893.00/9–1344
The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Penfield) to the Secretary of State 74
[Received October 10.]
Subject: Szechwan Particularism
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 23, May 30, 1944, entitled, “‘Small Party’ Political Activity at Chengtu”, and other despatches reporting on local phases of more or less nation-wide “small party”, “democratic” and other dissident movements. In addition to, or perhaps more exactly, underlying and supplementing these activities, there seems to be centered in Chengtu a general and bitter resentment against the Central Government, based primarily on a feeling that Szechwan and the Szechwanese are not being given a voice in national affairs commensurate with their contribution and importance. The following brief description of this phenomenon, based on recent conversations with local (Szechwanese) militarists, officials, landlords and business men, may be of interest in evaluating the despatches referred to above.
Szechwan, with its wealthy and powerful landlords and warlords, has long been one of the most conservative, independent and troublesome provinces of China. An old proverb states, “Before the world is disturbed there is trouble in Szechwan; after the world is peaceful Szechwan is still unsettled.” Although these provincial characteristics have not been so openly evident during the past few years it is obvious even to a casual observer that a very strong particularism underlies the actions and attitudes of most Szeclrwanese. This feeling has its most general expression in the frequent use of the term “down river people” (Chinese from other parts of China) and the prevalent tendency to regard such Chinese as foreigners who should be kept on the “outside” in local affairs almost to the same extent as Europeans or Americans.
The typical Szechwanese appears to regard the Central Government as a semi-foreign organization which has moved in on his preserves and is bleeding the province without making any suitable return in power, prestige or material assistance. It is commonly (but probably inaccurately) stated that Szechwan is contributing two thirds of free [Page 570] China’s manpower and financial support but is being given little material assistance by the Central Government and is allowed to have only a minimum of influence in that Government.
One matter which is currently receiving a great deal of attention locally is the question of repayment of that portion of certain rice loans levied on the province in 1941 and 1942 which falls due this year. The amount of rice involved is said to be worth some CN$6,000,000,000 at present prices. The local papers have recently commented extensively on plans for using the money (instead of repaying it to those from whom the rice was “borrowed”) either for railway construction in Szechwan or for “local economic reconstruction”. Although a Central Government–Provincial split on the question has not been specifically mentioned in the press it appears that most local people feel that these proposals are merely Central Government stratagems to cheat them out of their just due—the repayment of loans made in good faith. Parenthetically, it is an interesting commentary on the extent to which corruption is accepted in present day China to note that one of the arguments adduced in a recent editorial supporting the railway projects as opposed to repayment to the original contributors, is that it would be physically impossible to return such a large sum to individual farmers and landlords without a considerable percentage of it disappearing in squeeze before it reached the payees.
In addition to this and other less important specific questions, two more general and long standing matters apparently loom large in the minds of influential Szechwanese. The first is the fact that, it is claimed, Szechwanese are not given their just proportion of Central Government positions, or, more euphemistically worded, Szechwan talents are not being properly used in the war of resistance. A specific example of this alleged discrimination recently cited is the replacement by a non-Szechwan man of Li Chi-hsiang, a local general commanding a Szechwan army on the Honan front who was killed in action there a few months ago.
The second matter, one especialy important to local warlords, is the fact that no American lend-lease military equipment has been given to provincial troops and that, except for a relatively few individual officers, none of these troops have been given American training. Furthermore, local generals complain, Szechwan (and other provincial) troops fighting at the front are invariably put in the most dangerous positions and given the most dangerous missions, but are always overlooked when commendations and citations are given out.
Regardless of whether or not it is justified, the feeling of particularism described above appears to be a fundamental emotion with most Szechwanese, and it is therefore, probable that local participation [Page 571] in such nation wide movements as the current campaign for democracy, for instance, is motivated more by provincial particularism than similar participation in other parts of the country. Taking into consideration, in addition to this factor, the differences in Szechwan personalities, economic structure and background as compared with other parts of China, it may be logically assumed that, fundamentally, this province is one of the most important barriers in the way of an effective unification of the country and that, under certain circumstances, dissident activity in Szechwan might follow a very different pattern from such activity elsewhere in China.
Respectfully yours,
- Approved by the Ambassador in China for transmission to the Department.↩