalissimo’s counter-proposals. Chairman Mao, for example, went to considerable lengths when Mr. Emmerson and I called on him on December 16 in showing us courtesy. [Page 753] For a man of Mao’s standing, it was an exceptional manifestation of good-will.
I was impressed anew by the younger military commanders: Nieh Jung-chen, Chen Yi and Lin Piao. Nieh and Chen, especially, are men of commanding presence, evident vigor and determination.
My first conversation was with Chou En-lai on December 16. We talked mostly about the political implications of the Kweichow campaign. I discovered that he, too, felt strongly that the Generalissimo and the Japanese may have reached a tacit non-aggression agreement. He advanced some of the arguments set forth in my memorandum, Recent Developments in Sino-Japanese Relations.11 Chou also brought up the subject of the Communists possibly establishing an administrative federation over the areas which they control. He stated that he favored such a step but that Chairman Mao was more cautious and wanted to delay such action. (This information is, of course, for official American knowledge only) Apparently, the decision to establish a communist administrative federation, which would be a definitive step in the direction of separatism, is being held in abeyance.
In a conversation which Mr. Emmerson and I had with Mao Tze-tung on the evening of December 16, the Chairman stated with hearty amusement that it was impossible for anyone to do business with Chiang Kai-shek. With the Communists, he laughed, the Generalissimo will always negotiate but never come to an understanding. To the Americans, Chiang will always protest that he is determined to prosecute the war against Japan as vigorously as possible, but he will never seriously assume the offensive. Finally, he will always collaborate with the Japanese, but he will never surrender to them.
The Japanese policy in China at present, the Chairman declared, is to drive a wedge between the Chinese and the Anglo-Americans. Mao said that the Japanese appeal to the Generalissimo’s strong Pan-Asiatic feelings. Chiang, he observed, is responsive on that score.
At the same time, the Japanese play on the Generalissimo’s anti-Communist sentiments. There they find a definite willingness to cooperate. He said that there had been recently several attacks by Central Government troops on Communist forces. The Communists gave these incidents no publicity because they suspected that the Generalissimo wanted an outcry on this subject so that the Japanese would have ample proof that Chiang was engaging in punitive action against the Communists and so that the Generalissimo could point to Communist “attacks” as a reason for withholding the transfer of Central Government troops from the Northwest to the defense of Kunming. This is devious but not implausible oriental reasoning.
[Page 754]Mao said that the principal contact points between Chungking and the puppets and Japanese are Tientsin and Shanghai.
On the morning of December 17 I had a conversation with General Chu Teh and the Chief of Staff, General Yeh Chien-ying. They stated that Communist strength has been rapidly expanding in the wake of the Central Government’s disasters in Honan, Hunan and Kwangsi. They placed Communist strength at 600,000 regulars and full time guerrillas and 2,500,000 people’s militia. They said that Central Government forces have attacked their units recently in several places. They mentioned one incident involving units of five Central Government divisions attacking New Fourth Army forces near Lihuang, north of Nanking. They pointed out that this locale is near Japanese-held Nanking and has no American observers in close proximity. A second outbreak was in Chekiang when twelve companies of Ku Chu-tung’s troops attacked the Communists. Clashes have also occurred in Honan and along the blockade line in Shensi, General Chu declared. He claimed that although Communists were outnumbered, the Central Government forces retired in defeat. After all, the General remarked, Chiang’s soldiers do not have much stomach for fighting other Chinese.
I inquired regarding the strength of Tai Li’s guerrillas and regulars in the Shanghai-Nanking-Wuhu area. General Chu said that they were collaborating with or had gone over to the puppets.
General Yeh asked me whether I thought it would be a good idea for a Chinese Communist representative to visit the United States. I said that the suggestion seemed to me to be academic as I could scarcely see the Central Government providing the necessary visa. I gained the impression that Yeh would like to go to the United States.
Both Generals launched into a discussion of military developments in Europe. They expressed open disgust with the British handling of the Greek situation. The British, they went on to say, do not appear to be very active in the war against Germany. They were outspoken in their praise of the way the United States was fighting all out in Europe and in the Pacific. They said, and I believe genuinely, that they liked Americans, that they felt that Americans and the Chinese masses had many traits in common and that they liked working with us. I might parenthetically say here that I have the impression that the forthrightness, energy and efficiency of the Americans who compose the Observer Section has made an excellent impression on Yenan leaders.
General Yeh asked me if I had heard the rumor that General Cheng Chien would be appointed Acting Chief of Staff. I replied that I had. They added that there were also rumors that General Ho Ying-chin [Page 755] had been or might be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest, Ku Chu-tung for the Southeast and Li Tsung-jen for the North.