Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI

740.0011 PW/9–2944

Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Service)⁴³

No. 19

[Yenan,] August 31, 1944.

Subject: Possible Usefulness in Present War of Old Communist Bases in Southeast China.

To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech. USAF-CBI, APO 879.

1. The fact is probably not generally recognized that the present New 4th Army, the second main military organization of the Chinese Communists and numbering some 150,000 regular troops^*, was created out of remnants of the old Communist forces left behind in Southeast China when the Communists started their “Long March” in 1934, and that their old bases there are still potential centers of guerrilla resistance.

2. These “rearguards” of the main Communist forces withdrew into a number of mountainous regions especially suited to guerrilla warfare, usually along provincial boundaries, where in operations on a limited scale they were successful in resisting Kuomintang attempts at extermination which continued up to 1937. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, with the creation of the Kuomintang–Communist United Front, a general amnesty was issued by the Central Government to these forces and they were amalgamated into a new special unit, the New 4th Army, for guerrilla operations against the Japanese in the lower Yangtze Valley. This origin and early development of the New 4th Army is described in Colonel Barrett’s report no. 12, September 1, 1944,⁴⁵ which is based largely on material supplied by General Chen Yi, Acting Commander of the New 4th Army, in a lecture to the officers of the Observer Section on August 10, 1944.

3. A number of Communist leaders have made passing reference to the possible potential usefulness of these old bases in Southeast China from which the New 4th Army was organized. For instance, General Chu Teh discussing the general war situation in China in an interview with Maurice Votaw on July 15, 1944, had said:^†

“If the manpower of China were really mobilized, it is entirely possible that with our guerrilla forces we could annihilate the Japanese in China. Take the present fighting around Leiyang, Hengyang and that area. They are all old bases of the Red Army, and the people living there are very militant and highly trained from past warfare. But due to Kuomintang suppression, the people dare not gather together to fight the Japanese. These people have arms because the regular troops abandon them in fleeing from the enemy. …⁴⁶ It is difficult for the Kuomintang to train the people in guerrilla warfare. There are mass guerrilla leaders in Hunan but the Kuomintang would kill them if they came into the open. If allowed to, we will be glad to send cadres to other districts to train soldiers and people in guerrilla warfare.”

4. With these statements in mind, I took the occasion of a private conversation with General Chen Yi, on August 25, to draw him out on the history of these old guerrilla bases.

General Chen talked most interestingly and at great length. He himself spent the period from 1934–37 in the areas on the Kwangtung–Hunan and Kwangtung–Kiangsi borders, mostly in the vicinity of Nanhsiung (Namyung), with a high Kuomintang price for his head, usually only a small band of guerrillas with him, moving continually through the hills and villages to elude and harass the surrounding Government forces, and often having hair-breadth escapes from capture or death. His personal experiences, many of which I have heard only from others, would make a most thrilling book.

The chief interest of General Chen’s story, however, is that it shows that it was the support of the local people that made possible this continued resistance against seemingly overwhelming Government forces. The Communist Party was able to maintain its underground organization in the villages. In some small remote districts it actually kept its own governments. The villages cooperated actively with the guerrillas by warning them of the movements of the Government troops by sheltering them when possible, and by smuggling food and supplies to them when they were forced to take to the hills. The Government was finally forced to adopt the measure (later used by the Japanese in Manchuria and more recently in parts of North China) of forcing the peasants to live only in stockaded and guarded villages.

Although this continuing warfare on the fringes of the old Communist areas did not receive much publicity (the Central Government had publicly announced that the Communists had been crushed and driven from the areas), its existence has been confirmed by a number of foreigners (such as Rewi Alley and Ralph Lap wood) who subsequently traveled through some sections in Kwangtung and Kiangsi. The independence and aversion of the people of these areas to government control has reportedly been a major problem of the Central Government’s wolfram monopoly.

5. These old remnant bases of the Communists forces are shown, in blue, on the attached map^46a—which is copied from one in the possession of General Chen. They are 13 in number and are generally located as follows: (Names are as used by the Communists)

1. South Honan (west of the Pinghan RR on the Hupeh–Honan border)

2. Hupeh–Honan–Anhui (east of the Pinghan RR where the 3 provinces meet)

3. Northeast Kiangsi (at the meeting of the Anhui, Chekiang and Kiangsi borders)

4. South Chekiang (on the Chekiang–Fukien border near the coast)

5. East Fukien (near the Chekiang border)

6. North Fukien (on the Fukien–Kiangsi border)

7. South Fukien (on the Fukien–Kwangtung border near the coast)

8. Hunan–Hupeh–Kiangsi

9. Hunan–Kiangsi

10. South Hunan (two near-by areas in the region where the Hunan, Kwangtung and Kiangsi borders meet)

11. Kwangtung–Kiangsi

12. Juichin (Fukien–Kiangsi border)

13. Fukien–Kwangtung

6. The details of present conditions in most of these areas are not now known to the Communists. Since the “New 4th Army Incident” of January, 1941, the members of the New 4th Army have been regarded by the Central Government as rebels and have been unable to return to or have direct contact with these old base areas in which most of their homes are located.

