General Ho’s letter contains no new material and follows closely the
Kuomintang propaganda line against the Chinese Communists. There are obvious
untruths in the letter, such as the inference that the Central Government
troops blockading the Communist areas were sent to the Northwest only after
the Communist concentrations in north Shensi in July 1943, when the
circumstances as generally admitted even by Central Government officials are
that the Communists did not increase the number of their troops in north
Shensi until a month or more after the Central Government had reinforced its
blockade in July of last year. The accusation that the Communists hinder the
war effort and do not wish Allied pressure on Japan is hardly borne out by
the Domei reports of constant Japanese clashes with Communist forces in
north China in recent months while there is almost no reference by Domei to
any fighting with Central Government forces. The statement that the Central
Government has no intention of making use of puppet units is hardly credible
and the placing of the blame on the Communist forces for the surrender of
these erstwhile Chungking troops is slightly ludicrous. It is also difficult
to reconcile General Ho’s statement that the people in the occupied areas
are loyal in their support of the Central Government while a state of unrest
prevails in Communist areas with the reports of conditions in the
Communist-controlled areas in north China received by the Embassy from
impartial observers who have resided in or passed through those areas during
the past two years.
General Ho’s letter is the more astounding in that it actually represents a
reply to direct questions posed by the American military authorities here,
questions which reveal a lack of political sagacity and which were asked of
the Chinese military authorities on the basis that answers thereto would
enable the American authorities to keep the War Department correctly
informed of the situation. The questions asked were leading questions to an
extreme, such as “Is it possible that the Communists or other forces will
start a civil war in 1944?” and “Is it the long range policy of the
Communists to start a war now or to wait until the conclusion of the war
with Japan?”
General Ho’s letter was handed to the Embassy by General Hearn for its
information and is being forwarded to the Department as an example both of
Kuomintang thinking and of the political naiveté of the American military
authorities.
[Enclosure—Translation]
The Chinese Chief of Staff (Ho) to
General Stilwell’s Chief of Staff (Hearn)
[Chungking,] April 12, 1944.
Dear General Hearn: This will acknowledge the
receipt of your letter of February 28, 1944, addressed to General Shang
Chen, former Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the National
Military Council. To your query I wish to reply as follows:
1. The policy of the Chinese Communist Party is to resort to the use of
all kinds of intrigues and conspiracies to prolong China’s war of
resistance as long as possible or even to frustrate China’s war effort
altogether in the hope of creating a state of general confusion in the
Far East. Taking advantage of the confusion and in cooperation with
certain international elements, the Chinese Communist Party would seize
the political power in China to serve as a stepping stone towards a
World Revolution.
In the current year—1944—there is always the possibility of an armed
revolt on the part of the Chinese Communists against the Central
Government. Since last July, the Chinese Communists have been
withdrawing their armed forces from Shansi and elsewhere and
concentrating them in North Shensi. They have since taken up a position
from which they could threaten the rear of the 8th War Area. This action
on the part of the Chinese Communists is obviously strategically
favourable to the enemy. To meet possible emergencies, the Central
Government has been compelled to maintain a certain number of troops in
that region. In other words, these troops are stationed there as a
precautionary measure against a possible Communist uprising as well as
against a possible Japanese invasion of that region. In fact, the
Central Government is having the situation well in hand and has seen to
it that even [if] the Chinese Communists should stage a revolt no
strategic advantage would be allowed the Japanese. Nevertheless, the
Government is still doing its best to prevent the Chinese Communists
from taking such a step. It must be emphasized that aside from the armed
forces of the Chinese Communist Party, there is no independent armed
unit throughout China.
2. Since 1941 the strength of the Chinese Communist Party has been on the
decline. Out of the troops who had been coerced into submission by the
Communists, three Divisions have been organized by order of the Central
Government. Of the rest, they are only an unorganized and undisciplined
and untrained horde. Therefore, should they actually rise up in open
armed revolt the Central Government will be able to mete out immediate
and effective measures to cope with the situation and no strategical
advantage would be allowed the Japanese.
[Page 402]
The Government, however, is still maintaining a
policy of tolerance towards the Chinese Communist Party, hoping that
nothing of that nature would be done by the latter.
3. The object of the Chinese Communist Party is to seize political power,
“sovietize” China and create disturbances in the Far East in general and
in China in particular. As to how they will seize this opportunity to
carry out their plans, that is only known to themselves. However, there
is one thing that should be noted. That is that the Chinese Communist
Party is never willing to see China win a complete victory in the
present war of resistance through close cooperation between the Chinese
Government and our Allied Nations, particularly the United States and
Britain. So, whenever the military situation in China develops in our
favour, the Communists would not hesitate to resort to malicious
propaganda and fabulous attacks on the Central Government in an effort
to nullify our military successes. It is not unexpected that the Chinese
Communist Party will take the time when difficulties develop in China’s
military situation as the ideal hour for them to strike.
The action of the Chinese Communist Party is not decided by the situation
in China alone. For instance, before the conclusion of the Russo-German
Pact,23 the Chinese Communist Party put up a strong
argument in support of a joint peace front between China, the United
States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia. But following the conclusion of
the said Pact, the Chinese Communist Party’s tone changed into an attack
on the United States and Great Britain, branding them as “imperialistic”
nations. They called the war a war “between imperialistic countries” in
which China should not take part. But when Germany started to attack
Soviet Russia,24 the Chinese Communist Party again
contradicted their own earlier statement by declaring that this war was
a “war against Fascism” and that both the United States and Great
Britain were democratic countries. They are opposed, however, to the
Allied Nations bringing pressure on Japan at the present moment and they
are particularly opposed to the Allied Nations utilizing Soviet military
bases in the Far East against Japan. All these contradictory statements
made by the Chinese Communists, as you will see, could not be explained
by the status of the Chinese Communist Party in China alone.
