Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

500.CC/9–2044: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 20, 1944—8 p.m.
[Received September 20—5:40 p.m.]

3600. I must confess that a telegram is a difficult medium in which to attempt to answer the questions raised in your 2234, September 18, 10 p.m., and feel that I could only adequately do so if I were permitted to come to Washington. My cable 3572, September 19, 1 p.m.,¹² gives some background. I will now address myself to your specific questions.

1. I do not believe that Stalin and the Kremlin have determined to reverse their policy of cooperation decided upon by them at Moscow and Tehran. The difficult thing for us to understand is precisely their concept of the understanding that was reached at these conferences. Molotov has on a number of occasions indicated to me that he considered that after they had put us on notice of a Soviet policy or plan and we did not at that time object, we had acquiesced in and accepted the Soviet position. Point 1 of my cable of yesterday referred to above is a case in point. I believe the Soviets consider that we accept at Moscow their position that although they would keep us informed they had the right to settle their problems with their western neighbors unilaterally. Then too, words have a different connotation to the Soviets than they have to us. When they speak of insisting on “friendly governments” in their neighboring countries, they have in mind something quite different from what we would mean. With Czechoslovakia they have insisted upon a military alliance.¹³ Although they guaranteed Czechoslovakia noninterference in internal affairs, they insisted that Beneš¹⁴ should agree to give a prominent position in his national government to the Communist Party. As they appeared satisfied with the attitude of Beneš’ government, these were the only conditions imposed. In the case of Poland, however, where there is not the same political stability and where greater suspicion of Soviet good intents exists, they are insisting on a hand picked government which will insure Soviet domination.¹⁵ It is too early to judge how far this policy will be carried in other neighboring countries or how far they will insist in the future on subservience to the Moscow will. In terms that we would understand I believe that it is their intention to have a positive sphere of influence over their western neighbors in the Balkans. It is also too early to judge how far they expect to extend Soviet practices in these states on such questions as secret police (thereby eliminating personal freedom), control of the press, and controlled education. It can be argued that American interests need not be concerned over the affairs of this area. What frightens me however is that when a country begins to extend its influence by strong arm methods beyond its borders under the guise of security it is difficult to see how a line can be drawn. If the policy is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate her immediate neighbors for security, penetration of the next immediate neighbors becomes at a certain time equally logical. In my talks with Molotov about Poland he has given me the impression that he does not understand why we and particularly the British are unwilling to support their demand for a friendly government, and all arguments that I have used regarding our policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of a country appear not to have impressed him.

It seems to me that we have a basic issue with the Soviet Government on the definition of the term “friendly governments”. I am not optimistic that we can in the near future arrive at an understanding with the Soviet Government on this matter. At the present time I believe they certainly expect us to give them a free hand with their western neighbors. They are therefore most suspicious that this policy will be affected if they agree to refrain from voting on disputes in which the Soviet Government is involved.

Before discussing the problem as it relates to world organization it is my strong feeling that the only way we can eventually come to an understanding with the Soviet Union on the question of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries is for us to take a definite interest in the solution of the problems of each individual country as they arise. If we give them a free hand with any one country the precedent will be established, whereas if through our influence we can temper Soviet domination in each situation, I believe we have a chance to lead them to a behavior in international affairs that is compatible to our concepts. Specifically I have in mind not only the Polish situation but now also the former enemy satellites Rumania and Bulgaria. In the case of Rumania I strongly recommend that we appoint an experienced political representative on the Control Commission and insist that he shall have freedom of contact with the Rumanian Government and freedom to obtain information outside of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. Wherever we find that Soviet behavior offends our standards we should call it forcibly to the attention of the Soviet Government. I recognize that this will lead to unpleasant situations but for reasons which I will explain later I am satisfied that the Soviets will accede at least to a reasonable degree to our insistent demands. I have particularly in mind objection to the institution of secret police who may become involved in the persecution of persons of truly democratic convictions who may not be willing to conform to Soviet methods, and also to suppression, under the pretence of military requirements, of public information not only in Rumania but in the outside world. I refer to the interpretation which the Soviets will, I am afraid, place on their powers under articles I, V and XVI of the Rumanian Armistice Agreement.¹⁶ I believe it was not an incident of drafting but design which motivated the Soviet Government in insisting upon the words “in particular to the Soviet Union” in article XV. The same principles should be applied in my opinion to Bulgaria.¹⁷ I hope I have made it plain that I am not recommending interference in Rumanian affairs but quite the reverse, insisting that the Soviets do not unduly interfere in exercising their responsibilities as the occupying power.

