811.34553B/10–344: Telegram
The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:20 p.m.]
3058. We feel now that with the presentation by Dr. Salazar of the two drafts contained in the Embtels 3044, October 2, 8 p.m., and 3045, October 2, 9 p.m.,24 we have at long last reached a goal which was to extract from him a strictly bilateral global proposition covering construction [Page 74] and use (control to be implicit in the latter) of an airfield at Santa Maria. This proposition is decidedly unbalanced but at least covers in general our requirements. At the same time Dr. Salazar has presented us with a draft of what he would like us to submit to him for simultaneous acceptance covering primarily Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor. This is to be regarded as a tentative approach designed to feel us out. To the latter document he has, however, introduced a number of extraneous elements which are wholly unacceptable thus making his trading proposition (for that is what this is) unworkable in its present form.
If time were not an essential element, we feel that with further prolonged discussion it might not be impossible to reduce the two documents to such form as to act as a basis for some agreement. We would, of course, be inclined to remove from the Timor document elements which do not properly belong there, not necessarily, however, excluding their discussion in other channels. The commercial matters might, for instance, be diverted to the continuing supply purchase talks.
Unfortunately, however, we are apparently faced with the need for proceeding without delay and this must be measured in days not weeks in the construction of the overall project at Santa Maria as otherwise the time schedules will be so upset as to make the completion of the airfield impossible in time for its fullest use and the project therefore subject to the danger that our War Department may suggest immediate abandonment with all that that involves.
Our best efforts have not budged Dr. Salazar from his firm position that authorization for construction beyond the limit of the Panair tender will not be granted until the Timor–Santa Maria bargain is completed. We are accordingly stiff [still] faced with a problem of finding a means to obtain this urgently needed authorization. Two approaches suggest themselves. The first might be called the negative approach and the second affirmative. The first would be something along the following lines: To inform Dr. Salazar that his Timor proposal is of such preposterous nature that the United States Government cannot possibly enter into any further discussions on the subject of Santa Maria unless he grants immediate authorization for construction of the global project in which case the Government will be in a position to reconsider; or the second which would be to inform him that while we are disappointed in the nature of his proposals, we feel that if he will authorize immediate construction, we can undertake to attempt to work out a reciprocal agreement with him as to the Timor question on the one hand and the use and control of the Santa Maria field on the other.
Of the two, the second is the more appealing if only on the grounds that its failure would not exclude falling back on the negative approach [Page 75] whereas immediate recourse to the first would necessarily eliminate the second.
These decisions which, involving questions of policy as they do, must be made in Washington and I am accordingly awaiting an indication from the Department before taking any further steps here. I shall, however, seek an opportunity immediately to make known to Salazar the profound disappointment with which our mission here views Dr. Salazar’s drafts.
We are preparing a further telegram analyzing the draft propositions as seen from here.
- Neither printed.↩