893.00/9–844
Memorandum by Mr. Augustus S. Chase of the Division of Chinese Affairs
Reference Chungking’s despatch 2944, September 8, 1944. As you97 have already seen a previous copy of the enclosure,98 which came directly without a transmitting despatch, your main interest will be in the Embassy’s comments on Service’s conclusions (beginning with the first full paragraph on page 2 of the covering despatch99).
The divergence between the Embassy’s and Service’s views is of interest. The Embassy, while agreeing that the “Communists” have moderated their policies and pursue for the present a policy of self-limitation and avoidance of civil war, is inclined to disagree with Service’s thesis that the “Communists” are sincerely committed to a permanent policy of non-availment of their increasing power to overthrow the Kuomintang government and establish themselves as a national government over part or all of China, and that the “Communists” hope to achieve their socialist goal through a long and peaceful process within the framework of democracy. The Embassy points to the “Communists’” creation and expansion of strong bases and powerful organizations as evidence that the “Communists’” present self-limitation is probably for time-gaining purposes only and that their real policy is one of expansion and development aiming at political and military control of China at the propitious moment.
While Service sees the “Communists” as meriting “so far as possible, a sympathetic and friendly attitude” on the part of the United States, the Embassy shows concern lest one or more of China’s allies [Page 596] arm the “Communists” without Chungking’s approval—which would have serious consequences for the Kuomintang regime.
Comment: With regard to the final paragraph of page 2 of the Embassy’s despatch, it might well be argued that the basic factor responsible for the existing Kuomintang—“Communist” impasse is not so much the development of strong bases and organizations by the “Communists” as suggested by the Embassy, but rather Chungking’s failure, upon the collapse of positional warfare with the fall of Hankow and Canton, to enlist popular enthusiasm in the war through the democratic reforms and guerrilla warfare espoused by the “Communists”.
As to the Embassy’s statement that the reorientation of Chinese “Communist” policy had its inception in 1936 when the fortunes of the “Communists” were at their lowest ebb, it might be well to add that, aside from the situation in the Far East, the “Communists’” reorientation followed the general decision reached at the 7th Congress of the Communist International in 1935 (which included Chinese representatives) in favor of a united front policy against aggressors throughout the world.