Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

711.60n/11–2044

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[Washington,] November 20, 1944.

Mr. Stettinius:

Subject: United States Policy Regarding the Baltic States.

Historic

In October 1939, after the division of Poland between the Soviet Union and Germany, the Soviet authorities concluded mutual assistance pacts with the three Baltic States which provided, among other things, for the stationing of Soviet garrisons at specified points in each one of these countries for the essential purpose of the mutual protection of both parties to the agreement. In June 1940 the Soviet Government presented ultimata to the three Baltic States alleging that the governments of these States had not lived up to the terms of the mutual assistance pacts and stating that additional Soviet troops would enter the respective countries in order to assure the immediate establishment of a government capable of and ready to assure the honest execution of the mutual assistance pact and to avoid provocatory acts against Soviet garrisons in these countries.

Within a few hours after issuing the ultimata Soviet troops crossed the frontiers of the Baltic States and arrangements were made shortly thereafter for new elections for the ostensible purpose of putting governments in power which would be “capable” of proper implementation of the mutual assistance pacts. These elections were run on the Soviet pattern of one list of candidates and were supervised by the Red Army. The electoral campaign emphasized the need of electing a government capable of implementing the pacts and protecting the sovereignty and independence of the three States. No mention was made about incorporation into the Soviet Union. On July 21, six days after the elections, the new governments petitioned the Supreme Soviet in Moscow for permission to join the Soviet Union as constituent republics.

On the basis of these developments and apparently on direct instructions from the White House, the Acting Secretary of State on July 23 issued the following statement:

[Here follows text of the statement of July 23, 1940, by Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles, printed in Foreign Relations, 1940, volume I, page 401.]

In compliance with the policy outlined in the Acting Secretary’s statement, it was also announced that the United States would continue to recognize the Ministers of the Baltic republics as Ministers of sovereign governments now under duress.⁸⁵

Since that time the United States Government has continued to recognize the Ministers of the Baltic States in Washington. At the time of the signing of the British-Soviet pact in May 1942 the Soviet Government made efforts to induce Great Britain to recognize in the pact the absorption of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. When the British Government approached the United States Government on this question they were informed that we did not feel that it would be possible for us to recognize such territorial changes during the war and therefore we could not go along with the British if they desired to comply with the Soviet request. While Great Britain did not accede to the Soviet request in regard to this matter, it did, in August 1942, drop the Ministers from their regular place on the London diplomatic list and placed them in a special category in the back as being personally accredited to the King without mentioning the names of the countries.

Baltic States Ships

In view of the decision to continue to recognize the Ministers of the Baltic States, we refused to accept the Soviet request in 1940 and 1941 to assist them in taking custody of the fifteen odd Baltic ships located in the Western Hemisphere.⁸⁶ Since that time many cases have come before United States courts regarding these ships. In regard to the Latvian and Lithuanian ships, the Soviet lawyers were able to get partial recognition of their interest in the ships through joint trustee arrangements. The Estonian Chargé, who is an admiralty lawyer himself, has been very successful in all the suits brought by the Soviet attorneys who have been unable to force him to agree to joint trustee arrangements. In any event, in view of the recognition still accorded to the Baltic Ministers by the United States Government, no courts have ever held that the ships should be turned over outright to the Soviet Government. At the present time all the ships have either been taken over by the Alien Property Custodian or are in the process of being requisitioned for use by that organization, except for one Estonian vessel which is in such poor condition that the War Shipping Administration does not wish to charter it and it is now being operated by the Estonian Chargé in the interest of the original Estonian owners.

Political Aspects of the Question

While, from a purely foreign relations point of view and our relations with the Soviet Union, it might be advisable to acknowledge the absorption of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R., there are many important factors which make it impossible for us to take such action. The following are the principal reasons why we must maintain our position:

1. The reasons given by the Acting Secretary of State in 1940 for not recognizing the absorption of the Baltic States were based upon the principle and our long-standing policy of not recognizing territorial changes brought about by force or the threat of force.

2. It is the officially announced policy of the United States Government not to recognize any territorial changes in Europe during the course of the war.

3. Certain sections of the American public have received the impression that the United States Government has adopted a policy of “appeasement” toward the Soviet Union and that we have abandoned the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter. Therefore, if we should at this time give any indication that we have accepted the absorption of the Baltic States by the U.S.S.R. there might be very grave repercussions which would seriously prejudice the possibility of the American public accepting the Dumbarton Oaks plan.

It is felt, therefore, that the advisability of reversing United States policy on this question is of such fundamental importance that it can be decided only by the President.

Elbridge Durbrow

85. On the continued recognition of the Baltic States by the United States, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. iii, pp. 377–578.
86. For correspondence concerning the status of Baltic ships in the Western Hemisphere, see ibid., vol. i, pp. 391–392, 443–444; ibid., vol. iii, pp. 403, 411, 438–440, 441; and ibid., 1941, vol. i, pp. 633–634, 664, 666, 680, 685, 701, 708, 732–733, 784–785.