740.0011 EW 1939/10–1644
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary: From the information we have received from Ambassador Harriman regarding the Churchill–Stalin conversations, although as far as we know no concrete agreements have yet been reached, the following comments can be made:
Atmosphere
The general atmosphere has been exceedingly cordial and Stalin has gone out of his way to be friendly and conciliatory in his attitude towards Churchill and the United States. Stalin’s cordiality and apparent greater frankness is in contrast to his previous attitude towards his Allies and undoubtedly reflects his recognition of the changed situation in the war resulting from the Anglo-American invasion of Europe. It is of interest that Stalin has made a special point of bringing [Page 1017] the United States into the picture and undoubtedly, as a result of the President’s cable,82 has emphasized a number of times the tripartite nature of the Allied association. He has gone out of his way in toasts and other remarks to draw attention to the vital part which the United States has played in the war and at one point specifically congratulated Mr. Harriman when the latter referred to the necessity of tripartite consideration of all questions.
Dumbarton Oaks
Although in their joint message to the President of October 10, both Stalin and Churchill gave assurances that they would not discuss the Dumbarton Oaks’ issues at this meeting and would defer them until a meeting with the President, Churchill will in all probability disclose to Stalin that he is tending more and more to favor the Soviet position on voting in the Council.
Poland
In Ambassador Harriman’s opinion, Stalin and Churchill will, if humanly possible, force a settlement between the Polish Government and the Lublin Committee, and if this is not possible, will be disposed to agree privately on a British-Soviet solution. The chief obstacle, in Mr. Harriman’s opinion, is the strong suspicion that exists between the two Polish groups. Despite the meetings which have been held between Churchill and Stalin separately and jointly with Mikolajczyk and the representatives of the Lublin Committee, the main issues remain the same; namely, (1) the Polish-Soviet frontier, and (2) the composition of a provisional Polish Government. Mikolajczyk apparently has no authority from his Government to accept the Curzon Line83 as the future Polish-Soviet frontier, but in this connection Churchill has made it plain to him that the British Government is committed to accept the Curzon Line with compensation for Poland in East Prussia, Silesia, and up to the line of the Oder. (During the discussion on the Curzon Line, Molotov made the statement that the President at Tehran had also favored the Curzon Line with compensation for Poland from German territories in the west. Mr. Harriman, rather than introduce the question of the President’s position at the meeting with the Poles, spoke privately to Churchill after the meeting who agreed that the President at Tehran had specifically taken no position for or against the territorial arrangements suggested in regard [Page 1018] to Poland and Mr. Harriman intends to correct privately Molotov’s misconception on this point.84)
No progress apparently was made at the various meetings in regard to the question of the composition of the Polish Government. It is too soon to attempt to forecast the chances of solution or the exact lines which a solution, if any, of the Polish question will take. Present indications are that a possible solution would be the acceptance by the Polish Government of the Curzon Line as the de facto Polish-Soviet frontier with the suggested territorial compensation in the West in return for a compromise solution of the Governmental question along the lines of the Polish proposals of August 30.85 (We have a copy of the Polish proposals of August 30 which provide for the organization of a Polish Government based on representation from the five chief Polish political parties including the Communist, but specifically recognizing the legal continuity of the Polish Government-in-exile. Reference was made in the discussions in Moscow to an oral statement which Mr. Grabski made to the Soviet Ambassador in London in presenting these proposals on August 30. This oral statement we have not received but will endeavor to obtain.)
Balkan Questions
Respective Soviet and British interests in the Balkans have formed a prominent part of the Moscow talks. On this subject the information received from Harriman is somewhat general in nature but would appear to forecast a spheres-of-influence arrangement in which Great Britain would assume “responsibility” in Greece and the Soviets in Rumania and to a lesser degree in Bulgaria. The chief point of discussion appears to be Yugoslavia with some fifty-fifty arrangement for that area in prospect. Both Churchill and Stalin profess a desire to see a Yugoslav federation but in the event such a federation should prove impractical, they are apparently prepared to agree to an independent Serbia which would be under Soviet influence and an arrangement for the Dalmatian Coast which would be under British influence. In discussing Balkan affairs Stalin made the interesting comment that he considered Pan-Slavism an unrealistic concept since it could only mean Russian domination of the other Slav countries whose one desire was to be independent and that before long he might have to make a public statement presumably expressing disapproval of the idea of Pan-Slavism. The real significance of Stalin’s remark is yet to be seen.
[Page 1019]Bulgarian Armistice Terms
Eden and Molotov agreed on a redraft of Article 18 of the Bulgarian armistice terms regarding the composition and character of the Control Commission. This redraft represents a departure from the previous British position which was similar to ours, and is accordingly not regarded as satisfactory to us.86 Harriman and Winant have been so informed.
Far East
It is not entirely clear the extent to which Churchill and Stalin intend to discuss Far Eastern strategy, but Mr. Harriman has made it quite clear that General Deane must participate in any military discussions involving the Far East.
European War
The discussion with regard to the European war has been according to our information only in general terms. Stalin expressed the opinion that it was a mistake to try and take the Siegfried Line by frontal assault; and that it would be better to turn Germany’s flank through Switzerland forcing the latter to agree to the transit of Allied troops. Churchill demurred on the grounds that Switzerland is neutral. Stalin said that the Red Army had been unable to take Warsaw by frontal assault and it had been necessary therefore to clear out the Baltic States before any further offensive on the central front could be undertaken.
- See telegram 626, 4 October 1944, and footnote 2, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 362.↩
- In regard to the origin of the Curzon Line and for a description of it, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. ix, pp. 272–273, 286, 434, 446–447; ibid., vol. xiii, pp. 793–794. Further details are in H. W. V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, (Oxford, 1924), vol. vi, pp. 233–283, 317–322, and summary descriptions in S. Konovalov, Russo–Polish Relations: an Historical Survey (London, 1945), pp. 33–38, 57–63.↩
- See vol. iii, p. 1323, footnote 94.↩
- See Polish Series telegram 88, August 30, from the Chargé near the Polish Government in Exile at London, ibid., p. 1315.↩
- See telegrams 8651, October 12, from London, and 8526, October 14, to London, vol. iii, pp. 450 and 455, respectively.↩