893.00/15332
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 6.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of March 2, 1944,97 written by Mr. James L. Stewart, Assistant Director of the Chungking OWI Office, reporting observations made to him by four Chinese Kuomintang officials and newspaper men.
Summary. Mr. Stewart interviewed the following Chinese prior to his recent departure for the United States: Wang Yun-shen, editor of the Ta Kung Pao (influential independent Chinese daily); Chen Po-shan, chief editor of the Central News Agency (semi-official); General Wang Peng-sheng, Director of the International Affairs Research Office under the Military Affairs Commission and the Generalissimo’s chief Japanese expert; and General Wu Teh-chen, Secretary-General of the Kuomintang. The chief comments of interest made by the four men are as follows: Wang Yun-shen—strategy is determined solely by the Generalissimo; American and Chinese views concerning post-war Japan were felt to be identical*; the Japanese Emperor must be discarded*; it is doubtful that the British will ever fight hard against the Japanese*; China must make a greater war effort (also said by Chen); the Communist situation is hopeful (repeated by Chen); the chief blame for the present price situation should be placed on the rich families, such as the Soongs and Kung; and there will be a united China after the war. Chen Po-shan—the Generalissimo can be held to his pledge that the Communist problem will be solved politically; America should take the lead in guiding China’s postwar policy toward Japan and some Chinese officials wish to see all Japanese heavy industry transferred to China; China must have a navy (a view also held by General Wang); American influence must be used to bring unity in China; this year is the most serious year of [Page 37] the war for China because of the price situation, but normal crops can still pull the nation through; the picture of China taken home by American soldiers is important and those soldiers should be taught something about China; pressure from non-Communist sources will be so strong the Government will be forced to call a national congress after the war. General Wang Peng-sheng—the Generalissimo is steadily becoming more fixed in his views and feels that in the matter of foreign criticism of China the cases of the Turkish and Russian revolutions should be recalled; foreigners, particularly Americans, condemned those early revolutionary regimes but they are today stable governments and the same will be true of China; there should be [postwar] Sino-American cooperation in ship construction in Formosa in order to freeze out British interests; Soviet Russia must be given a voice in the settlement of the Korean and Thai questions; and China will not be imperialistic. General Wu Teh-chen—postwar, like wartime, China depends for its success on the Generalissimo’s personality; the Generalissimo will be able to keep all factions in line; Japan must be totally demilitarized† and limited to light industry only; the American people are too emotional and although the British are difficult to deal with because they look down on the Chinese it is easier for China to come to a long range agreement with the British than with the Americans; Soviet foreign policy deceives the world into thinking the Russians have in mind the emancipation of all oppressed peoples but Stalin97a has said nothing about the people of India, the most severely oppressed; the Communists are backing down and the situation will be satisfactory; if any Kuomintang members are guilty of acts contrary to Sun Yat-sen’s teachings, the Party will split. End of Summary.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- View expressed by all four. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- View expressed by all four. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- View expressed by all four. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- View expressed by all four. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Commissars of the Soviet Union.↩