893.00/5–3044
Memorandum by Mr. Augustus S. Chase of the Division of Chinese Affairs to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)
Mr. Stettinius: Reference Chungking’s telegram no. 907 of May 25, 1944, concerning reported progress by Marshal Li Chi-sen and others in forming a united front for action in the event of the Chungking Government’s collapse.
This information fits into the picture already evident from the Embassy’s previous reports. Since last autumn Marshal Li Chi-sen, who long before the present war embarrassed Kuomintang rightists by his activity and prestige among groups demanding stiffer resistance to Japan and cooperation with the “Communists”, has been working quietly in Kwangsi toward an understanding among dissatisfied elements. In this work he has obviously had the sympathy, if not cooperation, of other Kwangsi leaders and the Kwangsi Provincial Government. In recent months General Pai Chung-hsi himself left his duties as national Deputy Chief of Staff at Chungking for a protracted stay at his Kwangsi home and is said to have been seriously considering severing his relations with the Central Government. To meet the situation, the Generalissimo abolished the Kweilin Office of the Military Affairs Commission which Li Chi-sen headed; sought to effect Li’s transfer to Chungking by appointing him to a nominal military post there; has endeavored to retain Pai’s loyalty by offering him some new important post; and has tried to expand Central Government control in Kwangsi with a view to eliminating the Province’s potentialities as a remaining stronghold of liberal thought.
In late 1943 a group of young army officers, with apparently extensively organized support, took advantage of the Generalissimo’s absence in Cairo to plot a coup which reportedly aimed to force the Generalissimo to dismiss high-ranking officials (Dr. H. H. Kung, the Ch’en brothers, General Ho Ying-chin) believed to be guilty of corruption and inefficiency. The movement, which was quashed, at least temporarily, at first seemed possibly related to Li Chi-sen’s activities; but later reports suggested that it was confined to a military clique of Fascist rather than liberal complexion.
Available information has indicated that the “understanding” envisaged by Li Chi-sen involves concerted action in the event of the Chungking Government’s collapse or embroilment with the “Communists” rather than any immediate coup; and that Li has been mainly concerned with enlisting in this understanding military commanders in south and west China (Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Yunnan and Szechwan) who have resented encroachments by the Kuomintang [Page 440] “dictatorship”. Parallel with his activities, however, has been a general movement of gravitation toward a common anti-government front on the part of various dissatisfied groups, which, fearing Kuomintang-government centralization as a threat to their existence, see advantage in a common front and in cooperation (thus far potential) with the “Communists”. These groups include: provincial military-groups generally; minority political factions (Federation of Democratic Parties); liberal Kuomintang elements; members of the rightist Whampoa military clique; and Manchurian troops. The diversity of these groups and their motives renders unlikely their sustained solidarity in the event of the Kuomintang’s collapse, but the liberal and strongly anti-Japanese sentiment of the more dynamic elements (notably the Kwangsi group and minor political parties) make it probable that the new government which might be formed would press a more vigorous war effort against Japan and effect at least wartime cooperation with the “Communists”.
This general picture is not changed materially by Chungking’s latest telegram under reference. It would appear that Li Chi-sen has been increasingly active; that he may have reached an understanding with the Szechwan and Yunnan military leaders and the Federation of Democratic Parties; and that his further progress towards forming a united front is delayed by General Pai Chung-hsi’s hesitancy to join the movement wholeheartedly. The Embassy, while regarding these reported developments as revealing the “possible extent of dissatisfaction with the present regime”, is inclined to doubt that the movement has reached the point of “active existence” and serious threat to the Central Government. It points out that, if the Government did fear such a threat at the present juncture when its strength vis-à-vis the “Communists” is seriously weakened by new Japanese invasions in central China, it would presumably have taken active steps toward conciliating one or another dissatisfied faction and utilizing the occasion of the recent Kuomintang Central Executive Committee session to adopt popularly demanded reform measures. There is as yet no evidence of such steps being taken.
Of interest in this connection are (1) a recent report from the American Consulate at Kweilin (despatch no. 109, April 1964) indicating that the Kwangsi delegation to the Central Executive Committee meeting had earnest hopes of using the opportunity to persuade the Generalissimo of the vital need—from the all-important standpoint of relations with the United States and the U. S. S. R.—of admitting dissident groups (including “Communists”) into the Government and of revitalizing the military and economic aspects of China’s war effort; [Page 441] and (2) Chungking’s telegram 919 of May 27 (attached),65 which appears to confirm that, aside from a possible slight relaxation in domestic censorship, the Central Executive Committee (which ended its session May 26) made no concessions to liberal groups, and that it further strengthened reactionary Kuomintang control.
In view of these factors, and of the Central Government’s present preoccupation with the new Japanese offensives, the activities of Marshal Li Chi-sen and other dissatisfied elements (especially Pai Chung-hsi and his colleague, General Li Tsung-jen) should bear very close watching.
It should be noted that there has thus far been no indication of any move against the Generalissimo personally.