Major General Patrick J. Hurley to President Roosevelt 84
CFB 24103. The following message dated 9th October 1944 was handed me by Generalissimo with request I transmit to you immediately.
“To The President:”
“It was with regret that I read your telegram of October 6th.85
I am willing and indeed anxious to meet your wishes, whether by the appointment of an American officer to command all Chinese Forces, or one to command only those in Yunnan and Burma. I am likewise agreeable to your other proposals. The officer chosen, however, must be one in whom I can repose confidence, and must be capable of frank and sincere cooperation. You will, I am sure, agree with me that these are indispensable qualifications.
As I have set forth at length in my aide-mémoire of September 25th,86 General Stilwell has shown himself conspicuously lacking in these all-essential qualifications and you will understand that I cannot maintain in authority such an officer.
[Page 167]In taking this stand, there has not been any change or reversal in my approach to the problem, which has consistently been to require of the principal American officer cooperation and comportment deserving of my confidence.
I therefore stand on my original request that you will relieve General Stilwell and replace him with another officer better equipped to discharge duties of such import. I can assure you that the policies; which you advocate will then be executed without delay. Let me repeat that we are in entire agreement on all points of policy, and that I am grateful to you for the splendid and unvarying friendship and great aid you have always given to China. But in good conscience, considering my tremendous responsibility to the nation I cannot knowingly confide the execution of policies of such profound importance to an officer who in my opinion does not possess the qualifications essential for success.
I am moved to make this request by the compelling realities of the situation. I have discussed it more fully with General Hurley, and have asked him to elaborate on this brief statement if necessary. Sensible to the urgency of the crisis which now confronts us, I greatly hope that you can take prompt action.”
Here follows an aide-mémoire from the Headquarters of the Gissimo dated October 9th, 1944.
“To Major General Patrick J. Hurley.”
“In my telegram replying to The President which I have just handed to you, you will note that in order to avoid what may be considered controversial matter, I have purposely limited it to a simple statement of lack of confidence in General Stilwell and a request for his recall. So long as I am Head of State and Supreme Commander in China, it seems to me that there can be no question as to my right to request the recall of an officer in whom I can no longer repose confidence.
There are, however, certain essential points which I wish to make informally, with a view to obtaining full and clear personal understanding between the President and myself. I am anxious to secure such an understanding since the President’s courageous and farsighted leadership in the war against Axis aggression has won my unbounded admiration, and since he has my lasting gratitude for his generous assistance to China in her struggle to win independence and her rightful place in the family of nations. The President has been a constant inspiration to me and to my people, so that any misunderstanding between us distresses me most deeply.
Both the President and the War Department are dependent on General Stilwell for information concerning the military situation in China. Thus the President may not be aware that I not only have no confidence in General Stilwell, but also lack confidence in his military judgment. I believe the record sustains my opinion, and I shall summarize it briefly.
General Stilwell and I have never agreed about the Burma campaign. I have most naturally been anxious for a campaign in Burma which would reopen land communications with China. At the same time, in view of the enemy’s superior communications in that area, [Page 168] and the difficult terrain, I have always insisted that the only strategically sound campaign in Burma was one which included amphibious operations in south Burma to insure rapid collapse of the enemy’s resistance. From the first, I have repeatedly warned General Stilwell that a limited offensive in north Burma would be more costly than could be justified by the results and might even prove exceedingly dangerous. I had also given my opinion to the President when we met at Cairo.
At the Cairo Conference, commitments were finally made by the representatives of the United States and Great Britain which appeared to insure the kind of Burma campaign which I could approve. Unhappily, those commitments were abandoned shortly after I left Cairo. General Stilwell then came to me and announced that he proposed to proceed with a limited offensive in north Burma. I again warned him of the consequences, stating specifically that I feared the project would be difficult and costly, and would engage all of China’s limited resources at a time when this would be dangerous. He treated my warning lightly, and intimated that if I maintained my attitude, China would be suspected of wishing to withhold any real contribution to the Allied cause. At length I consented to his employing the Ramgarh troops, which were entirely American trained and equipped with the clear understanding that these forces were all that would be forthcoming.
It was not long before my warning was substantiated. The moment obstacles were encountered in Burma, General Stilwell began to use every sort of pressure to induce me to commit additional forces. I shall not enter into details. It is enough to say that by the beginning of May, the Burma campaign had drained off most of the properly trained and equipped reserves in China. At the same time, it had greatly reduced the incoming supply tonnage so that during critical ensuing months it was impossible to strengthen the military position in any area within China. It was not until June that the Hump tonnage, exclusive of the B–29 project, again reached the January level.
