811.34553B/9–2844: Telegram
The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:35 p.m.]
3013. A careful review of the file on the Santa Maria project has led to certain clear and well-defined conclusions as follows:
It is apparent that as soon as the CCS decision was communicated to Dr. Salazar, a connection between Portugal’s desire to participate in the liberation of Timor which was to be the subject of the staff talks and the American desires in connection with the Santa Maria project was firmly established in his mind. (See Embassy’s 2236, July 19, 9 p.m.). As his thoughts developed along this line, it became evident that he visualized the staff talks as a means of clarifying his mind concerning relations in general with Japan and the liberation of Timor on the one hand and the Santa Maria project on the other constituted two important phases of the main question. It is our belief that these two phases are now inextricably woven together in his thinking and that he frankly is looking to us to meet his desires in the one if he is to grant our requests in the other.
As matters now stand and in view of the somewhat restricted directives of the American (and British) mission, it would therefore appear [Page 72] to us that our problem is to develop some formula arising out of the staff talks which will satisfy Salazar re Portuguese participation in liberation of Timor which could then be presented to the Prime Minister on the diplomatic level prior to the departure of the mission, always provided, of course, that he would simultaneously furnish us with the desired assurances re construction, use and control of the Santa Maria airfield.
In other words if we have correctly interpreted Dr. Salazar’s thinking as reflected both in my last conversation with Sampayo and in the exchanges of views occurring in the staff talks, we have reason to hope that whole difficult and trying question of Santa Maria may be favorably solved provided I can be placed in the position of being able to hand Salazar at the end of staff talks some sort of assurance that his desires re Portuguese participation in liberation of Timor will be met. I realize, of course, that formal assurances would necessarily have to receive approval of the CCS and that such approval could not be obtained in anything like the brief time left to us prior to conclusion of staff conversations. However, it may well be that Salazar would be satisfied with a written assurance from me that the American mission (as distinct from British) will recommend to Joint Chiefs of Staff the acceptance of the formula to be reached. This in effect would be tantamount, as I understand it, to eventual approval by the CCS unless the British, Portugal’s Allies, wished to assume the onus of standing in Dr. Salazar’s way in the Timor matter.
A review of the foregoing will reveal that the matter resolves itself largely into a question of timing. As the affair now stands it appears that the American desire is to receive from Dr. Salazar the required authorization re the Santa Maria project prior to approval of the matters resolved in the staff talks whereas Salazar wishes the two questions to be agreed to simultaneously.
If a successful effort can be made to bring this about, I am hopeful that the entire matter may be on the brink of a satisfactory solution. This may be regarded as in reply to Department’s 2611, September 27.20 As far as concerns implications in Colonel Solborg’s 445, September 24,21 the question brought up therein, of course, forms a part of the general problem which we are now engaged in attempting to solve.