740.0011 P. W./10–1344
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 7.]
Subject: Operations of the 8th Route Army.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch No. 3052, October 11, 1944, “Strength, Distribution, and Arms of Communist [Page 645] Forces”, and to enclose a copy of report no. 18, August 31, 1944,28 on the subject of the operations of the 8th Route Army, prepared by Mr. John S. Service, Second Secretary on detail to General Stilwell’s staff who is now in Yenan with the U. S. Army Observer Section. The report covers a series of three lectures given to the Observer Section by General P’eng Teh-huai, Vice Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Route Army who is credited with a more intimate knowledge of the operations of that Army than any other of the Communist commanders.
Summary of Enclosure. The Japanese, holding all cities and fully equipped, have been unable to wipe out the weak Chinese Communist troops because the former have no political base and operate over too large an area and the latter have the cooperation of all classes, a democratic army based on volunteer recruitment and trained through combat, although they lack arms and ammunition, usually hold only small villages, and their areas of occupation are cut up by Japanese blockade lines. In contrast, the Kuomintang armies failed in North China because they lived off the people, opposed progressive policies, permitted no democracy, oppressed the people, carried out forced conscription, engaged in trade, failed to indoctrinate their troops, would not cooperate with the Communists, and eventually became Japanese puppets. The war in North China falls into four periods: from September 25, 1937 (the Battle of P’inhsingkuan) to October 25, 1938 (the fall of Wuhan); from the latter date to August 20, 1940 (the 100-Regiment Offensive); from November, 1940 to July 7, 1942; from July 7, 1942 to the present. In the first period, the Japanese hope for a short, decisive war was defeated by their failure to take account of the Communist armies and of the hatred of the general populace; the Kuomintang retreated south of the Yellow River but the armed resistance of the people sprang up everywhere in the Japanese rear, organized around nuclei of the 8th Route Army. During this period the Kuomintang armies were often deserted by their commanders; troops threw down their arms; and the local governments, deprived of protection, disappeared. The Communist armies cooperated with the Kuomintang and also moved in to the Japanese rear, meeting the Japanese converging attacks by dividing up and infiltrating through the Japanese lines. In the second period the Japanese policy underwent a major change: they henceforward recognized the Chinese Communists to be their main enemy; they began to employ racial, anti-foreign propaganda, and instituted a rigid blockade. During this period the Kuomintang also began to consider the Communists as their chief enemy; for the Communists this period was one of organization and consolidation of bases. The third period saw the beginning of the gradual concentric encirclement of the Communists by the Japanese; it was the worst period for the Communists. It also witnessed wholesale surrenders of Kuomintang forces in the area to the Japanese and the development of political work on the part of the Communists. In the fourth period, the main attention of the Japanese was engaged elsewhere; toward the Kuomintang troops they adopted the policy of “clarification”, forcing [Page 646] them to become outright puppets. The Communist armies were able in this period to reconsolidate and reorganize. In their present situation, the Communist troops could expand greatly although with what they have now their limit has about been reached. End of Summary.
Mr. Service notes in his comment on this report that it affords a striking reflection of the importance which the Communist military leaders themselves attach to their political program as the basis of military strength and success.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