Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

861.24/1741: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State

Moscow , March 2, 1944—4 p.m.
[Received March 3—12:15 p.m.]

699. For President’s Protocol Committee, copies for Hopkins, Stettinius and Crowley. Reference your 407, February 25, 7 p.m., I believe there has been a misunderstanding of my two cables addressed to Hopkins No. 131, January 6 sent through army channels,⁵² and No. 138, January 15, 1 p.m., through the State Department. In order to clear up any misunderstanding that may exist please let me restate my recommendations in which General Deane⁵³ concurs:

1. I did not contemplate that there should be a general screening in Moscow of all requests submitted by the Soviets nor that there should be in any case final decision on our part here as to what should be shipped to the USSR. We had contemplated that our activities should be limited to recommendations on those matters on which we were requested by Washington to express an opinion and to those items which in the light of our general knowledge of the situation here we had reason to believe should be questioned.

2. We had never contemplated that any activity on the part of ourselves here would interfere with the operation of the Soviet Purchasing Committee in Washington or the President’s Protocol Committee but only to supplement them. The activity I suggest is the kind of work that I did in London⁵⁴ and as a result not only were unnecessary shipments eliminated but information was obtained which substantiated British requests resulting in decisions in Washington to supply urgently needed requirements.

I fully realize that it will be impossible for us ever to get on the basis with Soviet officials that we were on with the British but certainly it is desirable to attempt to break down Russian traditional reluctance to give reasonable information. I believe we can show them that by frank and open dealings their own best interests can be served. Some progress along these lines has already been made and I ask for support from Washington in this direction.

3. It will be difficult for us to get information on Soviet requirements unless there is a belief that is established in the minds of Soviet officials that recommendations of myself, General Deane, General Spalding and Admiral Olsen⁵⁵ carry weight in Washington.

4. From your cable I understand that you are not in disagreement with what I have stated above. I therefore earnestly ask that you let the Soviet Purchasing Mission in Washington understand that you are depending upon us for our recommendations. I am satisfied that this will open the door to us to obtain desirable information which will save some over-ordering by the Soviets themselves and will generally increase our effectiveness in dealing with other matters of vital importance to the United States.

5. Although I agree that in the past limitations of ocean tonnage have forced the Soviets to give preference to badly needed high priority items and that this has limited the Soviet requests to their more urgent needs I do not feel that this will necessarily continue in the future. The increasing tonnage at their disposal is eating up the backlog of urgent war requirements and we are approaching the period when postwar reconstruction requirements will be merged in with their war needs. I am referring to requests not only for plants but for other supplies as well. Unless we now begin to get at the least some knowledge of the purposes for which they are using our shipments we lay ourselves wide open to just criticism at home. I do not wish to give the impression that I am opposed to shipments to Russia for reconstruction but it seems obvious that we should have reasonable knowledge in regard thereto.

6. We are not suggesting that supplies in general should be traded against the acceptance by the Soviets of requests we present here on instructions from Washington. It is a fact however that in connection with our requests it is the practice of the Soviets to say they will consider them on the basis of reciprocity. We may wish to recommend that in respect to some specific items Soviet requests be held up until the Soviets take action on U. S. requests of a related character in order to carry out the Soviet concept of reciprocity.

7. I would appreciate advice on whether I have made our recommendations clear and whether in principle you approve them.

Harriman

52. Not found in Department files.
53. Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.
54. Mr. Harriman had served as President Roosevelt’s Special Representative to facilitate material aid to the British Empire.
55. Rear Adm. Clarence E. Olsen, naval member of the U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.