893.00/6–844
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 27.]
Sir: Referring to the Embassy’s telegrams No. 919, May 27—2 p.m. and No. 926, May 30—2 p.m., in regard to the 12th Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, I have the honor to enclose74 (a) copy of a Central News Agency despatch of May 26 containing the manifesto issued by the CEC and (b) copy of a Central News Agency despatch of May 28 reporting the four important resolutions approved by the CEC, and to report further on the subject of recently concluded session.
Summary. The 12th Plenary Session of the CEC, which met at Chungking from May 20 to 26, was generally felt to have accomplished little at a time when the seriousness of the military, political and economic crisis facing the country demanded statesmanship of the highest order from this supreme governing organ of the nation. The reactionary CC clique dominated the session, apparently feeling [Page 449] sufficiently strong to attack and overcome all opposition. Chen Kuo-fu, one of the two Chen brothers who head the CC group, was elected (Party) Minister of Organization to succeed Chu Chia-hua, thus further strengthening the control of the CC clique over the Party and pointing to an increased organizational effort on the part of that group to ensure its control, and simultaneously that of the Party, over the “constitutional government” to be established after the war. Liberals, both within and without the Party, viewed the results of the session as a defeat, for it had been expected that the need to offset recent foreign and domestic criticism of China and the Kuomintang by ostensible democratic reforms within the Party would result in some action which would outwardly give the appearance of liberalization of the Party. The Generalissimo was reported to have displayed resentment of the foreign and domestic criticism in his speeches to the CEC; and Dr. Sun Fo, who had recently been outspoken in his criticism of the lack of democracy in the Kuomintang, was said to have exerted no influence during the session. The failure of the session to take any steps to meet the mounting wave of criticism within the country was expected to increase the political ferment among all liberal and dissident groups in the nation. End of Summary.
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Speeches to the Session
Although it is customary for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s speeches to the CEC sessions to be reported both in the Chinese and in the English language press, no mention was made of them in the Central New Agency’s English Service and only the barest outline of them was reported in the Chinese press. An informed foreign source (who does not read Chinese) states that an English translation of the Generalissimo’s speech at the opening of the session was prepared by the Ministry of Information for publication but that for some reason not known to him it was decided not to release the translation. This source states that the speech as translated was comparatively mild, the only portion which could in any sense be described as strong being that in which the Generalissimo stated that some of the recent foreign criticism of China had arisen from misunderstanding and could, therefore, be disregarded, some of it was justified and could be studied to China’s advantage but that criticism of the Chinese army was a cause of deep resentment as such criticism reflected upon the nation.
It is logical to assume that the translated portions of the Generalissimo’s speeches were those least likely to give offense abroad and that the failure to publish any of his speeches is in itself some indication that they were of such a nature that they would not be well received by foreigners.
Usually well informed sources report the substance of the Generalissimo’s speech at the opening meeting as follows: Criticisms both at home and abroad that China is not a democracy show a lack of [Page 450] understanding. Our fifty year revolution has been a striving for democracy. I have devoted myself to this cause. I cannot agree with those who say that China is not a democracy. We should be grateful for sincere and friendly criticism, but if others insincerely criticize us such criticisms are unfriendly and represent interference with China’s internal affairs and her sovereignty. These criticisms are insults. The purpose of the abolition of extraterritoriality was to free China from outside interference. Foreigners have criticized our censorship. British and Russian censorship is, however, more restrictive than ours. Why don’t they criticize them? We are always treated as semi-colonial.
