711.93/556: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:36 p.m.]
673. We are reliably informed that as a result of current criticism of China in American press and magazines, Generalissimo recently called meeting of Ministers and Vice Ministers and ordered them to draw up a plan to meet the criticism, assumably by recommending changes which would be in line with the constructive aspects of such criticism. According to informant, the meeting was composed chiefly of reactionary officials and nothing has so far been accomplished.
While in general it is yet too early to indicate the ultimate effects of the current criticism of China, we may safely say that we feel, and many liberal-minded Chinese also feel, that in the long run constructive criticism will be productive of benefit to China and to Sino-American relations, especially as such criticism furnishes sincere and objective Chinese critics of the present reactionary control of the party and Government with support in their quiet efforts to be of [Page 57] beneficial influence. The realization by China’s leaders of the need to maintain American good will was made clearly apparent [at] the CEC27 session in September, 1943, in connection with the Communist question and the question of providing for future constitutional Government.28 That this realization is by now fairly widespread is indicated by the circumstance that in recent weeks we have been made aware of little open resentment against the critical American writers; and Chiang’s action mentioned in preceding paragraph is illustrative, we feel, of general realization of China’s need of America’s good will and assistance both during and after the war, as was also his reaction to Sun Fo’s29 recent speech at Central Corps on democracy and constitutional government reported in our despatch 2392, April 3;30 we hear now that Chiang also ordered democratization of Kuomintang “within 2 years.”
The Chinese in general has a realistic and reasonable side to this [his] mentality and constructive criticism is, of course, the most effective for our purpose. At the risk of oversimplification, it is our conception that our pressing immediate problems in our relations with China are three: 1, to increase our aid to China so that she may in time take an offensive rather than a defensive role in the war against Japan; 2, to induce the Chinese to make now such affirmative contribution to the war effort as is in their capacity; and 3, to divert the Chinese Government from its Fascist-like tendencies, both political and economic, into the direction of democracy to an extent that will make it easy and natural for China to cooperate with us, economically as well as politically, after the war. Constructive public criticism can be of great assistance in all of these respects.