Major General Claire L. Chennault to President Roosevelt 74
Dear Mr. President: Some months have passed since my last report to you.75 At such a time as this, I have hesitated to trouble you with the problems of China; but the situation is now so grave that I feel impelled to write you again.
As I predicted in my last letter, the policy of concentrating our major military investment in Burma has now resulted in the loss of most of East China. I can honestly say that my men in the East have worked miracles with the force at their disposal. With an average of 90 operational aircraft, they have materially delayed the advance of eight to nine Japanese divisions. That advance, I am sure, would have been halted, if we had been enabled to initiate our effort before the Japanese offensive gained momentum, or if supplies had been made available for an air effort on a larger scale, or if the courageous Chinese Armies in the East had been given even a few tons of equipment. As matters stand, however, I fear that the fall of Liuchow, our last great East China base, is only a matter of time. The fall of Liuchow [Page 159] will create a politico-military situation which may be outlined as follows:
- 1.
- We shall no longer control any area from which we can strike effectively at vital points in the Japanese military structure, or offer effective support to our Navy’s operations.
- 2.
- China’s military power, never great, will be reduced almost to the vanishing point. Of the seven main groupings of troops in China, the four in East China will be either dispersed or cut off. There will remain only the Armies under General Chen Cheng based on Sian and Hanchung; the depleted Armies of the Sixth War Area, which stand between Chungking and the Japanese in the Yangtsze Valley; and the Armies now fighting on the Salween. Greatly increased supply tonnages will be available, both by air and, eventually, by road. But in my opinion these supplies will come too late. No tonnage of supplies will be enough to create an offensive striking force from the remnants of China’s military power, at any rate within eighteen months to two years time.
- 3.
- Of course the Chungking regime’s loss of military power will have far-reaching political repercussions. Very widespread political discontent is already evident in the area of Free China controlled by Chungking. What is even more important, Chungking’s loss of strength constitutes an equivalent gain for the regime at Yenan. Yenan will not only benefit by the change in the balance of power within China, but also by the penetration of East China by the Communist guerrillas based around Hankow, Shanghai and Canton.
I can imagine no more disquieting situation, unless it is your policy to withdraw American support from Chungking and leave an open field to Yenan. At the worst, the Russians may choose to support Yenan, involving us in a contest in which, as the supporters of Chungking, we shall find ourselves at a decided disadvantage. Even if we refuse to become involved in such a contest, there is obviously grave danger of civil war in China. Furthermore, if there is civil war in China, the Yenan regime has an excellent chance of emerging victorious, with or without Russian aid. In my opinion, it is too much to expect the Russians to resist the temptation to aid Yenan in such a conjunction. I know that at Yenan, and I suspect that at Moscow, ties between the two are now denied; but I cannot altogether forget the suggestive fact that the Yenan leaders took the rigid Communist Party line at the time of the Russo-German pact. I need not point out the extent to which the establishment of a government in China, closely tied to Moscow, would upset the balance of power in the Pacific, or what this might mean to us in the future.
There is only one way out now, as I see it. That is for us to sponsor thorough political reconstruction at Chungking, followed by true unification between Chungking and Yenan. Only in that way can we insure a strong, united and above all, independent China, such as our [Page 160] interests in the Pacific require. I would warn you most solemnly, however, that attaining this objective will be immensely difficult. It will have to be given absolute priority over all other objectives, either military or political. It will have to be done through the Chinese themselves. It can only be done by the persuasion and pressure of American representatives whom the Chinese leaders respect and trust, and it cannot be done by any attempt to reduce the Chinese to a condition of military or political tutelage. All our energy must go into the main effort, to obtain reconstruction at Chungking and unification between Chungking and Yenan. We cannot reach these goals by any roundabout road.
I venture to express my thoughts to you with the utmost frankness, since the loss of East China means that I no longer have anything to lose or gain, and because I am at least able to form a judgment on the basis of long and close acquaintance with the Generalissimo and his subordinates. You will take this, I am sure, as a purely personal letter, written solely because you once said you would be pleased to hear my views on vital Chinese problems.
With warmest regards and all my good wishes for success at home and abroad, I am,
Very sincerely yours,