893.00/8–744
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Ward)25
On July 13 in the course of brief conversation with the undersigned, Mr. Lin Tsu-han, the Chairman of the “Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border Region Government” at present in Chungking as the representative of that regime in the negotiations with the Central Government, reviewed again the essence of the Communist position, asserting that the absolute minimum requirements of the Communists were an acceptable provision for the Chinese Communist Army and the establishment of democracy. He said that no reply had been received from Yenan to the counter-proposals of the Central Government, and expressed the intention to remain in Chungking until the answer had come. He had had one further conversation with Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, one of the two representatives of the Central Government in these negotiations, since the officer’s last call at Communist headquarters on July 5 (reported in the Embassy’s despatch no. 2750, July 6, 1944). Mr. Lin stated that in that talk, at which only Dr. Wang and himself were present, he had felt that the former had adopted a somewhat more sympathetic and conciliatory tone.
On July 27 the undersigned again called at the Communist headquarters, being received by Mr. Tung Pi-wu, the resident representative in Chungking of the Communists, and the Secretary of the head-quarters, [Page 498] Mr. Li Pong. Mr. Lin was not present. Mr. Tung had that morning received a copy of the regular English service of the Central News Agency for July 26, 1944, in which there appeared a review of the course of the negotiations quoted from a statement which Mr. H. C. Liang, the Minister of Information of the Kuomintang Party, was reported to have given in a press interview. This statement, a copy of which is attached,26 was headed: “Relations between Kuomintang and Communists Improved”, although its fourth paragraph reads:
“But the obstacle to the fundamental solution of the problem so far has been the fact that while the Communists announced their intention of cooperation, they have not carried it into effect and on the contrary have done things in contravention to (sic) their pronouncements. They have, in short, thrown their well-meaning intentions to the winds and proceeded to take the power into their own hands.”
The release also quoted Mr. Liang as “revealing” that “after one week’s conversations between Dr. Wang Shih-chieh and General Chang Chih-chung, representing the Central Government, and Mr. Lin, representing the Communists, some sort of agreement was reached and signed by Mr. Lin”.
Mr. Tung stated that he wished to protest the whole statement, but it was evident that he reacted particularly strongly against the paragraph quoted above. This paragraph, he claimed, disclosed the intent of the whole article, and it and the article were a true reflection of the Kuomintang attitude throughout the negotiations. The heading stated that relations had improved, and the text of the article was cleverly worded to give the impression that the Central Government sought their improvement, but if the Central authorities were really constructively trying to bring about a settlement, why should they write into such an article a paragraph like that, flatly and provocatively charging the Communists with bad faith? Mr. Tung pointed out this article was for foreign consumption, and he expressed the belief that no such statement would be likely to appear in the Chinese press, although the Central Government must have been well aware that the Central News release would come to the attention of the Communist representatives here.
A reply to this press interview was being prepared by the Communists, Mr. Tung said, and a copy would be supplied to the Embassy when it had been completed.
Concerning the assertion contained in the Central News Agency release that “some sort of agreement was reached and signed by Mr. Lin”, Mr. Tung stated with great definiteness that absolutely no agreement was at any time signed with the Central Government or its representatives. At Sian, where, Mr. Tung said, General Chang and Dr. Wang [Page 499] had informed Mr. Lin that they had come to welcome him and to accompany him to Chungking as an earnest of good faith, there had taken place a week of informal conversations, in the course of which, for instance, the Communists had reduced their earlier demand for 16 armies with 47 divisions to 6 armies with 18 divisions. The representatives of the Central Government stated that it would recognize 12 divisions only. Other desiderata were also gone over, with the familiar differences between the two parties developing in each case.
At the close of these conversations Mr. Tung asserted that General Chang and Dr. Wang produced a written record of the exchange of views, containing the gist of the discussions which had transpired. Mr. Lin made certain slight revisions, and signed the revised copy, Mr. Tung said, on the clear understanding that he was signing what amounted to minutes, and that General Chang and Dr. Wang would also sign. He requested them to do this, but they refused.
It is this document, composed partly of statements of the Kuomintang position and partly of those of the Communists, to which the press release in question would make it appear that the Central Government now desires to hold the Communists, as to a signed agreement, which Mr. Tung asserted repeatedly that it definitely was not.
Answering the charge that the Communists had “thrown their well-meaning intentions to the winds and proceeded to take the power into their own hands”, Mr. Tung sketched briefly the aspects of the negotiations to which he assumed the accusation related.
