761.93/7–2444
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for the Secretary of State11
For years the U. S. Government has desired, and from time to time has given expression to its desire, that China attain democratic unity. In recent years the U. S. Government has been especially anxious that China achieve unity to strengthen its resistance to Japan and to strengthen its position in the post-war era.
The long years of China’s resistance to Japan and the resulting enhancement of China’s prestige have been in large measure responsible for China’s inclusion as one of the “Big Four”. Efforts of the U. S. Government in recent years have been directed toward obtaining for China full recognition of its place as one of the “Big Four”. We would greatly regret to see China’s position among the great powers weakened through internal disunity.
In Chungking Vice President Wallace urged President Chiang to seek means to improve China’s relations with the U. S. S. R. and in that connection stressed the importance of a settlement between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists. Mr. Wallace made it clear that the U. S. Government’s sole interest in the matter derived from its desire for effective prosecution of the war in Asia and the establishment of cooperative and constructive peace.
President Chiang expressed a desire for settlement with the Communists and said that such a settlement would make it possible for him to put into effect earlier than anticipated his democratic program for China. But the impression derived from President Chiang’s further observations did not encourage belief that a settlement would result from current negotiations.
President Chiang also expressed desire for improved relations with the U. S. S. R.; said that China would “go more than half way” in reaching an understanding with the U. S. S. R.; and requested that the U. S. Government use its good offices to bring about a conference of Soviet and Chinese representatives.
President Roosevelt telegraphed President Chiang on July 13,12 expressing gratification over the report which Vice President Wallace [Page 485] brought back concerning his conversations with President Chiang. But President Roosevelt expressed the view that, prior to any conference with the Russians, it would be advisable that the Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Chinese Communists.
You will, of course, understand that we are not presuming to pass upon the merits of points of issue between the National Government and the so-called Chinese Communists. This Government has no suggestions to offer with regard to the character of a settlement with the Communists. But it does suggest that unity in China based on democratic tolerance is vital to the prosecution of the war; that a settlement with the Chinese Communists would promote, if it is not a condition precedent to, an improvement in Chinese-Soviet relations; that no problem, which now impedes a settlement with the Communists and with other non-Kuomintang political elements in the country, is believed to be insoluble; and that the early institution of President Chiang’s democratic program might serve to unify support of the Government and revitalize war activity, and at the same time facilitate settlement of the special Communist problem.
The foregoing suggestions are offered not in behalf of or to the prejudice of any special group or interest. They are offered in the interest of a strong, unified, democratic China which can maintain its place in war and peace alongside the other United Nations, and in particular alongside the powers most vitally interested in the Pacific area—the U. S. S. R., the British Commonwealth and the U. S.—, and can work in close harmony and collaboration with them.
- Submitted on July 24 to the Secretary of State by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Grew) with the following comment: “In line with your discussion of July 21 with Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Vincent and myself, it is believed advisable that you choose an early opportunity to have a conversation with Dr. H. H. Kung in regard to conditions in China, with particular reference to their bearing on Chinese-Soviet relations. There are suggested on the attached memorandum certain facts and arguments that you may wish to present to Dr. Kung. The statement has been prepared in a form which would make possible your handing a copy to Dr. Kung informally if you so desire.” Marginal notation by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent): “It is not believed that the Secretary ever made a statement along these lines to Dr. Kung”.↩
- See telegram No. 955, July 14, 4 p.m., to the Ambassador in China, p. 245.↩