893.00/7–1244: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13—6:30 a.m.]
1205. I had a long friendly off-the-record talk yesterday afternoon with T. V. Soong and again went over most of the ground covered by your 829, June 15 and discussed suggestion in penultimate paragraph of my 1159, July 4. Reference your 931, July 8, 7 p.m.
Question of military observers visiting Communist areas was settled during visit of Vice President. Army is now assembling group to go to Yenan.
Soong said military situation is slightly improved. He recognizes gravity of whole situation. Little is being done or planned to meet it.
On Communist negotiations, Soong said the two sides are very far apart and show little real disposition to get at the heart of problem and effect a solution.
On better relations with Soviet, Chiang has told Soong to “study the questions” but has given no intimation that he contemplates action toward desired end.
On suggestion in penultimate paragraph of my 1159, Soong asked time to think it over saying he wished to discuss it with Tai Chi-t’ao, [Page 125] President of Examination Yuan, now his house guest. Tai is one of Generalissimo’s oldest and closest friends and his influence might be helped if it could be obtained. Soong quoted Tai as seriously concerned over present situation. As showing Generalissimo’s attitude toward any governmental change, however, Soong mentioned that Generalissimo recently informed managing director of Ta Kung Poo, leading independent newspaper, that while press may now have greater freedom and may discuss such matters as the constitution, it must under no circumstances propose any changes in Government.
On question whether Chiang might be disposed to accept active advice of U. S. military or technical experts, Soong referred in confidence to Generalissimo’s long standing objection to Stilwell. In this connection, I know Generalissimo desires appointment of a personal representative of the President who he expects could give Stilwell orders.
Soong told me that after leaving Mr. Wallace in Chengtu, he put latter’s views to Chiang as forcefully as he could. Chiang’s attitude was expressed in typical remark that Mr. Wallace was well-meaning but “he does not know China”; the usual formula by which Chiang dismissed foreign criticism and advice.
Soong is willing to arrange appointment for me to see Generalissimo whenever I wish but in view of Generalissimo’s reaction to Wallace suggestions and in view also of fact that Department’s 931 was sent before return of Vice President and his report to President, I have deemed it advisable to withhold request to see Chiang for the moment and to report to you with suggestion that it may be desirable to correlate all information now in Washington with a view to definite and precise instructions in light of all reports.
I feel China situation is rapidly reaching desperate straits. Military situation may be momentarily improved by resistance at Hengyang but Japs will probably continue their drive as soon as they have reorganized and their supplies are received. Chiang undoubtedly is worried, but he gives no evidence of being prepared to meet the emergency. I feel that the situation can only be held by radical measures to effect a united front in China representative of all parties and elements who should share with Chiang the responsibility of making and carrying out plans for renewed resistance and for reviving spirit of resistance of both the people and the army. This would require a complete about-face on the part of Chiang and I do not know that other elements could be brought in even if Chiang agrees. I believe, however, the step worth trying and that it should be on Presidential level through diplomatic channels.
Let me add in connection with Chiang’s desire for appointment of a personal representative of President that if it is desired I am of course [Page 126] prepared without question to step aside as Ambassador to China in the interest of setting up here an effective coordination and direction of our vital diplomatic and military activities in this country.
A personal representative might be able to hold the situation together for few months of a honeymoon period of relations with Chiang and those few months might be important to the war effort. Chiang would probably expect such a representative to be high ranking military man in position to give orders to Stilwell. Needless to say he would lose all influence when he had opposed Chiang on important questions unless he could speak categorically for the President and have full support of the President and American Government. If appointed he and Embassy should be the channel of communication with Chiang on matters of the higher levels and a [there?] should be clearly established by Presidential directive a definitive arrangement for coordination of activities of personal representative with those of whoever is in charge of Embassy and with Stilwell or his local deputy and under which the representative would receive the fullest cooperation from, and would fully cooperate with, Embassy and headquarters and insure their full cooperation with each other.