893.00/8–1044: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 10—1:45 p.m.]
1385. 1. Ringwalt at Kweilin reported through army channels [on] 9th that Li Cho-hsien, known to him as close associate and personal representative of Marshal Li Chi-shen, had called on him and asked that message to following effect be forwarded on behalf of Marshal Li to highest American authorities concerned:
“Paraphrase. In order to cope with the critical situation with which China is at present confronted, a provisional government to be known as Southwestern Government of Joint Defense will be established in near future and will be participated in and supported by a number of military and political leaders and by Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Fukien, Anhwei, Szechwan, Yunnan and Sikang. It will have following intentions: (1) substitute a democratic form of government under leadership of Kuomintang in lieu of present one-man party dictatorial government at Chungking; (2) effect a general mobilization and bring about national unity in order to cooperate with the Allies in crushing the Japanese; (3) obtain closer cooperation and better understanding with the Allied countries. A telegram will be sent out simultaneously with the formation of this government signed jointly by all the members who advocate this movement demanding resignation of President Chiang Kai-shek. It is expected that this can be obtained without armed conflict. The provisional government will be headed by Marshal Li Chi-shen, former Chief of Staff to President Chiang when latter commanded revolutionary army in famous northern expedition of 1926 and president of the Military Advisory Council of Chungking”.
Informant stated that it was expected that new government would be established in Kwangtung and Fukien so as to be in position to cooperate effectively on South China coast with the United States Armed [Page 506] Forces in the anticipated landing. He was anxious to enter into immediate negotiations with the competent American authorities. He said it could command the immediate support of a force of 8 to 12 divisions of Hunan and Kwangtung.
Ringwalt adds that he considers that the message should be given thorough immediate consideration as practical approach to a solution to what he describes as otherwise hopeless South China political and military situation.
2. I have telegraphically instructed Ringwalt through Army channels that he should remain aloof from the movement, dealing with local defense authorities as such, and that he should be exceedingly careful not to give any suggestion in connection with the movement of support, encouragement, approval this faction or recognition thereof. He, together with Consul General [at] Kunming and Secretary [at] Chengtu, has been instructed to look for any association of military elements with Federation of Democratic Parties, Communists and groups [of] young army officers and to report promptly all available information and developments.
3. Matter has been discussed with Hearn who is referring Ringwalt’s telegram to Stilwell for comment and instructions. My instructions sent to Ringwalt were made known to Hearn. It is believed he understands the situation and its implications, and the attitude to be adopted by our military officers which, in our opinion, necessarily involves the making of no suggestion that American recognition of and cooperation with present Chinese Government is in any way altered while at the same time American military of southwestern fronts must continue to cooperate with Chinese forces operating in the field against the Japs.
4. It is not without range of possibility that approach to Ringwalt was in nature of a feeler similar to that recently made to Consul in Kunming to ascertain whether we would support movement or mediate. On other hand, as it was probably impelled by fall of Hengyang it is also possible that the movement is now being forced out into open earlier than contemplated and that Generalissimo has waited too long to take remedial measures and will be faced with a division of free China into two areas and camps, the dissidents controlling the Chinese military forces which are actually assisting ours by defending regions in which we maintain air bases.