893.00/15425
The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Drumright) to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)54
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegrams nos. 57, April 26, 3 p.m., 68, May 3, 3 p.m., 70, May 4, 11 a.m., 82, May 15, 4 p.m., and 86, May 21, 6 p.m.,55 in regard to the Kuomintang–Communist negotiations held near Sian. It may be appropriate and desirable to collate and review such information as is available in regard to this subject.
The Chairman of the communist “Border Government”, Mr. Lin Tsu-han, is reported to have arrived in Sian by truck from Yenan on May 1st. He is reported to have been accompanied by Messrs. Wang Jo-fei and Wu Yun-fu.
Mr. Lin’s arrival in Sian was followed closely by that of General Chang Chih-chung, who was said to be representing the Kuomintang; Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, who was said to be representing the National [Page 430] Government and the People’s Political Council; and Mr. Lei Chen, Vice Minister of Interior. They flew up from Chungking by plane, arriving in Sian the evening of May 2nd.
Conferences between Mr. Lin and the Chungking representatives are said to have commenced on May 3rd. The site of these conferences is reported to have been Wangchu, a village situated about 20 kilometers south of Sian. The delegates resided in Wangchu (presumably in a residence that is retained there for the infrequent visits of the Generalissimo). Contrary to preliminary reports, it appears that neither General Hu Tsung-nan nor Chu Shao-chou (the Shensi Provincial Chairman) nor any other local officials took any part in the negotiations and discussions.
It is reported that the Kuomintang and communist representatives held four or five lengthy discussions between May 3rd and May 15th on the subject of party relations and national unity and the measures to be adopted and put into effect to bridge the gap separating the two political groups. During the period of these discussions rumors of all shades were rife in Sian, but most of them seem to have had little foundation. Indeed, for once the Chinese seem to have been able to hold a discussion in comparative secrecy; there appear to have been few, if any, leaks. It is reported that the representatives present at the discussions refused to discuss them with outsiders. General Chu Shao-chou told foreign correspondents from Chungking that he was not a party to the discussions and could not discuss them. The foreign correspondents saw Dr. Wang Shih-chieh on the air field at Paoki (he was returning to Chungking on the plane which had flown the correspondents to Paoki) and he also refused to comment on the negotiations and discussions.
According to information available to me (which is derived from a source who seems to have contact with Chinese Communist circles), the discussions were of an exploratory nature and were not productive of any satisfactory results, even with respect to minor problems. My informant said that it seemed that the Chungking representatives were not empowered to make any settlement. He said that a request made by Mr. Lin Tsu-han for the release of four communist guards seized at Sian a few months ago had been rejected, as had a further request of Mr. Lin for the withdrawal of a cordon of secret service operatives thrown about the Sian headquarters of the 18th Group Army. The removal of the venue of the discussions to Chungking suggests that little progress was made in the Wangchu conferences. Had there been any concrete results, it seems likely that the conferees would have been only too happy to announce them to the world.
The Kuomintang and communist conferees flew to Chungking on May 17th where it is assumed that the discussions have been continued, [Page 431] with the Generalissimo perhaps taking a hand in behalf of the Kuomintang.
The severe mauling received by the Central Armies in Honan at the hands of the Japanese, and the resultant threat of a Japanese invasion of central Shensi, can hardly have any other result than the strengthening of the communist position vis-à-vis the Central Government. Until the Japanese invasion of Honan General Hu Tsung-nan obviously regarded the communists as the major threat to his Shensi domain, but now that attitude must be discarded. The fact that General Hu has been busy moving several of his armies from their positions opposite the communists to the Honan-Shensi border area is clearly indicative of changed circumstances. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the communists would find it politically expedient at this time to take advantage of the present crisis to expand their territorial control of Shensi.
The decision of the United Nations to assist Tito in Yugoslavia may also be raising fears in the Chungking Government. The time may come when the United States and Great Britain will have to determine whether it will be expedient and desirable for them to assist and cooperate with the Chinese communists in driving the Japanese from north China. That the Chungking Government will do everything in its power to prevent such a development is almost certain. Obviously the best way to prevent such a development seems to lie in the reaching of an agreement between the Chungking Government and the Chinese communists. Will the two groups be able to reach a satisfactory agreement to unify and cooperate? Past experience and the present position of the contending groups seems to suggest that there is very little real hope for the reaching of such an agreement.
Respectfully yours,