861.24/1769: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

1363. I do not believe that the assumption expressed in Department’s 800, April 4, 9 p.m., that “basic essential needs of Russia for food imports will remain unchanged through 1946 irrespective of status of hostilities”, is valid.

You have doubtless by now received the Soviet Fourth Protocol request which shows a very large decrease in cereals over the Third Protocol, a substantial decrease in sugar and concentrates and a renewed request for more canned meats than we have been able to give them, other categories remaining about the same.

Regardless of the status of hostilities, I believe that the food import requirements will be further reduced after the crop of 1945 than [Page 1078] requested for the Fourth Protocol and very considerably less after the crop of 1946. Please note I am not speaking of calendar years.

After the first crop subsequent to the end of hostilities against Germany, I believe the return of men from the army to the farms and the release of production for increase of farm equipment will substantially reduce food import requirements. If lend-lease financing stops without further credit arrangements, Soviet food requests will be kept to a minimum and, even if arrangements are made under section 3(c) of Lend-Lease Agreement, Soviet policy will be to limit their requests, as their policy will be to use credit facilities for capital equipment and they will not wish to build up a large external debt except for this purpose. It is impossible at this time to give any accurate figures on the above. I have discussed the question generally with Mikoyan and my statements are based on this conversation. He stated that the grain and vegetable oil import requirements after the 1945 crop would be substantially less. There would be substantial production of sugar in the Ukraine in 1945 but little in 1944. Increased production in Russia of meat and animal fats would naturally be slower. He stated he would be in better position to give me more information in July. He observed of course that so much depended upon the weather that no forecast could be accurately made for the 1945 and 1946 crops.

He explained that they were hopeful of obtaining substantial quantities of grain from the liberated areas in the Ukraine this year. As previously reported, preliminary information indicates that the Germans fostered agriculture in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper and the withdrawal was so fast that little damage was done to the crops although many sugar beet factories were destroyed. Further, according to public statements of Soviet officials, the country, not considering areas liberated last autumn and winter, is better prepared for 1944 farm work than last year and, given normal weather, should yield an increase over that of last year.

Harriman