861.24/5–2344
Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman), Temporarily in the United States83
May 19, 1944
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Soviet Lend-Lease Settlement
- 1.
- If we intend to make any post-war claims with reference to the lend-lease supplies we are providing the Soviet Union, it is essential that we explain our policy to the Russians during the war. Any presentation of unanticipated claims afterwards would seriously threaten the continuance of good relations. While it may not be possible to have a formal lend-lease settlement at this time, it might be feasible for me to explore the subject with the Soviet representatives at some appropriate moment in the evolution of our relations with them, and to set forth the general principles which in your view should govern in the final settlement.
- 2.
- We are concerned with two broad categories of supplies:
- (a)
- Lend-lease supplies destroyed, lost or consumed during the war. As I read the Master Agreement, your various statements on the subject, and the 1943 Reports of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I assume there would be no financial claim for such articles. They represent an integral part of our own war effort.
- (b)
- Lend-lease supplies left over in the Soviet Union at the end of hostilities. These fall into three categories: (1) stocks of military supplies; (2) consumable supplies of use to the civilian economy of the Soviet Union; and (3) installations and capital equipment of a productive nature which will have a permanent post-war value to Soviet industry. I think that category (3) raises the chief problem.
- We have the option of asking for the return of supplies furnished under lend-lease. If you wish to request some appropriate benefits, direct or indirect, as compensation for the post-war value of those supplies which we do not want returned in any one or more of the three categories listed above, I think we should make the point to the Russians as soon as our position can be formulated in detail. It should be noted in this connection that under the Liquidation Agreements now proposed, with your approval, the Russians will undertake to make substantial post-war payments for equipment supplied for long-range projects and for the purchase of lend-lease supplies undelivered at the end of hostilities. Additional payments for lend-lease supplies would, I believe, be a serious burden to our post-war trade with them.
- (c)
- If, on the other hand, you wish ultimately to wipe the slate clean as to all of the categories in paragraph (b), discussions with the Soviet Government on the matter might be held in abeyance for possible use in the conversations on post-war trade policy under Article VII of the Master Agreement. Article VII is a commitment on both sides to seek the expansion of trade and production, through appropriate international and domestic measures. Our expectations under Article VII will be discussed with the Russians in the context of the lend-lease settlement, though not, I assume, as the specific quid pro quo for the position you wish taken on the points listed above.
I shall be in Washington on Monday,84 and should like to discuss this problem with you for a short time then.
W. Averell Harriman