According to Mr. Tung, on May 22, five days after Mr. Lin’s arrival in Chungking, the latter had formally brought up before the Central Government representatives the Communist desiderata, listed as twenty points. These points, the content of which is reviewed in the Embassy’s despatch no. 2740, July 5, 1944, were regarded by General Chang and Dr. Wang as too strong to be acceptable. Mr. Tung said that he felt that they were motivated by the fact that the wording of the twenty points did in fact imply a sharp criticism of the present Central Government. Mr. Lin had therefore wired Yenan for instructions in the premises, and received in reply a restatement of the twenty points in twelve points, dropping out certain of the minor matters, such as the request for the relaxation of the censorship of the Hsin Hua Jih Pao (Communist newspaper published at Chungking), as well as the demand that the Central Government give up its plans to stage a paid demonstration of people against the Yenan regime before the group of correspondents who were then about to go to Sian.
Mr. Tung said that upon the receipt of this new list, the Communist representatives telephoned to General Chang and Dr. Wang on June 4, and the latter agreed to meet them. At the meeting, which occurred [Page 500] the same day, an exchange of proposals took place: Mr. Lin handed over the Communist “twelve points” and General Chang and Dr. Wang produced the Central Government’s counter-proposals. These latter, covering (1) the military problem, (2) the question of local governments, and (3) the status of the Communist Party, offered no amelioration of the position, and Mr. Lin did not believe that they would be acceptable to Yenan, but he undertook to wire them there. On their part, however, Dr. Wang and General Chang informed Mr. Lin that they would not refer the Communist statement to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. In reply, Mr. Tung quoted Mr. Lin as saying, “I shall report your proposals to Yenan with a statement of your refusal to submit those which we have made to your superiors; if Yenan then asks that your proposals be returned, I shall do so”. Only then, Mr. Tung said, were the Central Government representatives willing to say that they would at least transmit the Communist proposals. In mid-June Mr. Lin received a letter from the two representatives stating that they had in fact sent forward the Communist proposals.
On June 28 Mr. Liang made the short press statement which was quoted in toto in the enclosure to the Embassy’s despatch of July 5 referred to above, and which the Communists felt was an effort to place the onus upon them if the negotiations failed; on July 1 Chou En-lai issued to a reporter of the Hsin Hua Jih Pao what amounted to a reply (a copy of the report of this interview is also enclosed),27 and on July 2 Mr. Lin made the statement in the Hsin Hua Jih Pao which caused the suppression of the entire mail edition of that day’s paper (see Embassy’s despatch no. 2750, July 6, 1944).
In recounting this sequence of events, Mr. Tung said that they only bore out what the Communists had been aware of before the inception of the negotiations: he asserted that a copy of a document had fallen into their hands which the Central Government distributed to the 12th Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee, and which had also been distributed to General Tang En-po’s troops, the text of which revealed the Kuomintang plan to carry out “false” negotiations which would be brought to failure.
Throughout the three months during which, to read the Central News reports of their progress, there have been almost constant discussions, there have in actual fact been, Mr. Tung asserted, only four or five meetings which could be called by that name.
Mr. Tung said that on or about July 15 Yenan had informed Mr. Lin that it would be happy to have Dr. Wang and General Chang visit Yenan to continue the present negotiations; if both could not go, it was hoped that one would be able to.
[Page 501]In an effort to convey this invitation to them, Mr. Tung continued, Mr. Lin called both Dr. Wang and General Chang by telephone three different times, but was unable to get in touch with them. Finally he wrote them each a letter, to which General Chang replied about July 19 giving Mr. Lin an appointment four days later. In this interview, at which only General Chang and Mr. Lin were present, the latter formally extended the invitation of the Border Area regime to Dr. Wang and the General, informing General Chang at the same time that if neither could go, it would be necessary for Mr. Lin himself to return to Yenan alone to report to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party the status of the negotiations. He stressed to General Chang the argument that the present difficulty in communications, due to the circumstance that all messages to Yenan had to go over Chinese Government military wireless, made it impossible to give the Border Area authorities a true picture of how the negotiations were developing. The lack of such information in turn made it impossible for the Central Committee at Yenan to complete the drafting of their counter-proposals, so that until Mr. Lin returned, with or without Dr. Wang and General Chang, the negotiations could proceed no further.
Mr. Tung said that he did not believe that either of the Central Government representatives would accept this invitation, and indicated that he felt that the negotiations were at an end. The Kuomintang, he repeated, had never really intended that a solution be reached; they had never been sincere. “And as for Mr. Liang’s assertion in the press release of July 26 that a part of the Kuomintang–Communist problem has been solved”, Mr. Tung added with finality, “not a hair’s weight of anything has been settled”.