By the Kuomintang agreement under which the New 4th Army was organized, these home bases were not to be interfered with. The existing local governments were not to be disturbed. Land holdings were not to be forcibly changed. The families of the men who left the bases to form the New 4th Army were not to be molested.

The Communists claim that this agreement was violated even before the “Incident”. The governments (which had been only on the village or possibly in a few cases hsien level) were reorganized by the Kuomintang; the land was given back to the landlords (as it had been earlier in the rest of the former Communist areas); and in many cases the families of known members of the New 4th Army were arrested and subjected to violence.

Resistance broke out in all or most of the areas. In some the Kuomintang was successful in crushing it by military force. But in other areas, the Communists are sure, sporadic resistance against the Central Government still continues. It is undoubtedly on a small scale and Communists claim to find confirmation in occasional newspaper reports of banditry and Government bandit suppression in these old base areas.

7. After this history of these old bases, I made the comment that if the expected Japanese attempt to open the Canton–Hankow Railway is successful, these areas (ignoring the two which are north of Hankow) would perhaps be freer of strong Kuomintang control. General Chen gave me a sharp and seemingly surprised look and said with some excitement: “That is just what we are considering.”

The General then went on about as follows: “After the New 4th Incident and the definite break with the Kuomintang, and especially after they learned that the Kuomintang was trying to liquidate these old bases, many of the old cadres and officers of the New 4th Army demanded that they be allowed to return and carry on the old fight for their homes. The Communist authorities did not permit this, but instead continued their movement north of the Yangtze River, where they have remained except for the small force that moved into East Chekiang after the Japanese occupation in 1942.

Now, however, the Communists are considering this question. If the Japanese close the Canton–Hankow line, the Kuomintang forces east of the railway will be weakened and cut off from supplies. Since they have proved in North China their inability to live and fight under guerrilla conditions they may lose most of the territory to the Japanese (if the Japanese want to take it) without much of a fight. This seems all the more likely because of the indications—in the Honan and Hunan fighting—that the fighting ability of the Kuomintang forces has sunk to a new low. It will also be likely because the Kuomintang forces will have, not the support of the people in these areas, but more likely their active resistance.

But this section of Southwest China may be of great importance to the war against Japan because it must be the site of American landings. If the Kuomintang cannot hold it, the Communists can. They could easily send officers and old cadres into the old bases from their present operating areas in the Yangtze Valley. Organization and training would be incomparably easier than it was in North China. The organizers would be natives of the areas who know it well from the long years of civil war and subsequent guerrilla fighting. The people would be already indoctrinated and eager to mobilize under a democratic regime. The arms would be plentiful from the Kuomintang forces who have been defeated and scattered all through the area by the Japanese. In six months the Communists could be sure of at least 100,000 well organized and effective guerrilla fighters.

So far the Communists have not decided to do this because they want to avoid more trouble with the Kuomintang, which would consider such expansion an aggressive act by the Communists and resist it violently. The Communists are not afraid of this competition with the Kuomintang, but it would be a stage closer to civil war, and it would interfere with fighting the Japanese.

Now, however, the situation may be changing. The possible near collapse of the Kuomintang in these areas, and the importance of the areas to the United Nations war effort must be considered.”

8. It would be a mistake to assume that the Communist consideration of the problem is all on the high-minded and unselfish plane that is indicated here. I have suggested, in paragraph 9 of my report no. 15, August 27, 1944,⁴⁷ that this particular question is a part of the general problems which the Communists are now studying. If the Kuomintang is going to continue the trend it now shows—determination on elimination of the Communists—then the Communists, in order to prepare to defend themselves, may take the initiative by actively trying to extend their influence. If the Kuomintang is going to collapse as a force able to actively resist Japan, the Communists may take the leadership by trying to organize these regions for guerrilla warfare in conjunction with American landing forces.

9. This second possibility is of possible direct military importance to American forces that may have to operate in Southeast China. If the Kuomintang is going to prove a hopelessly “broken reed” as far as holding this section of China is concerned, we may be able to find an effective ally in the Communists.

The Communists would not need much in the way of supplies. They will have the support of the local people because they will be the local people. They already have a small existing nucleus in the East River area. There is another at present in East Chekiang. But the expansion here contemplated would go far beyond those areas and fairly well cover the southeastern provinces. There are at least two areas where these old bases lie on the coast (See nos. 4 and 7 on map) where contact might be made and supplies landed.

10. But if these forces are to be organized and ready in time to be of any use, there must be a quick decision and speedy action on our part.

11. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted to the American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF-CBI, for the information of Mr. Davies.

John S. Service

Approved for transmission:
David D. Barrett, Colonel, G. S. C.

43. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his despatch No. 3020, September 29; received October 25.
44. See my report No. 17, August 30, 1944. [Footnote in the original; for summary of report, see despatch No. 3052, October 11, from the Ambassador in China, p. 635.]
45. Not found in Department files.
46. See my report No. 3, July 30, 1944, enclosure (f) page 4. [Footnote in the original; for summary of enclosure under reference, see despatch No. 2923, September 1, 1944, from the Ambassador in China, p. 536.]
46. Omission indicated in the original.
47. Not attached to file copy of this document.
47. Post, p. 602.