The Polish question is of course far more complicated. I consider it so partly because of my lack of sympathy with the attitude of a number of the men in the Polish Government in London. I refer of course particularly to General Sosnkowski¹⁸ and Messrs. Kot¹⁹ and Kukiel.²⁰ I cannot help but agree with the insistent demands of the Soviet Government that these men play no part in Poland’s future. I feel their objection is equally well founded as is ours against Colonel Farrell²¹ in Argentina. But when it comes to forcing on the Poles with the support of the Red Army the handful of individuals making up the Polish Committee of Liberation²² I don’t see how we can afford to stand aside without registering the strongest of objections.

2. In attempting to answer the questions you raise in the last two sentences of the second paragraph of your cable I can first say with confidence that the meeting of the two Allies at Quebec without Soviet participation has not affected the Soviet attitude expressed at Dumbarton Oaks. It is however more difficult to put one’s finger on the causes for the change in Soviet attitude toward the United States and Great Britain. I am not certain that there is a change in fundamental policy or attitude. It might well be that the change in developments has brought to the surface the underlying attitude. A clearer understanding on their part however of our and the British attitude on different problems may well have had an influence on the Soviet attitude.

As to their attitude toward us as distinct from the British, it is my feeling, without being entirely clear, that when the Soviets saw victory in sight they began to put into practice policies they intend to follow in peace. In order to get our cooperation during the war they have to a small degree at least bent their policies to foster our cooperation. True it has been meager in comparison with what we considered we were entitled to but this policy did permit the approval of granting to U. S. the use of bases for shuttle-bombing and in other ways giving our people certain consideration and information. It would seem that their post-war policy will be to have the Soviet Government and its officials participate in world affairs, but to protect the Russian people from almost all contact with and influence of Western civilization and ideas. There is evidence that the NKVD²³ and the Party never liked the idea of our troops coming into Russian bases. Influence was perhaps brought to bear from these sources to close them down as soon as possible. On the other hand, although we have had less consideration of the many matters that we have taken up with the Soviet Government in which our interests are involved, we have frequently had the quickest of action on the part of the Soviet Government on matters in which they consider their interests are affected. I mention as an example the quick response which was obtained when I was instructed to inform the Soviet Government that Mr. Morgenthau²⁴ would announce the report of the experts on monetary matters without Soviet participation unless word was received the same day. Within 3 hours of leaving my meeting with the Commissar of Finance,²⁵ Molotov called me over to give me the Soviet aide-mémoire. Although this case is somewhat more dramatic than others it is not the only case. The Soviet Government, as we well know, is not handicapped by the need to be consistent and when it found that it was up against a stone wall of British opinion in regard to aid to the insurgents in Warsaw, backed up by our own representations, the Soviet Government gave in, with bad grace it is true, but the fact remains that it did give way. This incident is the most encouraging we have experienced and I will refer to it again later.

As to the British there is no doubt that the Soviet attitude is less friendly to and more suspicious of them than U. S. However I do not feel we should place too much importance on this. This is due no doubt not only to the historic clashes but also to the greater insistence of the British in their demands. For example, the British have been more aggressive in opposing the Soviet policy vis-à-vis Poland and you are familiar with the difficulties that the Prime Minister had with Molotov in April over Rumania. They are also suspicious of the British moves in Turkey, Greece, et cetera. The Soviets also do not feel that they have as much to look forward to in aid from Britain in reconstruction as they have from us and have been somewhat more careful not to offend us. I believe they have the feeling also that we are not going to oppose their policies in Europe to the same degree as the British. However as I have explained above our long term interests may compel us to take issue with Soviet policy in Europe as it unfolds. When it comes to the Far East, we may also find ourselves in conflict with the Soviet policy at various points.