As I had feared, the Japanese took advantage of the opportunity thus offered to launch an offensive within China attacking first in Honan and then in Hunan. Owing to the Burma campaign, no adequately trained and equipped reinforcements were available for these war areas. Owing to the effect of the Burma campaign on the Hump tonnage, supplies were not forthcoming for the Chinese armies stationed in Honan and Hunan. The forces brought to bear by the Japanese in their offensive in east China were six times as great as those confronting General Stilwell in north Burma, and the consequences of defeat were certain to outweigh in China all results of victory in the north Burma campaign. Yet General Stilwell exhibited complete indifference to the outcome in east China; so much so that in the critical days of the east China operations, he consistently refused to release Lend-Lease munitions already available in Yunnan for use in the east China fighting. Prior to June 1944, with the exception of the Yunnan Expeditionary Forces, the entire Chinese Army did not receive a single rifle or piece of artillery from American Lend-Lease. It was not until the first week of June 1944, that General Stilwell at last visited Chungking to discuss the east China situation with me. When the [Page 169] enemy’s offensive was already well on the way to its objectives, General Stilwell finally consented to give a small quantity of equipment to the Chinese armies in east China, and to facilitate more effective air support. In all, excepting the Yunnan Expeditionary Forces, the Chinese armies nave received 60 mountain guns, 320 anti-tank rifles and 506 Bazookas.
In short, we have taken Myitkyina but we have lost almost all of east China, and in this General Stilwell cannot be absolved of grave responsibility. Even now he appears to be unaware of the implications of this fact and the grave damage to prestige and morale of the Chinese Army. It is possible that this fact, fundamentally important as it is, had not been pointed out to the President. Whatever my opinion of General Stilwell as a man may be, I might bring myself to appoint him to command in China if I thought well of him as a military leader. However, with all the facts before me I have come to the conclusion that he is not competent to envisage or deal with a problem of such range and complexity as now confronts us.
From what I have said above, it is also specifically evident that the various areas of war in China cannot be divided into independent sectors. Already what has happened in Yunnan and Burma has instantly and vitally affected all of China. To limit General Stilwell’s authority to Yunnan and Burma does not constitute a solution of the problem.
In his last telegram, the President asserts that the China situation has deteriorated so far that he is now inclined to feel the U. S. Government should not assume the responsibility involved in the appointment of an American commander of the Chinese Forces. I do not altogether understand this statement, for two reasons. First, no matter what happens, no matter what command arrangements are adopted, I cannot personally escape ultimate responsibility for the future of the China Theatre. Even the responsibility of General Stilwell’s errors must be borne by me since I allowed myself to be overpersuaded against my judgment to countenance them. Second, I cannot feel that the deterioration is so serious as the President suggests. After long years of experience and first hand knowledge of Japanese methods and strength, despite the defeats in east China, I cannot foresee any disaster fundamentally incapacitating China.
The statement was also distressing to me in another sense. While I do not anticipate disaster, the situation in China is indeed critical. Aid is most needed in an hour of crisis. Yet the statement I have referred to appears to imply that aid will be withheld precisely because this is an hour of crises.
I am disturbed by the fact that the President has expressed regrets at my ‘reversal of agreement’ with respect to the appointment of General Stilwell in command of Chinese Forces. My telegram to the President dated August 12th, showed great readiness to meet his wishes as far as humanly possible. Developments which I described in aide-mémoire of September 25th, have, I trust, made it clear why it has become impossible to appoint General Stilwell.
I am wholly confident that if the President replaces General Stilwell with a qualified American officer, we can work together to reverse the present trend and achieve a vital contribution to the final victory.”
The following are my comments:—
“I have been in almost constant conference with the Generalissimo. I spent last week end with him in the country. Our discussions of the Stilwell matter have been continuous. Before I left Washington you told me that your overall purpose is to prevent a collapse of China and keep the Chinese Army in the war. As a part of your plan to do this you had decided to sustain the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek. In studying the situation here I am convinced that there is no Chinese leader available who offers as good a basis of cooperation with you as Chiang Kai Shek. There is no other Chinese known to me who possesses as many of the elements of leadership as Chiang Kai Shek. Chiang Kai Shek and Stilwell are fundamentally incompatible. Today you are confronted by a choice between Chiang Kai Shek and Stilwell. There is no other issue between you and Chiang Kai Shek. Chiang Kai Shek has agreed to every request, every suggestion made by you except the Stilwell appointment.”