4. Many puppet troops in Japanese occupied territories in China were
forced to surrender to the enemy as a result of treacherous attacks
[Page 403]
made on them by the armed
forces of the Chinese Communist Party while they were engaged in heavy
fighting against the enemy. All such treacherous attacks were carried
out by the Communist troops either from the flank or from the rear.
Being sandwiched in between by the Japanese troops and the Communist
forces, these troops were compelled to become puppets. In fact, these
troops have no love for the Japanese and they were only victims of
circumstances. One does not need to worry as to how these puppet troops
would act when the right hour strikes. On the other hand, however, the
Central Government, in order to build up a strong front in our war of
resistance, has no intention of making use of these puppet units.
One of the main supporters of the Central Government is the Chinese
people in Japanese occupied territories. Before the Chinese Communist
Party unmasked themselves, these Chinese people, believing that they
were a part of the Government troops, welcomed them as they did to other
Government forces. However, since 1940, the Chinese Communists gradually
showed their treachery and consequently a strong social reaction was
created among the Chinese people in occupied areas. Subsequent to that
year, in territories not penetrated by the Chinese Communists, the
people did everything to prevent them from gaining a foothold in those
regions while in all areas under Communist penetration a state of unrest
prevailed. To meet the unfavourable situation for them, the Chinese
Communists resorted to methods of terror in an effort to terrorize the
people into submission. Nevertheless, they persisted in deceiving the
people by saying that they were engaged in the war of resistance and
that they still supported the Generalissimo. Under such circumstances,
the people in Japanese occupied areas are far more enthusiastic and
loyal in their support to the Central Government than the general public
believes them to be. It is this tendency on the part of the people in
occupied territories that worries the Chinese Communists most but
against which they could do nothing.
5. 1940 was the year in which the armed forces of the Chinese Communist
Party carried out most of their unlawful activities. At the present
moment, however, nothing serious has been done by the Chinese Communists
aside from concentrating their main force in North Shensi and indulging
in independent unlawful acts as a result of the lenient policy now being
followed by the Central Government.
6. In order to enable you to have a clear picture of the situation I am
sending you herewith a set of photographs showing the banknotes and
postal stamps issued by the Communists. In addition, I am going to send
you seven important documents promulgated by the Chinese Communist Party
dealing with different parts of the bogus
[Page 404]
administration. All these documents are now being
translated by the Foreign Affairs Bureau and they will be sent to you as
soon as they are ready. The documents in question are as follows:
(A) Undermining National Unity of
China by the Establishment of a Bogus Regime:
1. Decisions concerning the unification of Party leadership in areas used
as bases for anti-Japanese activities and decisions for the readjustment
of relations between the various Party organizations.
(B) Undermining the National
Communication System:
2. Provisional Regulations Governing the Function of the Communications
Office of the Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border Regime.
(C) Undermining the National Financial
Administration:
3. Regulations Governing the Punishment for Undermining the Currency
Administration in the Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border Regime.
4. Text of Proclamation promulgated by the Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border
Regime suspending the circulation of legal tender notes.
5. Regulations promulgated by the Finance Department of the
Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border Regime Governing the Procedures for
exporting legal tender notes.
6. Regulations promulgated by the Finance Department of the
Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border Regime Governing the application for permit
to export legal tender notes.
(D) Undermining Social Security by
Strengthening Secret Service Agencies:
7. Regulations governing the organization of the Anti-Spy Committee of
the Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border Regime.
7. Before 1940, the Central Government accorded similar treatment to the
Chinese Communists as that given to other citizens of China and
encouraged them to join various Government military units for the
prosecution of the war of resistance. However, as soon as they joined
these military units, the Chinese Communists started to instigate
insubordination among these forces and forced them to join the ranks of
the Communist forces. Prominent among the troops who had been compelled
to join the Communist armed forces were the troops of the 14th Guerrilla
Detachment under Shen Tze-chin in North Anhwei, those of the 111th
Division of the 57th Army under Chang En-to in Shantung, the 269th
Brigade, 169th Brigade, the 2nd Independent Brigade, and two
administrative commissioners, Po Yi-po and Chang Wen-ang, under General
Yen Hsi-shan, Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd War Area. They all revolted
against the Central Government and joined the Communists under the
latter’s instigation.
However, since the treachery of the New Fourth Army (a Communist unit)
has been brought to light the general public is paying more
[Page 405]
attention to the activities of
the Chinese Communists. It is therefore unlikely that much opportunity
will be offered the Communists to conduct illegal activities within the
ranks of the Government forces. What is more, many Communist units have
disowned their Party and have returned to the fold of the Central
Government. Prominent among these troops are those of the 6th
Instructional Brigade of the 115th Division under Hsin Jen-pu. In this
connexion, I should say that the most effective precautionary measure
against Communist activities is to carry out in a thorough-going manner
an educational system in strict accordance with the Three Peoples’
Principles of the Kuomintang and to promote the national consciousness
of the Chinese people. This measure has already been put into execution
and has produced considerable success.
Sincerely yours,