3. On the constructive side I desire to make the following brief comments. In spite of what I have said in this cable and in my background cable of yesterday referred to, it is my conviction that Stalin and his principal advisers place the greatest importance and reliance on the newly won relationship with the British and ourselves and desire above all else to take a leading role in international affairs. We must realize that very few of them have ever been abroad and those who have for any extended period of time are suspect in the minds of the others. Thus they, the group as a whole, have little understanding of the real concept of Western civilization. They are fearful of the antagonism of the world against them. They are always conscious of the fact that they are a backward country materially and culturally. Now they take great pride in the strength of the Red Army. All of this makes them unduly sensitive and suspicious of our motives and actions. With it all they are realists and have developed a fairly clear idea of what they want. I believe the time has come to develop a more definitive policy toward them than has been possible up to now. In general we should be understanding of their sensitivity, meet them much more than half way, encourage them and support them wherever we can, and yet oppose them promptly with the greatest of firmness where we see them going wrong. In the latter there can be no compromise or indecision if we are to build a sound foundation for future relations with this strange country. When we oppose them we must be certain that we are right and be clear in advance how far we are ready to go. In minor matters, the registering of our objection may be sufficient but in these cases we must make it plain that we do not intend to take further action. When it comes to matters of greater importance, we should make it plain that their failure to conform to our concepts will affect our willingness to cooperate with them, for example, in material assistance for reconstruction. They should be made promptly to feel specific results from our displeasure. Lastly on matters that are vital to us and on which we can find no compromise (as I understand from what you say is the case in connection with the voting of the four powers) I believe we should make them understand patiently but firmly that we cannot accept their point of view and that we are prepared to take the consequences if they adhere to their position. In such cases, I am satisfied that in the last analysis Stalin will back down. We have seen him reverse his decision in connection with aid to the insurgents in Warsaw.

We should bear in mind always in connection with the Soviets that many of Stalin’s counselors see things to a degree at least as we do, whereas others are opposed. The Soviet Government is not one mind. Through our actions we should attempt to encourage his confidence in the advice of the former group and make him realize that the others get him into trouble when he follows their advice. There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the Russian people want friendship with us, and my contacts in Moscow lead me to feel that the principal men in the Government hold the same view.

If a general policy of the kind that I have outlined is adopted and consistently pursued by all branches of our Government, I have confidence that in time we can find common ground with these people.

Harriman

12. Vol. i, p. 826.
13. Treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar collaboration, with protocol, between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic, signed at Moscow on December 12, 1943; for text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxlv, p. 238, or Department of State, Documents and State Papers, vol. i, no. 4, p. 228. In regard to the negotiation of this treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 670–734, passim.
14. Eduard Beneš, President of the Czechoslovak National Committee in London, 1939–1945, recognized as President of Czechoslovakia by the Allied Powers after July 1940.
15. In regard to the interest of the United States in the Polish Government in Exile, and in its relations with the Soviet Union, see vol. iii, pp. 1216 ff; and on the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a Soviet-supported government in Poland, see ibid., pp. 1398 ff.
16. For negotiations leading to the signing of an armistice with Rumania at Moscow, September 12, 1944, see pp. 133 ff.
17. For negotiations leading to the signing of an armistice with Bulgaria at Moscow, October 28, 1944, see vol. iii, pp. 300 ff.
18. Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski, who had been relieved as successor-designate to the presidency of Poland in June 1944, and who was dismissed on September 30 as Commander in Chief of the Polish Army.
19. Stanislaw Kot, former Polish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1941–1942, and Minister of Information in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, 1943–1944.
20. Lt. Gen. Marjan Kukiel, Minister of National Defence in the Cabinets of Mikolajczyk and Tomasz Arciszewski, 1944–1945.
21. Gen. Edelmiro S. Farrell, Acting President, then President of Argentina from March 10, 1944, following the failure of a coup d’état. For correspondence on the non-recognition by the United States of the Farrell régime, see vol. vii , section under Argentina entitled “Withholding of recognition from the regime of Edelmiro Farrell by the United States.”
22. The Communist-sponsored and Soviet-supported Polish Committee of National Liberation was established by decree of the National People’s Council of Poland on July 21, 1944. It originally met in Kholm (Chelm), but early in August transferred to Lublin, after which it was frequently called the Lublin Committee.
23. The Soviet People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs.
24. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.
25. Arseny Grigoryevich Zveryev.