Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI

893.00/15319

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

No. 2303

Chungking, March 14, 1944.
[Received March 25.]

Sir: Referring to the Embassy’s despatch no. 2160 of February 15, 1944, in regard to provincial military factions within China, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of March 2, 1944, prepared by Second Secretary John S. Service,⁹⁷ on detail to General Stilwell’s staff, regarding the unification of anti-Central Government elements.

Summary. In his memorandum, Mr. Service offers his observations on a memorandum (attached) of February 22, 1944,⁹⁷ on this subject written by a member of the staff of OWI at Kweilin. Activity of provincial elements is said to be a reflection of provincial restlessness under growing Central Government pressure and the fear of provincial interests that this pressure will be increased with the approaching end of the war. The preservation of their own selfish and divergent interests is not a sound basis for joint action. The real opposition on their part to civil war is believed to be their wish to perpetuate the status quo so that they may continue to exist by holding a kind of balance of power. Democratic aims or patriotic zeal, or plans for a new government or party are most unlikely, and the hopes of the minority political parties (looking both to the Communists and to the provincial elements for support) that they can influence the provincial militarists toward democratic progressive reforms and active prosecution of the war or that they can bring the Communists and these local elements together to form a government seem unfounded. The war in China has stimulated political consciousness to a point where loose separatism, the goal of the provincial elements which would mean a return to the chaos of the early years of the Republic, is impossible. End of Summary.⁹⁸

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss

97. Not printed.
97. Not printed.
98. Mr. Service concluded in his memorandum that civil war in China was likely after the war, and that out of such civil war “there can be expected to emerge either a more progressive Kuomintang Government or a communist state, probably of the present modified Chinese communist type.”