893.00/6–944
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 27.]
Subject: Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang on Necessity of Improving Condition and Leadership of Chinese Armies.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s telegram no. 1001, June 8, 2 p.m.77 on the above subject, and to enclose a copy of a memorandum of June 6, 1944,78 prepared by Second Secretary John S. Service (on detail to General Stilwell’s Headquarters), which formed the basis of the telegram in question.
Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, prominent in China’s civil war period as the “Christian General”, is now a member of the National Military Affairs Council, member of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and a State Councilor of the National Government; but in none of these positions does he appear to have any considerable influence. He has recently been traveling about free China, making speeches to the people and raising funds for war relief purposes. He has a certain popularity among the people for his interest in their welfare; and he has been successful in his money-raising activities.
His views on the condition of China’s armies and China’s military leadership are undoubtedly sincere. The deplorable condition of the Chinese troops has been commented upon frequently in the Embassy’s despatches and telegrams to the Department. As to China’s military leadership, the estimate of our own Army officers on the point undoubtedly is known in Washington. The Embassy does not feel competent to pass judgment on individual Chinese military commanders, but it has heard much in the way of criticism of these commanders—as to their military ability, their corruption, and their treatment of the common soldiers.
I cannot accept the view of Marshal Feng that Chinese commanders who have risen from the ranks are more competent to lead China’s armies than are those trained in the military academies; but there is truth in the criticism that favoritism and political influence, and not ability or experience, have placed a number of the higher commanders in their present posts, while commanders of proven worth fail to receive recognition.
I am certain that Generalissimo Chiang would not react favorably to any endeavor on the part of American diplomatic officials or U. S. Army officers to influence him to undertake the tremendous task of general reformation and reorganization of the Chinese armies. Indeed, [Page 454] it is doubtful whether the Generalissimo is now in a position to do anything substantial in this direction as his personal power is based primarily on the loyalty of the commanders whom Marshal Feng would be rid of and on the balance of power which he maintains among them.
Respectfully yours,