On the third day of the session the Generalissimo is reported to have delivered another strong attack on critics, particularly those in the Party, the substance of which is as follows: Instead of assisting in overcoming the heavy tasks before us many of our comrades are devoting themselves to fault finding and blind obstructive criticism. They see only the bad and close their eyes to the progress we have made and the great things we have accomplished. For example, the Chengtu airfields built with the labor of thousands of men have been the world’s greatest engineering feat, we have built in two years roads that would normally have required ten years and our troops in Burma and west Yunnan have won great victories. These critics have so little faith that they cry that all is lost in Honan but I can guarantee you sensational good news from there in the very near future. As for foreign criticism, I at first paid some attention to it, but it has now passed the point of being reasonable. Formerly if foreigners found 1% good about China, they said that China was 100% good. Now if they find 1% bad, they say that the other 99% is also bad. We should stop worrying about such criticism just as I now disregard it. These criticisms, both from our comrades and foreigners, play into the hands of the Japanese and their puppets. Censorship must be maintained to protect us against these unfair criticisms. All that is censored now, despite foreign complaints, consists of false rumors and reports. However, there should be greater freedom allowed to persons and publications showing fairness, accuracy, responsibility and a historical perspective.
Other portions of this speech are said to have dealt with the question of price control, the improvement of the livelihood of government officials and increase in government revenue. There is no indication in any reported versions of the Generalissimo’s speeches that the vital military, political and economic problems with which China is now confronted were given the exhaustive and thoughtful consideration warranted by existing conditions.
[Here follows detailed report of meetings.]
[Page 451]Conclusion
Various explanation[s] have been given by Chinese observers for the failure of the CEC to take adequate steps to meet the crisis with which China is now confronted. Some observers feel that the Generalissimo could not propose reforms to meet foreign and domestic criticism as the carrying out of such reforms would in itself be an admission of the validity of the criticism and would result in “loss of face” for him. Other observers point out that the Generalissimo feels that China can probably go on, even in a rapidly deteriorating situation, for another year and that he does not feel that the recently concluded CEC session offers the last opportunity open to him if compromise with liberal forces in China should become necessary. These observers explain that the Generalissimo probably expects the war situation in the China theater to be more favorable before the end of a year and that his position, with ample American and possibly British aid at hand, will be sufficiently strong to enable him to weather the crisis. Many Chinese feel that the recently concluded CEC session marks a turning point in the situation in China and that the continued ignoring by the Kuomintang leaders of the opposition and criticism within the country will merely increase the intensity of that opposition. The problem of the opposition is one of leadership. Younger army officers are said to be dissatisfied with conditions; the minority parties are becoming increasingly vocal; Dr. Sun Fo is now said to have the warm approval and respect of Chinese liberals for the first time in his career; various dissident provincial elements, including such reactionary figures as the Szechuan warlords and General Lung Yun, are reportedly taking an interest in movements to establish a “United Front Government” in the event of a collapse of the Chungking regime. The failure of the Kuomintang in the CEC session to make any apparent effort to meet this tide of political unrest can be expected to increase the political ferment which might have been allayed by Kuomintang adoption of needed reforms.
It is generally believed that the trend of the CEC session points to an all-out effort on the part of the Kuomintang to strengthen its control over the various local self-government units and that Chen Kuo-fu’s appointment as Minister of Organization was made with that end in view. The Kuomintang is looking toward the establishment of constitutional government and intends that its position under whatever constitutional government is established will be so strong that its domination of the government will be perpetuated under the cloak of the expression of the people’s will. Critics of the Kuomintang leadership point out that regardless of the proposals, resolutions and reforms made by the Kuomintang, there can be no expectation of any real change in the Government or of any real democracy in China until [Page 452] there are changes in Government personnel at the top which will remove from positions of leadership those persons whose only interest lies in the retention of their power and position. The 12th Plenary Session of the CEC revealed no indications that any of the Kuomintang leaders who are most severely under attack, such as Dr. H. H. Kung, General Ho Ying-chin and Chen Li-fu, have any intention of relinquishing their positions. Nor are there any indications that the Generalissimo himself will take any action to remove such officials. His failure to take such action, whether it arises from his dependence upon such officials or from his feeling that they are completely loyal to him, is beginning to arouse undercurrents of criticism against the Generalissimo himself.
Respectfully yours,
- Enclosures not printed.↩