893.00/10–1744
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 7.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a summary translation30 (prepared by the Chinese Ministry of Information) of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s message to the people of China on October 10, 1944, the 33rd anniversary of the uprising at Wuchang commonly known as the Double Tenth anniversary.
The Generalissimo asserts that the coming year will bring victory and the successful conclusion of China’s national revolution; that to have fought a formidable enemy for seven years, three of them during a period of stringent blockade, “is a feat unknown in the annals of human struggles”. General Chiang states that “We are well aware of our shortcomings and weaknesses in political and economic affairs”, adding that “Such shortcomings are unavoidable in a nation going through a revolution and, in general, nations waging a war”. He decries faultfinding and undue criticism in such circumstances, asserting that they merely “lend comfort to the enemy and traitors”. The Generalissimo goes on to say that “Recent malicious rumors circulated by the enemy and the traitors have, however, influenced the views of some foreign observers, and as a result, a section of foreign opinion has advanced confused views on our military and political affairs …31 due largely to an inadequate perception of the true nature of our war of resistance and to imperfect understanding of the characteristics [Page 648] of a revolutionary nation”, adding that “We must not allow ourselves to be influenced by other people’s praise or reproach”.
General Chiang declares that the “War in Eastern Asia cannot be fought successfully without China’s participation and the future of world peace is closely linked with the success or failure of our revolution”; and that the “objective and basis of our struggle are unchangeable …32 and no matter how the situation may develop in the future, we shall continuously maintain our friendship with our Allies and discharge our responsibilities as a member of the United Nations in a spirit of mutual assistance and cooperation”.
The Generalissimo minimizes the importance of the current military operations along the China coast and the railways, saying that “temporary gains and losses or local success and failure at this time cannot shake the faith in our final victory”. Stressing that China relies on “revolutionary spirit” to guarantee final victory, he goes on to say that there are 400,000 regular Chinese troops east of the Peiping–Hankow and Canton–Hankow railways who are “capable of delivering massive blows against the enemy” and that China has in reserve “ample manpower and material in the interior provinces” to repel the Japanese if they should endeavor to invade “the real base of our war of resistance”.
Finally, the Generalissimo refers again to the “intrigues of the enemy and traitors”, asserting that “their object is to mislead the world and undermine our war spirit and self-confidence”. Apparently referring to critical comment appearing in the press abroad in regard to the situation in China, he repeats his charge that “some foreign commentators, unfamiliar with the real background, have also lent themselves unwittingly to a wider circulation of such rumours, not realizing that they are aiding and abetting our common enemies—the Japanese and the traitors. But as long as we remain true to ourselves such rumours will fail to attain their objects and in the full light of the dawn our nation will march to final and complete victory”.
The chief significance of the Generalissimo’s message is the obvious revelation of his sensitiveness to external criticism of the situation in China. He seeks refuge in the charge that the criticisms stem from the “enemy and traitors” who wish to mislead the world and undermine China’s spirit and self-confidence, and that foreign observers and commentators with an inadequate knowledge and understanding of conditions in China have spread misleading reports abroad based on such criticisms. Or to put it in other words, the Generalissimo strongly denounces foreign writers and correspondents for painting what he terms a confused picture of the situation in China, and he endeavors [Page 649] to show that China is still a military power to be reckoned with in the prosecution of the war against Japan. The Generalissimo once again reveals his well-known characteristics of determination, tenacity, strong willpower and stubbornness, and at the same time that common Chinese weakness—inability to accept criticism.
The Generalissimo is not specific in his definition of the term “traitor” which is used several times in his message. It seems very likely, however, that he had reference to the Chinese Communists who, in the past month or two have, according to reports from Yenan, become increasingly critical of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Government at Chungking. During the past two years or so the appellation “traitor” in reference to the Chinese Communists has had common currency in Kuomintang circles and has even appeared in the Kuomintang-controlled press, although it should be related in all fairness that its use seems to have declined appreciably since the start of the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations in May at Sian. In all probability, the Generalissimo has been disconcerted by the allegedly glowing nature of the reports sent out by the foreign correspondents who have been visiting Yenan and is fearful of the reaction of foreign opinion.
According to information available to the Embassy, the Generalissimo is reported to be seriously concerned with regard to the state of relations with the Chinese Communists who he is wont to regard as an ever-growing menace to his regime. According to a reliable Chinese informant, the Generalissimo is represented as having recently said to a group of his close followers that the military and economic situation in China gave him far less cause for worry than the political situation, i. e., the Communist question. He is said to have stated that he could cope with the Japanese, whatever military operations they might undertake, but that the internal political situation was so complex that he was at a loss to devise means to deal with it. In this connection, there can be little doubt but that the Generalissimo entertains great anxiety as to the future attitude of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union toward the Chinese Communists.
In some respects, the Generalissimo’s message may be regarded as a warning to these Powers not to intervene in the Chinese Communist problem, and a warning that the Generalissimo will not countenance external advice or dictation in regard to it. As has been reported previously, the Generalissimo is almost certain to oppose any attempts of these Powers to supply the Chinese Communists with arms and military equipment, failing some kind of settlement whereby the Communists undertake to comply with the military orders issued by the Generalissimo. The prospects for a Kuomintang-Communist settlement, hitherto far from bright, appear to have been further dimmed [Page 650] as a result not only of Yenan’s diatribes but of the Generalissimo’s continued intransigeance.
Respectfully yours,